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Markets or platforms assemble multiple selfishly-motivated and strategic agents. The out-
comes of such agent interactions depend heavily on the rules, regulations, and norms of the
platform, as well as the information available to agents. This thesis investigates the design
and analysis of mechanisms and information structures through the “computational lens” in
both static and dynamic settings. It both addresses the outcome of single platforms and fills
a gap in the study of the dynamics of multiple platform interactions.
In static market settings, we are particularly interested in the role of information, because
mechanisms are harder to change than the information available to participants. We ap-
proach information design through specific examples, i.e., matching markets and auction
markets. First, in matching markets, we study the situation where the matching is preceded
by a costly interviewing stage in which firms acquire information about the qualities of can-
didates. We focus on the impact of the signals of quality available prior to the interviewing
stage. We show that more “commonality” in the quality of information can be harmful,
yielding fewer matches. Second, in auction markets, we design an information environment
xii
for revenue enhancement in a sealed-bid second price auction. Much of the previous litera-
ture has focused on signal design in settings where bidders are symmetrically informed, or
on the design of optimal mechanisms under fixed information structures. Here, we provide
new theoretical insights for complex situations like corporate mergers, where the sender of
the signal has the opportunity to communicate in different ways to different receivers.
Next, in dynamic markets, we focus on two dimensions: (1) the effects of different market-
clearing rules on market outcomes and (2) the dynamics of multiple platform interactions.
Considering both dimensions, we investigate two important real-world dynamic markets:
kidney exchange and financial markets. Specifically, in kidney exchange, we analyze the
performance of different market-clearing algorithms and design a competing-market model
to quantify the social welfare loss caused by market competition and exchange fragmenta-
tion. Here, we present the first analysis of equilibrium behavior in these dynamic competing
matching market systems, from the viewpoints of both agents and markets. To improve
the performance of kidney exchange in terms of both social welfare and individual utility,
we analyze the benefit of convincing directed donation pairs to participate in paired kidney
exchange, measured in terms of long-term graft survival. We provide the first empirical
evidence that including compatible pairs dramatically benefits both social welfare and indi-
vidual outcomes.
For financial markets, in the debate over high frequency trading, the frequent call (Call)
mechanism has recently received considerable attention as a proposal for replacing the con-
tinuous double auction (CDA) mechanisms that currently run most financial markets. We
examine agents’ profit under CDA and frequent call auctions in a dynamic environment. We
design an agent-based model to study the competition between these two market policies
xiii
and show that CALL markets can drive trade away from CDAs. The results help to inform
this very important debate.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Markets or platforms assemble multiple selfishly-motivated, strategic agents. The outcomes
of such agents’ interactions depend heavily on how the market is designed, which involve
the rules of the platform as well as the information available to the agents. Poorly designed
platforms and information environments suffer from unexpected and undesirable results,
for example, agent manipulation (the scandal of badminton at the 2012 Summer Olympics
- Women’s doubles 1, where eight players were found guilty of “not using best efforts” by
playing to lose matches in order to manipulate the draw for the knockout stage), unnecessary
expense of human effort and equipment, social welfare loss (high-frequency trading arms
race [27]), and so on.
This thesis studies mechanisms and information structures of markets through the “compu-
tational lens.” We investigate problems for both static settings and dynamic settings. In
a static setting, agents and items arrive at the market and are matched at the same time,
then the market disappears (examples include matching medical residents to hospitals and
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Badminton_at_the_2012_Summer_Olympics_%E2%80%
93_Women%27s_doubles
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matching students to schools). In a dynamic setting, agents (or both agents and items) ar-
rive and depart over time in a persistent market (for example, kidney exchange or financial
exchange (NYSE, Nasdaq)). Further, we address the design and analysis of mechanisms and
information structures on the outcome of single platforms, as well as the dynamics of multi-
ple platform interaction. Using multiple approaches, including computational game theory,
multi-agent simulation, and empirical game analysis, this thesis provides insights for impor-
tant real-world domains like kidney exchange and financial markets, and also methodological
advances in modeling complex and dynamic agent interaction environments.
The rest of this chapter introduces the background of this thesis for each part and overviews
the structure and high-level contributions of the thesis.
1.1 Static Markets and Information Design
Traditionally, researchers and policymakers have studied platforms where agents interact for
economic or social purposes to inform mechanism and market design. One specific goal is
to provide a descriptive model of how the rules that the platform imposes on intermediate
interactions between the agents affect individual and social outcomes. However, one can
also then use these models to guide the design of these platforms to achieve certain social or
commercial goals. This is the focus of the field of market design, which can be thought of as
“microeconomic engineering” and has clearly become one of the key areas where economics,
computer science, and operations research intersect [82]. In most of the literature on mech-
anism design, the model assumes that agents’ information is given, and then searches for
rules of the game that yield desired outcomes. However, there has recently been considerable
interest in the parallel problem of designing the information environment that agents will
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encounter [35, 77]. This paradigm is clearly applicable in many scenarios of interest to AI
researchers, including online advertising and internet marketplaces. This line of research is
motivated by asymmetric information, where some relevant information is available to only
one side of the market. For example, the seminal job market signaling model of Michael
Spence [132] considers how the employers try to infer the quality of candidates from observ-
able characteristics. In systems with entrenched mechanisms that are unlikely to change,
manipulating information available to agents (employers in Spence’s model), and thus affect-
ing the outcomes of the mechanism becomes more valuable, especially when the valuations or
preferences of agents are unknown or noisy. In this thesis, we investigate the role and design
of information in both matching markets (Chapter 2 [40]) and auction markets (Chapter
3 [96]) in static settings.
1.1.1 Matching Markets and the Role of Information
Matching markets have a long history of study in economics, operations research, and other
areas, which focus on who gets what. In 1962, Gale and Shapley published their pioneering
paper on college admissions and marriage [59], and since then a large theoretical literature
has grown from this paper. Matching can be one-sided, i.e., allocating indivisible items
among agents, where the items do not have preferences but the agents do. Alternatively, it
can be two-sided, i.e., agents from two different sides, such as firms and workers, and they
cannot just choose, but also have to be chosen.
In standard matching mechanisms, ordinal preference/priority rankings are submitted by
the participants to represent their individual choice, and often this is sufficient to induce
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desirable or stable outcomes. While there has been much work on the theory and applica-
tions of matching, the literature has typically assumed that agents know their preferences
before the mechanism is run.2 Recently, there have been papers that try to relax this strin-
gent assumption [30, 38, 90]. This work can be divided into two main categories: one-shot
settings and repeated match settings. In one-shot settings, agents come into the matching
setting with unknown (or partially known) true preferences, but can learn more through a
costly information acquisition (interviewing) stage before the actual matching happens (for
example, academic job markets). In repeated matching settings, the “match” is not final,
but conveys information to participants on quality (for example, the matching between task
requesters and contractors in crowdsourcing platforms [75], or potential mates in a dating
market [38]). In this thesis, we focus on the former, one-shot settings.
We are motivated by labor markets. In most labor markets, employers interview potential
employees before offering them positions. The interview is an information acquisition stage,
where both employers and employees can learn more about their true preferences. Lee and
Schwartz [91] proposed what may be the first model of matching with an interviewing stage,
in which they ask about the employer’s decision of whom to interview, given that interviews
are costly and all employers and workers on either side of the market are ex-ante identical.
Another recent piece of work on interviewing is that of Rastegari et al., who look at the
problem of minimizing the number of interviews while guaranteeing stability and proposer-
optimality; they assume that agents have correct partial orderings and use interviewing to
refine and complete these partial orderings [121]. Our research is motivated by their models,
but the main issue we investigate is different. We consider the role of information ahead of
the interview process.
2There are many interesting variants where agents know their own preferences, but don’t know the
preferences of others [125], or where the mechanism does not wish to elicit complete preference information
[49], that we will not consider in detail here.
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Consider the matching process that academic departments go through when interviewing and
hiring faculty candidates. Typically, departments have a budget, say they can interview three
or four candidates for a position. They start off the process by receiving a noisy signal about
their preferences over candidates – CVs, letters of recommendation, and word-of-mouth can
yield much information about candidates, but not nearly as much as an in-person interview.
Once they have received these noisy signals, each department chooses which candidates to
interview to further form their true preferences. Following Lee and Schwartz, after all the
interviews have taken place, we can model the matching process as Gale-Shapley matching
with departments submitting ranked lists of the candidates they interviewed. While this
ignores some frictions (like exploding offers [41, 99]) that can be important, those are likely
to be a second-order effect compared with the choice of candidates to interview.
We study the effects of prior information signals that can be incorporated into firms’ inter-
viewing decisions and seek to illuminate how information influences the preference learning
and matching process. We are interested in both the overall efficiency of market outcomes
and distributional differences in expected outcomes. We show that more commonality in the
quality signals can be harmful, yielding fewer matches as some firms make the same mistakes
in choosing whom to interview. Relatively high and medium quality candidates are most
likely to suffer lower match probabilities. The effect can be mitigated when firms use “more
rational” interviewing strategies, or through the availability of private signals of candidate
quality to the firms.
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1.1.2 Auction Markets and Information Design
The other particular domain where manipulating information is interesting is in auctions
with signaling, which have been studied extensively in both economics and computer sci-
ence. Auction itself is one of the oldest ideas of selling and spans many different domains.
For example, Christie’s, founded in 1744 and Sotheby’s, founded in 1766, use them to sell
art. Governments use auctions to sell treasury bills, spectrum, or oil leases. Auction theory
was initiated in the seminal 1961 article by William Vickrey [141], which is the first game-
theoretic analysis of auctions, and then developed by researchers including Wilson, Clarke,
Groves, Milgrom, Weber, Myerson, Maskin, and Riley [15]. There are many different ways
of defining auctions, and they promote different kinds of behavior among bidders. Particu-
larly, this thesis analyzes the type called sealed-bid auctions (i.e., static settings) for single
items, where all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids to the auctioneer, ideally without
knowing their opponents’ bids. The auctioneer unseals the bids and determines a winner,
usually the highest bidder. The three most commonly studied sealed-bid formats are:
• First-price sealed-bid auctions. The terminology reflects the original format for such
auctions, where the highest bidder wins the object and pays the value of her bid.
• Second-price sealed-bid auctions, also called Vickrey auctions. The highest bidder wins
the object and pays the value of the second-highest bid.
• All pay auctions. The highest bidder will be awarded the item and every bidder pays
her bid.
The underlying assumption of auction models is that each bidder has an intrinsic value for the
item being auctioned and she is willing to purchase the item up to this value. The bidders
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can share a common value, which we refer it as common value auctions, but the bidders
may have different information about the item’s value; for example, the value of an oil-lease
depends on how much oil is under the ground, but bidders may have their own experts to
estimate the amount. In contrast, in private value auctions, each bidder’s private valuation
of the item is different and independent of peer’s valuations. A key feature of auctions is
the presence of asymmetric information, where one side, either the buyer or seller, may have
better information than the other. Because both sellers and bidders are trying to maximize
their utility, signaling begins to play an important role.
The theory of signaling begins with the groundbreaking work of Michael Spence [132] as we
mentioned in the beginning of this section, which considers how the employers try to infer
the quality of candidates from observable characteristics. Since then, auctions with signaling
have been studied in several different contexts. Much of the literature assumes that agents
are symmetric with respect to the information they receive about the value of the item,
in the sense that the bidders’ signals are drawn from the same distribution. For example,
the seminal “Linkage Principal” of Milgrom and Weber [107] states that fully and publicly
announcing all information available to the seller is the expected-revenue-maximizing policy
in common value auctions. Somewhat less is known about auctions with asymmetrically
informed bidders, and most of that literature has focused on understanding how information
asymmetries affect revenue rather than on the design of the optimal signal structure. There
has also been a line of work on so-called “deliberative auctions” [24, 88] in AI domain,
where agents have the opportunity to acquire information about valuations before entering
a bidding process. Most of this literature focuses on strategic choices by the bidders and
how this affects equilibrium outcomes of the auction.
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Recently, a popular strand of research has considered the power of signaling in the so-called
persuasion model. Kamenica and Gentzkow [77] consider the problem of designing the
optimal information environment for the case between one self-interested agent (“sender”)
and one decision-maker (“receiver”), where both of them are rational Bayesians. The sender
can design the information structure or signal structure to release information about the
state of the world to receiver before the receiver makes her choice.
In this thesis, we analyze the signal design of a sealed-bid second price auction as a persuasion
game. As usual, the winner is the bidder who submitted the highest bid (with ties broken
equiprobably in either direction), but pays to the seller the second highest bid. The bidders
and seller share the same common prior on the underlying state of the item. Before the
bidding stage, the seller can provide a (noisy) signal to each bidder based on the state
of the world. She commits to a signaling strategy in advance, which can be asymmetric
for each bidder, and the resultant structure becomes common knowledge. We explore the
following two auction games: (1) a basic common-value auction model, where the value of the
item is determined either by a single attribute or by two independent attributes when each
bidder can receive information from exactly one of the attributes; (2) an interdependent-
value auction, where the valuation for each bidder is decided by a common value attribute
and a private attribute. We show that in the common-value auction settings, there is no
benefit to the auctioneer in terms of expected revenue from sharing information with the
bidders, although there are effects on the distribution of revenues. In an interdependent-
value model with mixed private- and common-value components, however, we show that
asymmetric, information-revealing signals can increase revenue.
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Our model contributes to the growing literature on Bayesian persuasion with multiple re-
ceivers; this literature usually focuses on public signals [50, e.g.] or symmetric signal struc-
tures [39, e.g.]. Our model is applicable to complex situations where the sender of the signal
has the opportunity to communicate in different ways to different receivers. This can hap-
pen in situations like corporate mergers [19, 123], where targets (sellers or signal senders in
our case) have to communicate with potential acquirers (the signal receivers). It is known
that targets often inflate their output [64] or themselves may not be aware of their value
to an acquirer due to the complexity and intangible characteristics which cannot be easily
observed [81].
1.2 Dynamic Markets and Platform Competition
Instead of static settings as we discussed above, many real-world market problems are dy-
namic, with agents (or both agents and items) arriving and departing over time in a persistent
market. Dynamic markets in a single market have been explored in many domain-specific
applications. We can still consider the categories of one-sided markets and two-sided markets
as we did for the static settings. For example, famous public housing assignment problem,
which tries to assign scarce public housing to low income households [1,78,79,92]; cadaveric
organ allocation, which matches cadaveric organs to patients based on their medical charac-
teristics [20,133,150], and general barter markets like kidney exchange [48]. These examples
are in the area of one-sided markets, where only one side (the agents) has preferences over the
other (the items). There are also many applications in two-sided markets, and examples of
such markets are myriad: online dating (e.g., Match.com and OkCupid) [21]; rideshare, like
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Didi Chuxing and Uber [71]; and financial or commodity markets (e.g., NYSE and Nasdaq),
where we have buy orders and sell orders.
In dynamic markets, the planner needs to select a subset of acceptable transactions at any
point in time. Thus, the natural question is, what kind of algorithm to use for matching?
There is greate debate about this in this area across different domains [4,11,13,17,142,143].
In this part of our research, we investigate the role of matching algorithms or market-clearing
rules in helping inform the debate; Particularly, we focus on two extreme but representative
cases: greedy policy, which attempts to match each entering agent immediately; and patient
or batch policy, which allows agents to accumulate in the market.
Furthermore, many dynamic applications, like rideshare services, universities, and organ
exchanges, involve multiple clearing houses that compete to attract participants, and they
may share overlapping pools of agents. These platforms may be self-interested: their eventual
goal is to survive in the competitive environment and optimize their profit. The interactions
of markets or platforms are understudied by literature, especially in the area of general barter
exchange or in the context of matching markets. Accordingly, we focus on quantifying the
social welfare and on capturing individual equilibrium behaviors of both agents and markets
in the multi-market competition environment. Overall, this part of the thesis can be applied
to many important real-world domains, two important examples are (1) kidney exchange
and (2) financial markets.
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1.2.1 Kidney Exchange
According to the National Kidney Foundation3, in the last few years, more than 100,000
patients have been waiting for a kidney transplant in the US. In 2014, which is the latest
year we have data, about only 17,000 transplants were conducted, and close to one-third of
those were from living donors. One major issue with living-donor transplantation is that
willing donors must be medically compatible with the patient. Unfortunately, due to ABO
blood-type incompatibility and positive crossmatches, some pairs are incompatible. One
idea proposed decades ago is to have incompatible pairs enter a kidney exchange [120].
A kidney exchange allows patients who suffer from terminal kidney failure, and have been
lucky enough to find a willing but incompatible kidney donor, to swap donors. Apparently, a
kidney exchange is a dynamic matching market, where the patient-donor pairs (i.e., agents)
arrive gradually over time. They stay in the market until they find a compatible pair unless
the patients’ situation deteriorates so that kidney transplants are no longer feasible, in
which case the agent leaves the market. U¨nver [139] was the first to address dynamic kidney
exchange, with recent follow-up work by Ashlagi et al. [13] and Anderson et al. [6]. All three
papers look at matching policies that aim to maximize (discounted) social welfare (i.e., the
sum of expected utility). Particularly relevant to real-world kidney exchanges are batching
policies, where a market clearing occurs at a fixed interval; several theoretical and empirical
explorations of this class of policy have been performed [6,8,13,16]. Learning policies are also
designed based on different data distributions or use potential data distribution to inform
myopia algorithms [12,33,45,46,48].
3https://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/factsheets/Organ-Donation-and-
Transplantation-Stats
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Kidney Exchange and Market Fragmentation
While paired kidney donation of this kind has had success in the United States, a raft of
coordination problems and exchange fragmentation has prevented it from accounting for a
truly significant fraction of transplants. In practice, kidney exchange accounts or only 10%−
12% of living donations. The interaction of multiple competing kidney exchanges—a problem
that is especially relevant in the US now, and, as kidney exchanges move to international
swapping, will soon become relevant worldwide—is little reviewed in the literature, and we
seek to fill the gap. In this part of the thesis, we make two contributions:
We address market fragmentation and quantify the social welfare loss directly in these com-
peting markets (Chapter 4) [37]. In the United States, multiple fielded kidney exchanges
exist, and patient-donor pairs are entered simultaneously into one or more of these markets,
based on geographical location, travel preferences, home transplant center preferences, or
other logistical reasons. Individual kidney exchange clearinghouses have the incentive to
compete on the number of matches performed within their specific pools. We explore the
effect of competition between exchanges with different matching policies on global social
welfare in the context of the number of matched patients.
We formalize a two-market model where agents enter one market or both markets stochas-
tically; they can then be matched to other agents who have joined the same market or
both markets. The markets adhere to different matching policies, with one matching greed-
ily (Greedy market) and the other building market thickness through a policy of patience
(Patient market). From both theoretical support and experimental evidence, we show that
market fragmentation caused by the competition leads to worse global loss than a single
market.
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We then provide the first analysis of equilibrium behavior in this competing market (Chapter
5) [98]. Akbarpour et al. [4] show that platforms may maximize the number of transplants
achieved by being patient (Patient policy) instead of trying to match new pairs immediately
(Greedy policy). The intuition is that waiting helps the market become thicker. Thus,
Patient market is actually more socially preferable. However, any given individual almost
certainly seeks to maximize her own utility instead of considering the social welfare of the
market. Now we approach this market competition problem from a game-theoretic point of
view—under what circumstance and which type of agents have the incentive to participate
in Patient or Greedy market? Similarly, because markets seek to maximize their own utility
at a potential cost to overall social welfare, how should they adapt their matching rates?
We utilize the above two-market model, and first allow agents to strategically choose a
market, given the knowledge of their own criticality. Our model considers two types of
agents in terms of criticality, short-lived and long-lived. An agent receives zero utility if
she perishes. If she is matched, she receives a utility of 1, discounted at rate δ. Thus,
the market choice is actually a tradeoff between matching probability and utility. That is,
entering a Patient market gives an agent a higher matching probability but lower utility as
the patient’s situation deteriorates during waiting; in contrast, immediate matching from a
Greedy market provides a higher utility but may lower the probability of matching since the
market is not thick enough.
Second, we prescribe agency to the markets themselves, allowing them to choose overall
matching policies (defined by the frequency at which they decide to match) strategically to
maximize their overall utility. In this case, the agents are stochastic in their choice to join
one or the other market or to enter both markets. We quantify via best response dynamics
the social welfare loss of this competitive marketplace under a variety of initial conditions
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and compare that loss to the lower bound provided by a single market running an optimal
matching policy.
Our work is among the first to study strategic issues in market/platform competition in the
context of matching markets. Matching markets of the kind we study here are quite distinct
from markets for securities or for other kinds of products, because in our setting the value of a
matching is idiosyncratic (to the pair matched) and utility is nontransferable [28]. Therefore
the standard price mechanism is unavailable as one of the levers available to the platforms
or the agents to change outcomes, and the matching policy becomes of central importance.
These restrictions (no money changing hands and nontransferable utility) are necessary for
modeling domains like kidney exchange (where exchanging money is prohibited by law and
utility can be a function of waiting time as well as kidney quality, although in this part we
focus on a model for the former), or dating (where it would be considered problematic for a
dating app to pay users to go on dates with certain other members).
Our work applies techniques from computational game theory to studying platform compe-
tition in the context of dynamic matching markets. An established model of matching due
to Akbarpour et al. [4] has found that greedy matching (making matches as soon as they
are possible) can lead to worse social outcomes. If one defines social loss in terms of the
additive inverse of the waiting-time discounted number of matched pairs, then adopting a
Greedy strategy can result in exponentially worse loss than a Patient strategy for sufficiently
low discount rates. We extended that model to quantify the costs of market fragmentation
when greedy and patient markets compete. The central insight in both cases is that thinner
markets lead to fewer (or poorer quality) matches. In this thesis, we show that the thinness
problem actually gets worse when either agents are strategic about market entry or mar-
kets are strategic about choosing matching frequency/cadence. The existence of greedy and
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patient alternatives can lead to patients with privation information about their type into
separating equilibria that further fragment markets, leaving everyone worse off than if there
were a single monopolist market (even if that market were greedy rather than patient!).
The presence of another market that could be greedy can lead a market to choose a greedy
matching policy, even when it would have been better off choosing a patient policy if it were
a monopolist.
The above results are not merely theoretical concerns. In the United States, for example,
two of the largest kidney exchanges are the National Kidney Registry (NKR) and the United
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). NKR matches in an essentially greedy fashion. UNOS
started by matching once per month, then moved to twice per month, then weekly, and
now 2+ times per week, in part to reduce the “failure rate” caused by competition with the
fast-matching NKR. We see this behavior replicated in our model, and can quantify social
welfare loss as well. Combinations of analytic and simulation results of this nature have set
policy in kidney exchanges before (e.g., [47] and [48] have set parts of UNOS policy), and
our model could help inform this debate.
Utility Design and Incorporating Compatible Pairs in Kidney Exchange
To improve the performance of kidney exchange, instead of solving the market fragmentation
problem directly, one proposal for transplanting more recipients from incompatible pairs has
been to incorporate compatible pairs into exchanges. This idea was first proposed by Gentry
et al [61], but it has not been studied much. Part of the reason is that it is very tough to
come up a reason or a quantitive measure for the compatible pairs to participate in a kidney
exchange instead of just transplanting directly with their compatible donors. The recent
development of new metrics for the quality of a living donor transplant [104] presents an
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opportunity to reassess the possible benefits in the context of realistic models of compatible
pair behavior, while also evaluating benefits in terms of both additional transplants made
possible and improved outcomes from transplants. Further, it is reasonable to believe that
compatible pairs may be more willing to enter exchanges if (1) their waiting times are kept
low, and (2) they have a more precise idea of the potential benefit to doing so.
In this part of the thesis (Chapter 6), our main contributions are two-fold: (1) We first present
a framework for studying kidney exchange in a weighted or cardinal utility setting, which can
directly present how much benefit a compatible pair can receive in terms of long-time graft
survival; (2) Then we use this framework to estimate the benefit of including compatible
pairs in kidney exchange. Using data from Barnes Jewish Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri,
we develop a novel simulator that generates realistic distributions of graft survival (based
on the recent introduction of the Living Kidney Donor Profile Index [104]) and combine this
with a well-known compatibility simulator [127] in a manner that is faithful to data on real
arriving pairs. We use our simulator across different matching mechanisms to estimate both
the increased numbers of transplants of incompatible pairs (almost doubling the number
transplanted) and the improved match quality for recipients in compatible pairs (increasing
expected graft survival by between 1 and 2 years). Our results are robust across several
different exchange sizes in the static setting, in dynamic settings where compatible pairs
must be immediately matched, and across assumptions about incompatible to compatible
pair ratios. The results are also promising for hard-to-match subpopulations, including blood
group O recipients and highly sensitized patients.
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1.2.2 High-frequency Trading and Competition Between Finan-
cial Exchanges
Another interesting line of dynamic markets is financial markets. Most modern financial
exchanges operate using the continuous double auction (CDA) mechanism, a greedy fashion
mechanism, which in principle allows for trading in continuous time, at least to within our
measurement and implementation capabilities [58]. In this kind of market, agents submit
bids, or limit orders, which represent the maximum price at which they would like to buy, or
the minimum price at which they would like to sell. Outstanding orders are maintained in
two priority queues: one for bids (the buy orderbook) and one for asks (the sell orderbook).
Bids and asks are prioritized first by price and second by time. When a new order comes in,
it is added to the corresponding order book. A trade is executed immediately if the highest
bid exceeds or is equal to the lowest ask. The execution involves the orders at the top of the
bid and ask queues, at the price of the older of the two orders involved.
In the last two decades, The existence of this continuous time feature has led to the develop-
ment of the phenomenon called High-frequency trading. Essentially people are competing to
get to market a little bit quicker than someone else, because having small of time advantage
can make a big difference. With companies keeping investing in faster infrastructure for
trading, and events like the “flash crash” of May 2010, high frequency trading (HFT) has
become an increasingly debated topic in both the media and policy spheres [93]. Proponents
claim that high-frequency trading improves liquidity and price discovery. Improved liquidity
means lower transaction costs for average investors, while better price discovery serves the
social information aggregation and dissemination role of market prices [26, 106]. However,
there is increasing evidence that at least one form of high frequency trading, namely latency
arbitrage, has reached a point of socially diminishing returns. Budish et al demonstrate
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this both empirically and through a simple model: empirically, they show that correlations
between virtually identical assets being traded in different markets break down at very small
timescales, while they are essentially perfect at larger timescales [27]. Correlation breakdown
can almost be thought of as a law of physics – there is no natural force tying the assets or
markets together, so there is no way to make them actually move simultaneously. What is
problematic is the “arms race” this creates to extract the maximum profit from squeezing
this reaction time down as much as possible. Budish et al. show that this is not only socially
inefficient, it can actually create thinner markets. Along similar lines, Wah and Wellman
build a model where an asset is traded on two markets, and there is an infinitely fast la-
tency arbitrageur present. They show how the presence of the arbitrageur can hurt social
welfare [143]. Both sets of authors recommend frequent batch auctions as a market structure
that could replace CDAs, since the minimum time period between trades is specified, and
there is no benefit to being faster than that.
An important question for the possible use of frequent batch (or call) auctions is how they
would work in the presence of existing CDA markets. Competition between exchanges or
platforms that try to attract trade is a vast topic, and there is evidence in many domains
that platforms with better welfare properties assuming that there is only one platform is
considered at a time may not be able to capture enough of the market for these properties
to become evident when they face competition from other platforms. For example, as what
we showed in living-donor paired kidney exchange, even though exchanges that wait to build
thickness may be socially preferable, exchanges that match greedily can make them non-
viable. Therefore, even though they may have desirable welfare properties, could call auction
based markets actually take volume away from CDA markets if both existed simultaneously?
Wah et al have engaged this question using empirical game theoretic analysis [142]. They
develop a model where the environment is populated by fast (HFT) and slow (non-HFT)
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traders. They argue that a frequent call market in the wild could attract sufficient volume
for viability from two perspectives: first, in equilibrium, welfare of slow traders is generally
higher in the call market, where they are relatively protected from sniping and adverse
selection, and second, fast traders are willing to follow the slow traders to either market,
including to the call market, so it could serve as a basin of attraction. Wah et al.’s model
does not consider traders who have a preference for immediacy, and it also restrict traders
to choose a single market and then do not allow traders to move. While their results are
quite promising, we seek to build a richer model that combines aspects of classic financial
market microstructure models and agent-based models that are known to replicate important
properties of order books.
Another line of literature relates to the Trading Agent Competition Market Design Com-
petition (CAT) [111]. In this competition, participants aim to design better mechanisms to
maximize a score (a combination of profit, market share and transaction success rate) when
traders are drawn from a known population of different types. CAT gives a general view
of competition among different markets, but we focus on a comparison of two more specific
market mechanisms and how they influence the social welfare of traders.
In this part of the thesis (Chapter 7 [95]), we contribute to this nascent literature by de-
veloping an agent-based model of competition between a Call market and a CDA market.
Agent-based modeling seeks to fill the hole in simple stylized models which may not represent
agent behavior in sufficiently complex manners to really capture the essence of the important
phenomena. The last two decades have seen substantial work on agent-based modeling of
financial markets, using both sophisticated [32,52,57,114] and simple [56,80,89] trader mod-
els in the population. Our model is as parsimonious as possible while attempting to capture
the essential relevant behaviors that are important to understanding the behavior of these
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markets. As such, it follows the basic structure of classic models of market microstructure
such as those of Glosten and Milgrom [66] and of Kyle [85]. In these models, there are
informed traders, who possess superior information and trade in search of profit, liquidity
(or background) traders, who trade for exogenous reasons (e.g. retirement funds that receive
cash and need to track indices, or investors liquidating portfolios in retirement or in order
to buy a house, say) and demand immediacy, and market makers, who may be employed in
order to facilitate price discovery and trade execution.
We show that there is a strong tendency for the Call market to absorb a significant fraction
of trade under most equilibrium and approximate-equilibrium conditions. These equilib-
ria typically lead to significantly higher welfare for the background traders, an important
measure of social value, than the operation of an isolated CDA market.
1.3 Contributions and Structure of the Thesis
Part I of the thesis studies static markets and information design, which consists of Chapter
2 and Chapter 3.
Chapter 2 addresses the role of information in matching markets. We study two-sided
matching markets where the matching is preceded by a costly interviewing stage in which
firms acquire information about the qualities of candidates. Our focus is on the impact of the
signals of quality available prior to the interviewing stage. Equilibrium interviewing decisions
are hard to characterize in complex models with differentiated quality, so we use a mixture of
simulation, numerical, and empirical game theoretic analysis to analyze social outcomes. We
show that more commonality in the quality signals can be harmful, yielding fewer matches
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as some firms make the same mistakes in choosing whom to interview. Relatively high and
medium quality candidates are most likely to suffer lower match probabilities. The effect
can be mitigated when firms use “more rational” interviewing strategies, or through the
availability of private signals of candidate quality to the firms.
Chapter 3 investigates the information design in auction markets. We consider the problem
of designing the information environment for revenue maximization in a sealed-bid second
price auction with two bidders. Much of the prior literature has focused on signal design in
settings where bidders are symmetrically informed, or on the design of optimal mechanisms
under fixed information structures. We study common- and interdependent-value settings
where the mechanism is fixed (a second-price auction), but the auctioneer controls the signal
structure for sellers. We show that in a standard common-value auction setting, there is no
benefit to the auctioneer in terms of expected revenue from sharing information with the
bidders, although there are effects on the distribution of revenues. In an interdependent-
value model with mixed private- and common-value components, however, we show that
asymmetric, information revealing signals can increase revenue.
Part II of the thesis contributes to dynamic markets and platform interactions or competi-
tions, and consists of Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7. Chapter 4, Chapter
5 and Chapter 6 focus on kidney exchange, and 7 studies financial markets.
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 investigate dynamic matching market competition. While dy-
namic matching markets are usually modeled in isolation, assuming that every agent to be
matched enters that market, in many real-world settings there exist rival matching markets
with overlapping pools of agents. We extend the framework of dynamic matching due to
Akbarpour et al. [4] to characterize outcomes in cases where two such rival matching mar-
kets compete with each other. One market matches quickly, while the other builds market
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thickness by matching slowly. We give an analytic bound on the loss—the expected fraction
of unmatched vertices—of this two-market environment relative to one in which all agents
enter either one market or the other, and numerically quantify its exact loss, demonstrating
that rival markets increase overall loss compared to a single market that builds thickness.
We then look at two competing kidney exchanges, where patients with end-stage renal failure
swap willing but incompatible donors, and show that matching with rival barter exchanges
performs qualitatively the same as matching with rival matching markets—that is, rival
markets increase the global loss. We also provide the first analysis of equilibrium behavior
in dynamic competing matching market systems—first from the points of view of individual
participants when market policies are fixed, and then from the points of view of markets
when agents are stochastic.
To improve the performance of kidney exchange in terms of both social welfare and individual
utility, Chapter 6 analyzes the benefit of convincing directed donation pairs to participate in
paired kidney exchange. This possibility has been relatively understudied by literature. Pos-
sibly, incorporation of compatible pairs in exchanges has not taken off because the potential
benefits to recipients in compatible pairs have been pooly qualified. The recent introduction
of the Living Donor Kidney Profile Index (LKDPI), which can be transformed into an ex-
pected survival time for the graft, presents an opportunity to better estimate the potential
benefits, and to present compatible pairs with a compelling medical reason to participate in
an exchange rather than proceeding with a direct donation. Using data from Barnes Jewish
Hospital, we develop a novel simulator for LKDPIs that generates realistic distributions of
graft survival, and we combine this with a well-known compatibility simulator in a manner
that is faithful to data on real arriving pairs. We use our simulator across different matching
mechanisms to estimate both the increased numbers of transplants of incompatible pairs
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(almost doubling the number transplanted) as well as the improved match quality for recip-
ients in compatible pairs (increasing expected graft survival by between 1 and 2 years). Our
results are robust across several different exchange sizes in the static setting, dynamic set-
tings where compatible pairs must be immediately matched, and across assumptions about
incompatible to compatible pair ratios. The results are also promising for hard-to-match
subpopulations, including blood group O recipients and highly sensitized patients.
Chapter 7 studies dynamic markets from the view of financial markets. In the debate over
high-frequency trading, the frequent call (Call) mechanism has recently received considerable
attention as a proposal for replacing the continuous double auction (CDA) mechanisms that
currently run most financial markets. We examine agents’ profit under CDA and frequent
call auctions in a dynamic environment. Another natural question, which has begun to spur
the development of new models, is the effect of competition between platforms that use these
two different mechanisms when agents can strategize over platform choice. We contribute
to this nascent literature by developing an agent-based model of competition between a
Call market and a CDA market. Our model incorporates patient informed traders (both
high-frequency and not) who are willing to wait for order execution at their preferred price
and impatient background traders who demand immediate execution. We show that there
is a strong tendency for the Call market to absorb a significant fraction of trade under
most equilibrium and approximate-equilibrium conditions. These equilibria typically lead
to significantly higher welfare for the background traders, an important measure of social
value, than the operation of an isolated CDA market.
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Chapter 2
Matching Markets and the Role of
Information
In this chapter, we investigate the role of information in matching markets. Specifically, we
focus on labor markets with interviewing. In most labor markets, employers interview po-
tential employees before offering them positions. The interview is an information acquisition
stage, where both employers and employees can learn more about their true preferences. Lee
and Schwartz proposed what may be the first model of matching with an interviewing stage,
where employers first simultaneously choose a subset of workers to interview, and then, in
a second stage, submit preferences to a (Gale-Shapley) matching algorithm that then forms
the matching [90]. An interview is a precondition for a possible matching to be formed be-
tween an employer and a worker. The basic question that Lee and Schwartz ask is about the
employer’s decision of whom to interview, given that interviews are costly and all employers
and workers on either side of the market are ex ante identical. The main complexity is then
that the marginal benefit of interviewing a worker goes down as her number of other inter-
views goes up. The major result is that in symmetric equilibria (where each employer and
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worker has the same number of interviews), the number of agents matched goes up in the
overlap, a measure characterizing the number of common interview partners among agents.
In this chapter, we follow Lee and Schwartz’s model but consider a different issue. we are
interested in situations where firms and workers are of different qualities instead of ex ante
identical, and some quality signals are available prior to the interviewing stage. We study
the effects of prior information signals that can be incorporated into firms’ interviewing deci-
sions. We are interested in both the overall efficiency of market outcomes and distributional
differences in expected outcomes.
In order to elucidate these issues, we look at a stylized model where there is a universally
shared, common knowledge ranking of all firms, and there is a “true” universally shared
ranking of all candidates, but this true ranking is not known – instead, firms receive different
signals of candidates’ rankings or qualities. If the true ranking were known to everyone,
there would be only one stable matching, the assortative one, and any rational interviewing
process would lead to the stable outcome in the matching stage. When signals of quality or
ranking are noisy, firms must reason both about the true quality of candidates and about
strategic issues in deciding whom to interview. This can lead to inefficiencies, where some
candidates andfirms do not end up getting matched whereas they would have with better
information; these inefficiencies may fall disproportionately on some portion of the population
of candidates and firms.
We are particularly interested in the roles of common and private information on aggregate
and distributional outcomes in such matching markets. Common signals are shared across
firms – for example, the quality of a CV, number of publications, LinkedIn endorsements,
or public contributions to open source projects, can all be thought of as common signals
of varying precision. A private signal is, as the name suggests, private to a particular
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firm. Private signals can be generated through phone screens, preliminary interviews, etc.
We assume that common and private signals are conditionally independent given the true
ranking or value of the candidate. The central question of this chapter is the effect of
the relative precision of common signals and private signals on market outcomes. While
a perfect common signal would reduce the problem to one with known rankings of both
firms and candidates (and lead to the assortative matching and no inefficiencies under any
reasonable model), our main finding is that the presence of a strong, but imperfect, common
signal in addition to existing private signals can actually have significant negative effects,
with fewer matchings occurring than with a private signal alone. The burden of this is
typically borne by the candidates who are ranked relatively high (but not in the highest
echelon). The mechanism is interesting – when these candidates end up with a common
signal that is “too high”, they interview at firms that are ranked too high for their actual
quality. The firms that are closer to their true range choose not to interview them, but when
these candidates’ true qualities are revealed, they often don’t get offers from the places that
did interview them.
In this chapter, we start from introducing the formal matching model and the various models
of quality signals that we consider. All the interviewing strategies we develop are predicated
on the posterior belief of each firm after receiving the common signal and the private signal
of employee qualities, so in Section 2.2 we describe the inference procedures necessary to
compute these posterior beliefs. In Section 2.3, we analyze matching outcomes when all firms
use the heuristic interviewing strategy of interviewing applicants “around” their own rank.
Section 2.4 develops more sophisticated strategies in a sequential setting, and examines the
distributional and aggregate effects on matching outcomes when firms use these strategies.
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2.1 Model
There are n workers and n firms, represented by the sets W = {w1, ..., wn} and F =
{f1, ..., fn}. The matching market operates in two stages, following the model of Lee and
Schwarz [90]. In the first stage, each firm selects k workers (or candidates) to interview;
this decision is made on the basis of information present in the signals received by firms
(described below). During the interview process, the true ranking of the set of candidates
that is interviewed is revealed to each firm. The second stage can then be thought of as a
Gale-Shapley matching where each firm submits a ranked list of the candidates it interviewed
(others are unacceptable), and each candidate submits a ranked list of firms.
2.1.1 Signals and Preferences
All workers know their preference rankings over employers with certainty. We assume that
the workers all have exactly the same preferences over potential employers (for example, all
workers rank departments solely on the basis of the US News and World Report program
ranking).4 Further, there exists a universal “true” ranking of all the workers as well, but
this ranking is unobserved. Employers receive a private signal of their preferences as well as
a common signal. In this chapter we consider two possibilities:
1. Random-utility models: wi has a true value vi (which is drawn from a normal
distribution). fj’s private signal is a vector sj = (s1, s2, . . . sn). Each si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n is a
noisy realization of the true value of vi. We consider two noise distributions, Gaussian
and uniform. For Gaussian noise, si ∼ N (vi, σp), where N (vi, σp) denotes the Gaussian
4Because of this, who proposes in the second stage becomes irrelevant for the rest of this chapter, since
either side proposing would yield the same outcome.
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density function with mean vi and standard deviation σp. σp is constant for all i. For
uniform noise, si ∼ U(vi − bp, vi + bp), where U(vi − bp, vi + bp) denotes the uniform
distribution with support on [vi− bp, vi + bp]. bp is also constant for all i. The common
signal, received by all employers, is a single vector zC = (z1, z2, . . . zn). Similar to the
realizations for the private signal, the realizations for the common signal are also noisy,
with zi ∼ N (vi, σC) in the case of Gaussian noise and zi ∼ U(vi − bC , vi + bC) in the
case of uniform noise.
2. Mallows model: We can also directly consider signals over the ranking space, instead
of the value space. The Mallows model [103] is a distance-based model, which defines
the probability of a permutation according to its distance to a modal permutation
[101]. Following Lu and Boutilier’s description of its form, we say that each employer’s
private signal is a ranking Γj sampled from the distribution which assigns P (Γj|Γ, φp) =
1
Z
φp
d(Γj ,Γ), where Γ is the modal ranking (which in our case is the true ranking), φp ∈
(0, 1] is a dispersion parameter such that the smaller φp is, the more the distribution will
be concentrated around the modal ranking, d is a distance function between rankings
(in our case the classic Kendall tau distance which counts the pairwise disagreements
between the two rankings), and Z is a normalizing factor. The common signal, ΓC is
sampled from a Mallows model with the same modal ranking Γ and a possibly different
dispersion parameter φC .
In both cases, we assume common knowledge of all the relevant parameters of the distribu-
tions; the only unknowns are the true values or rankings. Note that in all cases, if the true
rankings were known, the only stable matching is assortative, with the best worker getting
matched to the top employer, the second-best to the second-best, and so on.
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2.2 Inference
In order to describe interviewing strategies and outcomes, we first need to specify appro-
priate inference techniques for firms to compute posteriors given the private and common
signals they receive. We denote posterior density functions on values of workers as fv(·). In
both the random utility and Mallows models, it is computationally difficult to perform full
Bayesian reasoning over the whole space of possible posterior rankings, so we assume that
firms compute the single most likely posterior ranking from the common and private signals
(defined explicitly below in either case), which we denote as Γ˜j, and use this single ranking
for interviewing decisions.
2.2.1 Inference in the random utility models
The main ideas for combining different signals in the random utility models follow from those
developed by MacQueen [102]. Given fj’s private signal sj = (s1, s2, . . . , sn), and common
signal zC = (z1, z2, . . . zn), the posterior on wi’s value vi is given by Bayes’ rule:
fv(vi|si, zi) = fv(si|vi)fv(zi|vi)fv(vi)∫ +∞
−∞ fv(si|vi)fv(zi|vi)fv(vi)dvi
.
When the noise is Gaussian, vi ∼ N (µ, σ), si ∼ N (vi, σp) and zi ∼ N (vi, σC). Thus, the
expected value of vi is
E(vi|si, zi) =
si
σp2
+ zi
σC2
+ µ
σ2
1
σp2
+ 1
σC2
+ 1
σ2
.
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When the noise is uniformly distributed, vi ∼ N (µ, σ), si ∼ U(vi − bp, vi + bp), and zi ∼
U(vi − bC , vi + bC). The expected value vi is
E(vi|si, zi) =
∫
D
vif(vi)∫
D
f(vi)dvi
dvi,
where D is the intersection of [si−bp, si+bp] and [zi−bC , zi+bC ]. In both cases, the posterior
ranking Γ˜j is found by sorting the E(vi|si, zi) in descending order.
2.2.2 Inference in the Mallows model
For inference in the Mallows model, we use an algorithm based on the one devised by Qin et
al [117] in the coset-permutation distance based stagewise (CPS) model (which is equivalent
to the Mallows model using the Kendall tau distance). Here we describe their model in
terms of our problem (our exposition below follows theirs, adapted to our domain). W
is the set to be ranked. A ranking pi is a bijection from W to itself; pi(i) denotes the
rank of wi and pi
−1(i) denotes the worker assigned to position i. The bracket alternative
notation is also used to represent a permutation, i.e., pi = 〈pi−1(1), . . . , pi−1(n)〉. Let Sn
denote the symmetric group of order n (a non-Abelian group under composition). The right
coset Sn−kpi = {rpi|r ∈ Sn−k} is a subset of permutations whose top-k objects are exactly
the same as in pi (here Sn−k denotes the subgroup of Sn consisting of all permutations
whose first k positions are fixed: Sn−k = {pi ∈ Sn|pi(i) = wi, ∀i = 1, ..., k}). The coset-
permutation distance is a measure of the average distance between the permutations in the
coset and the reference permutation. Given a permutation distance d (we use the Kendall
tau distance), the coset-permutation distance dˆ from a coset Sn−kpi to a target permutation
r is dˆ(Sn−kpi, r) = 1|Sn−kpi|
∑
τ∈Sn−kpi d(τ, r), where |Sn−kpi| is the number of permutations in
30
set Sn−kpi. The CPS model defines the probability of a permutation pi conditioned on a
dispersion parameter φ ∈ (0, 1] and a reference permutation r as,
P (pi|r, φ) =
n∏
k=1
φdˆ(Sn−kpi,r)∑n
j=k φ
dˆ(Sn−k(pi,k,j),r)
,
where Sn−k(pi, k, j) denotes the right coset including all the permutations that rank workers
pi−1(1), ..., pik−1(k − 1) and pi−1(j) in the top k positions respectively. When the coset-
permutation distance in the CPS model is induced by the Kendall tau distance, the CPS
model is mathematically equivalent to the Mallows model defined with the Kendall tau
distance.
We apply the sequential inference algorithm (shown as Algorithm 1) of [117] to get a single
posterior ranking Γ˜j. This algorithm approximates the single highest probability posterior
ranking conditioned on the input rankings. The algorithm decomposes the inference into n
steps. At the kth step, it selects worker wi who minimizes the coset-permutation distance,
∑
m
(− ln(φm))dˆ(Sn−1(〈Γ˜j−1(1), ..., Γ˜j−1(k − 1), wi〉),Πm),
and puts this worker at the kth position.
2.3 Market Outcomes With a Simple Interviewing Strat-
egy
We first examine outcomes in a market where firms all use the same simple and intuitive
interviewing strategy. They each compute their posterior ranking based on the available
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ALGORITHM 1: Sequential Inference for Posterior Ranking (from [117])
Input: : W , input rankings Π where Π1 is the private signal, Π2 is the common signal, and
parameters φ where φ1 is the private signal dispersion parameter and φ2 is the common
signal dispersion parameter.
Output: the final ranking Γ˜j .
Γ˜j
−1
(1) = arg minwi∈W
∑
m(− ln(φm))dˆ(Sn−1(〈wi〉),Πm);
Remove worker Γ˜j
−1
(1) from set W ;
repeat
Γ˜j
−1
(k) = arg minwi∈W
∑
m(− ln(φm))dˆ(Sn−1(〈Γ˜j
−1
(1), ..., Γ˜j
−1
(k − 1), wi〉),Πm);
Remove worker Γ˜j
−1
(k) from set W ;
until W = ∅;
signals, and then interview the k candidates who are ranked “around” the firms own rank-
ing. So, suppose k = 5, then the firm ranked number 11 will interview the candidates it
ranks in positions 9 through 13. Firms at the top and bottom of the firm rankings adjust
their interview set downwards and upwards respectively (so, the top three ranked firms all
interview candidates 1-5, and the bottom three all interview candidates 26-30, although the
particular candidates occupying these ranking positions can be different for each firm, since
they may be based on a posterior computed using private information).
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Figure 2.1: Simulation results with 30 employers, 30 workers and an interview budget of 5 for each
firm. The graphs show the average number of agents left unmatched (Y axis) versus a decreasing
function of the precision of the common signal (σC for Gaussian noise (left), bC for uniform noise
(middle), and φC for the Mallows model (right)), holding the precision of private signals fixed.
The dashed line shows the number that are left unmatched when there is no common signal.
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Figure 2.2: The probability that the candidate of a particular rank is matched when firms have
access to both a common signal and a private signal. Left: Gaussian noise (σC = 0.6, σp = 0.5),
Center: Uniform noise (bC = 0.6, bp = 0.5), Right: Mallows model (φC = 0.7, φp = 0.6).
In order to study market outcomes, we run 50000 simulations for each of the random utility
and Mallows models; each simulation is of a market with 30 firms and 30 workers, each
with interview budget 5. In each run, we hold the private signal parameters fixed, which
are σp, bp in the random utility models and φp in the Mallows model, and vary the common
signal parameters, which are σC , bC in the random utility models and φC in the Mallows
model.
2.3.1 Analysis
Based on the observation that the only stable matching if true preferences were known is
the assortative matching, and that adding a common signal gives everyone more information
about the true ranking, one would assume that adding the common signal always leads to
more agents being matched. At the extreme, this is obvious – suppose the common signal
had no noise and contained perfect information. Then the rational inference is just to use
that signal. In this case, the assortative match would occur for sure.
But it turns out that, as the signal becomes less precise, the number of unmatched agents
goes up sharply, and quickly exceeds the expected number of unmatched agents when no
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Figure 2.3: The average number of agents left unmatched when firms have access to only a single
common signal. The X axis in each graph is a decreasing function of the precision of the common
signal. Left: Gaussian noise, Center: Uniform noise, Right: Mallows model.
common signal is present! Surprisingly, on the candidates’ side, the candidates who are less
likely to get matched are actually the higher ranked ones (except for the very top ranked
ones) (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). The typical case for such a candidate being left unmatched is
when the candidate gets a common signal that is too high. Then the candidate interviews at
firms that are ranked too high for their actual quality. The firms that are closer to their true
range choose not to interview them, but when these candidates’ true qualities are revealed,
they often don’t get offers from the places that did interview them. The truth-revealing
nature of the interview phase means that it can be disadvantageous to “place too high” in
the first (interview selection) stage. These effects are even more extreme when there is only
a single, common signal available to the firms for all candidates (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4).
In order to gain a little more insight into this process, we look at a simpler example.
2.3.2 The Case of 4 Firms and 4 Workers
In order to investigate further, we look at a simpler case, with only four employers and four
workers, and a slightly different interviewing strategy – in this case, employers interview the
3 candidates ranked from their rank down (so Employer 2 would interview the candidates it
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Figure 2.4: The probability that the candidate of a particular rank is matched when firms have
access to only a single common signal. Left: Gaussian noise (σC = 0.6), Center: Uniform noise
(bC = 1), Right: Mallows model (φC = 0.6).
ranks from 2-4). We focus in this part on only the Mallows model. These changes do not
affect any of the results substantially, but allow us to obtain exact numerical results, rather
than simulation results, and the simpler model yields insight into the basic properties of the
larger markets above. With only 4 firms and 4 candidates, we can find the exact probability
that each candidate, ranked from 1-4, is left unmatched by breaking the probability up into
components. For example, for Candidate 2 to remain unmatched, it must be the case that
(1) Candidate 1 was interviewed by Employer 1, and, (2) Candidate 2 was not interviewed
by any of Employers 2-4. This is because, once a candidate is interviewed, their true ranking
is revealed, so if Candidate 2 interviewed with any of Employers 2, 3, or 4 (and Candidate
1 went to Employer 1), then Candidate 2 would be the highest ranked for any of those
Employers and would match with them. But for Candidate 2 to not be interviewed by
Employers 2-4, they must all have ranked her as the top candidate based on the private and
common signals they received.
These probabilities can all be efficiently exactly computed in the Mallows model. Figure
2.5 shows the probabilities that each of the candidates gets matched. Interestingly, the
probability of candidate 2 being matched is lower than the probabilities of candidates 3 and
4 being matched. The effect is stronger with just a common signal (left graph), and the
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Figure 2.5: Left: The probabilities that each of candidates 1-4 is matched with a single common
signal (dashed red line), and with both common and private signals (solid blue line). Right: The
probability that candidate 2 is left unmatched as a function of φC (the common signal becomes
less accurate as φC increases), holding φp fixed.
probability that candidate 2 remains unmatched decreases as the strength of the common
signal declines with respect to the strength of the private signal (right graph). This helps
us understand the mechanism at play. In a more coordinated environment, as created by
a common signal, the correlation between employers’ estimates of a workers desirability is
higher. Thus, it is more likely that several employers all make the mistake of thinking a
particular worker is too good or too bad for them.5 In fact, when there is only a common
signal, the probability of Candidate 2 being matched in the 4 agent model drops to less than
0.8 with φC = 0.5. When opinions are more independent, as is the case when the private
signal is stronger, it is less likely that someone will fall through the cracks in this manner.
Therefore, more homogeneity of opinion, with even a little bit of noise, can create worse
outcomes!
5For example, suppose a middle-ranked candidate gets early “buzz” on the job market, he may not get
interviews from departments actually ranked in his vicinity because they think he is out of reach, but may
not get offers once he is interviewed by higher ranked places and they realize he isn’t quite at their level.
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2.4 Alternative Interviewing Strategies
The results in the previous section apply to one simple strategy, albeit one, which, anecdo-
tally, is often used in practice. A natural question is whether the inefficiencies we document
are a result of irrational interviewing strategies, rather than an inherent feature of the types
of signals available to agents. Therefore, in this section we analyze more sophisticated inter-
viewing strategies, using the basic idea of empirical game theoretic analysis [76,147].
The fundamental strategic decision faced by a firm is to choose a set of k candidates to
interview. Game-theoretically, an (ex-ante) Bayes-Nash equilibrium would be one where each
firm would not change the set of candidates it chose to interview, given the strategies of other
firms, and the information available to them prior to the interview stage. Unfortunately,
this game is very complex to analyze – even the set of strategies available to one firm is
combinatorial (
(
n
k
)
). Therefore, we restrict our attention to a manageable set of strategies:
each firm can decide on any set of k contiguously ranked candidates (in its posterior private
ranking). So, say firm i has posterior ranking Γ˜i, then when it uses strategy Ti, uniquely
identified by some integer m, it interviews the candidates ranked from m to m + k − 1 in
Γ˜i. This includes the “interview around my own rank” strategy discussed in Section 4 as a
special case with m = i− (k− 1)/2, and also allows firms to shoot higher or lower than their
own ranking.
Which of these strategies is best? One simplification in analyzing which strategy is best
for firm i to follow arises from the observation that firm i’s best strategy depends only on
the choices of the firms ranked above i. Since firm rankings are all common and common
knowledge, firm i will always get its pick over any firm that is ranked lower. Since a Gale-
Shapley mechanism is used in the second stage, firm i will get the candidate that it likes
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the most among the candidates it interviews who do not effectively receive an offer from a
higher ranked firm.
The determination of firm strategies is iterative. Firm 1 should always interview the top k
candidates in Γ˜1. Given the strategies being used by all firms ranked above it, firm i can
run Monte Carlo simulations of outcomes for all strategies it can use, and pick the one that
yields the highest utility or highest rank on average.6 Importantly, note that the choice of
firm i’s strategy has no effect on the utilities being achieved by any of the strategies of the
firms ranked above it, because those firms would always be able to get any candidate they
interview before firm i could, by virtue of being higher ranked. Therefore, the choice of
strategies by all firms is (approximately, because of the simulation) an equilibrium given the
restricted range of strategies available to the firms.
2.4.1 Effects of common and private signals on strategies
First, we turn to understanding what kinds of interviewing behavior result as a choice of the
intelligent strategy selection method above. Figure 2.6 shows what happens when there is
only a common signal, and firms do not receive any private signals. The first row is for the
case where the common signal is perfect information (σC = 0). The top k firms all interview
the top k candidates, and every firm thereafter moves one candidate down. As σC increases,
an increasingly zig-zag behavior in choice of strategy becomes apparent. As there is more
uncertainty in the actual qualities of candidates, there can be more benefit to lower-ranked
firms in interviewing higher-ranked sets of candidates, because the probability that they will
not match with a higher-ranked firm increases. Of course, this tradeoff is governed by how
6Here, we focus on minimizing the average rank of the candidate the firm is matched to. The “average
rank” when the firm is left unmatched can be important, but our results are qualitatively similar across
many choices.
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Figure 2.6: Strategies when firms have only a single common signal. Noise in the common signal
is increasing as we move down the rows (σC = 0, 5, 10, 20 respectively). The left column shows the
average rank of the candidate each firm is matched to, the center column shows the average rank
of the firm each candidate is matched to, and the right column shows the strategy employed by
each firm.
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many interviews they already have, so once one firm jumps up (like firm 14 in the second row
of the figure), there is less benefit to the next firm of also jumping that high, thus yielding
the zig-zag behavior. Note that, despite this, the average ranks of candidates that firms are
matched to are monotonically increasing in firm rank (and vice versa), as we would expect
in equilibrium from the fact that firms all have to choose from the same set of strategies, so
a lower-ranked firm cannot do better than a higher ranked one in expectation and still have
an equilibrium.
The behavior with both common and private signals (Figure 2.7) is different. In some cases,
the zig-zag behavior of the strategy still manifests itself, but less so as σC increases. With a
high σC compared with σp, the difference in private signals is strong enough that interviewing
mostly based on the private signal is the best strategy, providing enough differentiation in
the sets being interviewed.
2.4.2 Effects of complex strategies on matching outcomes
Can “more rational” interviewing strategies resolve some of the inefficiency in terms of the
number of participants left unmatched? Figure 2.8 shows the average number left unmatched
as a function of the strength of the common signal. In addition to the “interview around my
own rank” strategy of Section 4, we include the empirically determined strategies Ti, with
three different values for the “penalty” rank assigned to a firm when it is unmatched: 31, 50,
and 100. With only common signals, when the penalty is high enough, the better strategies,
do, in fact, reduce the number left unmatched. However, with both common and private
signals, the more complex strategies actually lead to a greater number of agents being left
unmatched. This indicates that the greater complexity in strategy selection does not have
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Figure 2.7: Strategies when firms have access to both a common signal and a private signal.
Noise in the common signal is increasing as we move down the rows (σC = 0.01, 5.01, 10.01, 20.01
respectively). As in Figure 2.7, the left column shows the average rank of the candidate each firm
is matched to, the center column shows the average rank of the firm each candidate is matched to,
and the right column shows the strategy employed by each firm.
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much societal benefit when private signals are available, but could be beneficial when there
are only common signals available.
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Figure 2.8: Number of agents left unmatched when firms use more sophisticated interviewing
strategies with only a common signal (left) and common and private signals (right).
2.5 Discussion
In two-sided matching, firms want to hire the best candidate they can. Complications
arise because of the tradeoff between quality and “gettability”, and the fact that the game
takes place in two stages, interviewing and matching. Our model focuses on capturing
the essence of these phenomena. We are particularly interested in the role of information,
because mechanisms are harder to change than the information available to participants.
In addition to the “common signals” of applicant quality, many job markets allow firms to
gather higher quality private signals in advance of making very costly interviewing decisions
through phone screens or convention interviews. The main result of this chapter is that
inefficiencies that arise through the use of simple, but anecdotally common, interviewing
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strategies (like interviewing around your own rank), can be alleviated by either the use of
more sophisticated interviewing strategies or the use of additional private information. Given
the complexities of picking interviewing strategies and the sensitivity to others’ choices,
institutional encouragement to participants to acquire diverse private signals may be more
robust.
43
Chapter 3
Auction Markets and Information
Design
In an auction game, assume a fixed mechanism; can the seller expect to make more revenue
if the bidders are more or less informed than the “baseline”? In this chapter, we investigate
the revenue-enhancement information design problem in the classic second-price auctions. In
a second price, or Vickrey, auction, bidders are asked to submit sealed bids. The bidder who
submits the highest bid is awarded the object, and pays the amount of the second highest
bid. In particular, we explore the following two auction games: (1) a basic common-value
auction model, where the value of the item is determined either by a single attribute or by
two independent attributes when each bidder can receive information from exactly one of
the attributes; (2) an interdependent-value auction, where the valuation for each bidder is
decided by a common value attribute and a private attribute.
We show that in the common-value auction settings, there is no benefit to the auctioneer
in terms of expected revenue from sharing information with the bidders, although there are
effects on the distribution of revenues. In an interdependent-value model with mixed private-
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and common-value components, however, we show that asymmetric, information-revealing
signals can increase revenue.
Our model is applicable to complex situations where the sender of the signal has the oppor-
tunity to communicate in different ways to different receivers. This can happen in situations
like corporate mergers [19, 123], where targets (sellers or signal senders in our case) have to
communicate with potential acquirers (the signal receivers). It is known that targets often
inflate their output [64] or themselves may not be aware of their value to an acquirer due to
the complexity and intangible characteristics which cannot be easily observed [81].
We position this work in the persuasion literature [77, 122], where a sender strategically
reveals information through signals. Much of this literature focuses on the design of the op-
timal signaling scheme [63,113]. While this is tractable in some cases, for example with costly
signals and a single receiver [62], or when a single buyer is signaling to a single monopolist
seller [128], the problem of optimal signal design is not always even computationally, leave
alone analytically, tractable [50, 149]. Therefore, the demonstration of a revenue-enhancing
signal structure in the game with multiple receivers that we demonstrate here is significant,
even if the particular structure we find is not the optimal one.
3.1 Common Value Auctions
We begin by considering a single-item auction with two risk-neutral bidders (agents) i ∈
{1, 2} and a seller. Both bidders value the object identically: the item has a common value
of v ∈ R+ to the two bidders. The realization of v is not observed by either the seller or the
bidders. v depends on an underlying state of the world w ∈ Ω. Without loss of generality,
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we assume that the item’s value is 0 when w’s quality is Bad (B) and 1 when w’s quality is
Good (G), and the common prior is represented by P (G) = x, x ∈ [0, 1]. Before bidding, each
bidder receives a conditionally independent low (L), or high (H) signal from seller without
cost, si ∈ {H,L}.
P [s1 = H|G] = p1 P [s1 = L|B] = q1
P [s2 = H|G] = p2 P [s2 = L|B] = q2
where si is agent i’s signal and all signals have accuracy of pi, qi ∈ [1/2, 1]. Thus, a high
(low) signal suggests a good (bad) value of the item.
Following prior literature, we make some assumptions.
Assumption 1 Seller cannot distort or conceal information once the signal realization is
known. [77].
Assumption 2 Bidders play only weakly undominated strategies. [24]
The first assumption allows us to abstract from the incentive compatibility issues, while the
second helps rule out implausible or uninteresting equilibria.
In the game, the seller decides the signal structure S with the goal of maximizing her expected
revenue R and the bidders submit their bids based on their private signals si. The seller runs
a two-player second-price sealed-bid (SPSB) auction. Define bids−i(si) as the bid of bidder
i given she receives signal si and the other bidder receives signal s−i. The seller can either
reveal the realization of the signal privately to the corresponding bidder, or reveal it publicly.
Here we show the analysis of private revelation, as public revelation follows similarly.
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Proposition 1 If the seller reveals the realization of the signal privately to the corresponding
bidder, a unique symmetric equilibrium exists. Each agent bids her expected value conditioned
on her opponent’s signal being equal to her own,
bidL(L) = E[v|s1 = L, s2 = L]
= P (G|s1 = L, s2 = L)
=
(1− p1)(1− p2)x
(1− p1)(1− p2)x+ q1q2(1− x) ,
bidH(H) = E[v|s1 = H, s2 = H]
= P (G|s1 = H, s2 = H)
=
p1p2x
p1p2x+ (1− q1)(1− q2)(1− x) .
Proof The proof of this proposition is similar to prior work of Hausch [73] and of Brinkman,
Wellman, and Page [24]. Assumption 2 (that bidders play only weakly undomainated
strategies) restricts an agent with a Low signal to bid between E[v|si = L, s−i = L] and
E[v|si = L, s−i = H], and one with a High signal to bid between E[v|si = H, s−i = L] and
E[v|si = H, s−i = H]. To see that the proposed strategy in proposition 1 is the only sym-
metric equilibrium, we begin by assuming that there exists a symmetric strategy that, when
receiving signal L, the Bidder 1 bids x1 and the Bidder 2 bids x2, and when receiving signal
H, Bidder 1 bids y1 and Bidder 2 bids y2. Suppose x1 ≥ x2, then Bidder 1 will be strictly
better off by deviating to E[v|si = L, s−i = L] when receiving an L signal, since bidding x1
could result in negative utility (E[v|si = L, s−i = L] − x2) if Bidder 2 also receives an L
signal. Similarly, if y1 ≥ y2, Bidder 2 has incentive to switch to E[v|si = H, s−i = H] when
receiving an H signal to achieve higher expected utility. Thus, the equilibrium bids above
constitute the only symmetric equilibrium. 
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Equilibrium selection It is well known that the second-price common-value auction gen-
erally has many equilibria [3, 73, 84, and so on]. Assumption 2 helps us to rule out all
dominated bids. In this game, suppose that Bidder 1 obeys the strategy in Proposition 1.
Bidder 2, conditional on receiving signal L bids b ∈ (bidL(L),E[v|s1 = H, s2 = L]] and,
conditional on receiving signal H, bids bidH(H). These strategies are still Nash equilibria.
Thus, Nash equilibrium provides no prediction about revenue beyond an upper bound on the
full surplus. For this chapter’s purpose, therefore, we only focus on symmetric equilibrium
bidding strategies.
In a common value auction, the seller’s expected revenue R is the expected value E[v] of the
item, minus the sum of the two bidders’ utilities. When each bidder observes a private signal
only, we can treat each bidder independently and minimize the utility of each bidder.
Theorem 1 If each bidder observes her own private signal, the optimal signal structure for
the seller in terms of revenue is p1 = p2 = 1, q1, q2 ∈ [1/2, 1], or p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 = 1/2,
where maxR = E[v].
Proof For revenue maximization, we can treat the two-bidder second-price sealed-bid auc-
tion as a three-player, constant-sum game. The revenue
R = E[v]− E[u1]− E[u2]. (3.1)
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E[ui] is Bidder i’s expected utility and R is maximized when E[u1] = E[u2] = 0, where
E[u1] = p(s1 = H, s2 = L)(E[v|s1 = H, s2 = L]− bidL(L))
= p1(1− p2)x− p(s1 = H, s2 = L)bidL(L),
E[u2] = p(s1 = L, s2 = H)(E[v|s1 = L, s2 = H]− bidL(L))
= (1− p1)p2x− p(s1 = L, s2 = H)bidL(L),
which gives us
p1 = p2 = 1, q1, q2 ∈ [1
2
, 1],∀x ∈ [0, 1],
or
p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 =
1
2
,∀x ∈ [0, 1],
or
p1, p2, q1, q2 ∈ [1
2
, 1],when x = 1.
When p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 = 1, the seller always reveals complete information, thus the
expected revenue R is also E[v]. 
We can see that there is a wide range of signal structures that achieve the maximum revenue
in equilibrium, and none of these is better than a policy of revealing no information at all.
Another natural question to ask concerns the distribution of revenues to the seller under
different signal structures. It is relatively easy to compute the variance of the revenue
var(R) = (bidL(L)− bidH(H))2(1− P (HH))P (HH) (3.2)
Clearly var(R) is minimized at q1 = q2 = 0.5. Figure 3.1 shows some illustrative examples
of the standard deviation of revenue.
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Figure 3.1: Standard deviations of revenue for different revenue-maximizing signal structures in
the simple common-value model. While each of these signal structures achieves the same revenue,
the risk profiles are substantially different.
3.1.1 Adding an Intermediate Value
Brinkman et al. [24] study a common-value auction setting with intermediate values, which
serves as a model for studying signal acquisition by bidders. They motivate this setting
with an example of the auction of extraction rights for some resources (say oil and gas)
on a specified plot of land. The value to energy companies of these rights depends on the
unknown amounts of extractable resources. The question of optimal signaling is motivated
in this example by the fact that the government can reveal information about one or both
of the specific resources to each energy company. Now the item can take on three possible
values, {0, g, 1} with g ∈ [0, 1]. The underlying state w which decides the value of the item
now has two attributes, w = (w1, w2). Each attribute is associated with signals potentially
observed by the respective agents. Each bidder can request one signal with no cost. Here
we study a variant where the seller can decide which attribute to signal to each bidder and
what the corresponding signal structure should be.
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Each attribute is still either Good (G) or Bad (B), where P (wj = G) = x ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {1, 2}.
The realization of each signal is also High (H) or Low (L). The signal structure can be
represented as (sji ∈ {H,L}):
P [sj1 = H|wj = G] = p1 P [sj1 = L|wj = B] = q1
P [sj2 = H|wj = G] = p2 P [sj2 = L|wj = B] = q2
where j ∈ {1, 2} and sji is Bidder i’s signal from attribute j. All signals have accuracy of
pi, qi ∈ [1/2, 1].
The value of the good is 0 if neither attribute is G, 1 if both are G, and g ∈ [0, 1] if only one
is G.
v =

0, if
∑
j
I{wj = G} = 0
g, if
∑
j
I{wj = G} = 1
1, if
∑
j
I{wj = G} = 2
Figure 3.2 shows the decision flow in this game. The seller’s goal is to maximize her expected
revenue R. The signal structure and the seller’s choice of which attribute to signal to each
bidder are both common knowledge.
First, we observe that it must again be the case that the seller’s revenue is maximized when
revealing no information even in this intermediate value setting, since it can still be modeled
as a three-player, constant-sum game, and Equation (3.1) holds. What can we say about
signal structures that achieve this revenue? Again, we analyze private revelation.
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Seller
Choose the attribute
and decide the signal
structure for Bidder 1
Choose the attribute
and decide the signal
structure for Bidder 2
Bidder 1 Bidder 2
Observe signal
and opponent’s
signal structure
Observe signal
and opponent’s
signal structure
Bid Bid
Second-price sealed-bid auction
Figure 3.2: The intermediate-value model. Dashed lines mean that the bidder knows the structure
of the signal that the other bidder receives, but not the specific realization.
Theorem 2 In the intermediate value model, (1) if the seller sends signals of different
attributes to the two buyers, there is only one signal structure, ∀g, x ∈ [0, 1], p1 = p2 =
q1 = q2 = 1/2 (equivalent to sending no information) that achieves the maximum possible
revenue; (2) if the seller sends signals of the same attribute to both buyers, for ∀g, x ∈ [0, 1],
there are a number of signal structures that achieve the maximum possible revenue: p1 =
p2 = 1, q1, q2 ∈ [1/2, 1] or p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 = 1/2.
Proof The seller’s revenue still follows Equation (3.1). To maximize R, E[u1] = E[u2] = 0.
- Sending signals of the same attribute:
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The unique symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy is that each bidder bids her ex-
pected value conditioned on her opponent’s signal being equal to her own,
bidL(L) = E(v|sji = L, sj−i = L),
bidH(H) = E(v|sji = H, sj−i = H).
We denote P (sji = H, s
j
−i = L) by P (HL),
E[ui] = P (HL)(E(v|sji = H, sj−i = L)− bidL(L)).
Thus, to maximize R
E(v|sji = H, sj−i = L) = bidL(L). (3.3)
The solution of Equation (3.3) is
p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 =
1
2
, ∀g, x ∈ [0, 1],
or
p1 = p2 = 1, q1, q2 ∈ [1
2
, 1],∀g, x ∈ [0, 1],
or
p1, p2, q1, q2 ∈ [1
2
, 1],when x = 1,∀g ∈ [0, 1].
When p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 = 1, the seller reveals perfect information, thus the expected
revenue R is also E[v].
- Sending signals of different attributes:
As the signal accuracy between different attribute is identical, the equilibrium biding
strategy is same as above, that is to bid the expected valuation conditioned on the
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opponent observing the same signal value. Denote bid−s−i(si) as the bid of Bidder i
given she receives si and the other bidder observes the signal of the other attribute
and receives signal s−i ,
bid−L(L) = E(v|sji = L, s−j−i = L),
bid−H(H) = E(v|sji = H, s−j−i = H).
We simplify P (sji = H, s
−j
−i = L) by P (H,L),
E = [ui] = P (H,L)(E(v|sji = H, s−j−i = L)− bid−L(L)).
Thus, to maximize R,
E(v|sji = H, s−j−i = L) = bid−L(L). (3.4)
Solving Equation (3.4) we get,
p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 =
1
2
, ∀g, x ∈ [0, 1].

It is again easy to show that var(R) is minimized at q1 = q2 = 0.5.
Discussion Brinkman et al. [24] analyze this problem from the perspective of the bidders.
In their model, the signal structure is fixed and restricted to the symmetric information case
(p1 = p2 = q1 = q2). They show that when the two attributes are sufficiently complementary,
54
that is g → 0, and the signals are noisy, the agents choose to observe the same attribute.
When the signal accuracy is high, or the two signals are substitutable g → 1, the agents
choose to observe different attributes. Our result above demonstrates that, from the seller’s
perspective, sending no information can always maximize seller’s expected revenue. The
seller can also achieve the maximum possible revenue by sending information on the same
attribute to both bidders. The corresponding signal structure shows that the bidders always
know the item is bad if they see a low signal, but they have uncertainty when they see a
high signal.
3.2 An Interdependent Value Auction
We now move to a setting with an unambiguously positive result for the seller. We consider
a classic situation in corporate mergers. A firm (target) can generate synergies if acquired by
another firm (bidder) [19]. The source of this synergy may include management, economies
of scale, technological matches, tax savings, etc. A sketch of the game is shown in Figure
3.3. The target’s quality can be either good or bad, which is unknown to the market and
the bidders at the time of bidding. The bidders’ types can be high or low tech, privately
known to each bidder. The ability of a bidder to generate synergies can be either high or low,
which is unknown to the market and to the bidders, but may be discovered by the target
(since the target is willing to invest in discovering this prior to making it known that it is
open to acquisition). If the type of a bidder is high tech, as long as the ability of the bidder
to generate synergies is high, it can get high value (α > 1) no matter the target’s quality.
However, if the type of a bidder is low tech, only when both the ability of the bidder to
generate synergies is high and the quality of the target is good, can it get medium value (1).
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Target Firm
Good/Bad
quality (w0)
High/low
synergy (w1)
High/low
synergy (w2)
Bidder I
High/Low
tech (t1)
Bidder II
High/Low
tech (t2)
v1 v2
Figure 3.3: A sketch of the interdependent value setting.
3.2.1 Model
We first extend the common-value model of Brinkman et al to this situation. The item’s value
still depends on an underlying state w, which now has three attributes w = (w0, w1, w2). The
common attribute w0 can affect the valuation of both bidders (quality of the target firm),
and the private attributes w1 and w2 only affect each bidder’s own valuation respectively
(idiosyncratic synergies). Each attribute takes quality Good (G) or Bad (B) as above. For
simplicity, we assume P (wj = G) = x ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {0, 1, 2} (this assumption can be easily
removed and all results hold). The seller sends a signal of the quality of either common or
private attribute wj to each bidder. The realization of each signal is also High (H) or Low
(L). The signal structure is (sji ∈ {H,L})
P [sj1 = H|wj = G] = p1, P [sj1 = L|wj = B] = q1,
P [sj2 = H|wj = G] = p2, P [sj2 = L|wj = B] = q2.
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All signals have accuracy of pi, qi ∈ [1/2, 1]. Once the signal structure is decided, it becomes
common knowledge. The seller can choose to either reveal realizations publicly or privately.
The bidders can be of two types, ti ∈ {tl, th}. The bidders will be of either type with
probability P (ti = tl) = P (ti = th) =
1
2
. If the bidder is type th (high tech firm), then
her valuation is only dependent on her private attribute, that is wi = G with value α > 1
(pure strategy Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed if α = 1) and wi = B with value 0. If the
bidder is type tl (low tech firm), her valuation is dependent on both common and private
attributes: the bidder’s value is 0 if both the common and her private attribute are B, and
1 if both are G. Formally,
i ∈ {1, 2}
vi(w0, wi, ti = tl) =
 1, if w0 = G,wi = G,0, else,
vi(w0, wi, ti = th) =
 α, if wi = G,0, else,
where P (ti = tl) =
1
2
.
3.2.2 Analysis
Before the game, the seller needs to decide which attribute she wants to signal to each bidder
and whether the realization of the signal is public or private. The seller still provides one
signal to each bidder, but the realization of that signal can be public. The complete results
characterizing the best possible revenue impact and the corresponding signal structure based
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on seller’s strategy is shown in Figure 3.1. The main results to note are that there are two
signal structures that are revenue enhancing.
When we allow one bidder (w.lo.g. Bidder 2) to observe a signal of her private attribute
while the other bidder receives a private signal of the common attribute (case 9), there exists
a revenue-enhancing signal structure. In equilibrium, a bidder of type th always bids her
expected value given the signal realization of private attribute if she receives one. If Bidder
1 is type tl she bids her expected value given the signal realization she observes. If Bidder 2
is type tl, if she observes a low signal, her bid falls in the range [E[v|s01 = L, s22 = L],E[v|s01 =
H, s22 = L]] under Assumption 2 and also needs to be smaller than Bidder 1’s expected
value given Bidder 1 observes a low signal E[v|s01 = L]; if she observes a high signal, from
Assumption 2 her bid falls in the range [E[v|s01 = L, s22 = H],E[v|s01 = H, s22 = H]], and
also needs to be greater than bidder 1’s expected value given Bidder 1 observes a high signal
E[v|s01 = H].
Now, suppose the seller chooses signal structure p1 ∈ [0.5, 1], p2 = 1, q1 = 1, q2 = 0.5. If
Bidder 1 observes a high signal, she knows with certainty that the common attribute is
good, and is uncertain otherwise. Bidder 2 knows that her private attribute is bad if she
observes a low signal, and is uncertain otherwise. Combined with the observation about
bid ranges above, it now becomes a simple matter of algebra to show that the expected
revenue is greater than that which is achieved when the seller reveals no information or full
information, yielding the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Privately revealing the realization of the common attribute signal to one bidder
and privately revealing the realization of the private attribute signal to the other bidder, the
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seller’s expected revenue at p1 ∈ [0.5, 1], p2 = 1, q1 = 1, q2 = 0.5 is always better than that
she can achieve when revealing no information or full information.
Proof Without loss of generality, we assume Bidder 1 receives a private signal of the common
attribute while Bidder 2 observes a signal of her private attribute.
If Bidder 1 is type th, she bids bid
1
th
= αx since she only receives a signal of the common
value. If Bidder 1 is type tl, sice the private attribute of Bidder 2 does not influence the value
of Bidder 1, if she observes a low signal, she bids bid1tl(L) = E[v|s01 = L]; if she observes a
high signal, she bids bid1th(L) = E[v|s01 = H].
If Bidder 2 is type th, she bids her expected value given the signal realization of the private
attribute bid2th = E(v|s22). If Bidder 2 is type tl, if she observes a low signal, her equilibrium
bid falls in the range
bid2tl(L) ∈ [E[v|s01 = L, s22 = L],E[v|s01 = H, s22 = L]],
and bid2tl(L) ≤ E[v|s01 = L]
under Assumption 2; if she observes a high signal, from Assumption 2, her equilibrium bid
falls in the range
bid2tl(H) ∈ [E[v|s01 = L, s22 = H],E[v|s01 = H, s22 = H]],
and bid2tl(H) ≥ E[v|s01 = H].
Considering the lower bound of the revenue, we choose the minimum bid under all cases.
We separate the revenue into the following four parts,
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1. t1 = tl and t2 = tl, where we have P (t1 = tl, t2 = tl) =
1
4
:
R1 =P (s
0
1 = H)P (s
2
2 = H)E[v|s01 = H]
+ P (s01 = H)P (s
2
2 = L)E[v|s01 = L, s22 = L]
+ P (s01 = L)P (s
2
2 = H)E[v|s01 = L]
+ P (s01 = L)P (s
2
2 = L)E[v|s01 = L, s22 = L];
2. t1 = tl and t2 = th, where we have P (t1 = tl, t2 = th) =
1
4
:
R2 =P (s
0
1 = H)P (s
2
2 = H)
min(E[v|s01 = H],E(v|s22 = H))
+ P (s01 = H)P (s
2
2 = L)
min(E[v|s01 = H],E(v|s22 = L))
+ P (s01 = L)P (s
2
2 = H)
min(E[v|s01 = L],E(v|s22 = H))
+ P (s01 = L)P (s
2
2 = L)
min(E[v|s01 = L],E(v|s22 = L));
3. t1 = th and t2 = tl, where we have P (t1 = th, t2 = tl) =
1
4
:
R3 =P (s
2
2 = H) max(E[v|s01 = L, s22 = H],E[v|s01 = H])
+ P (s22 = L)E[v|s01 = L, s22 = L];
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Case c1 pr1 c2 pr2
Revenue
impact
Maximizing
structure
Remarks
1 no no no no − −
2 no yes no no ↓ no information unique eq
3 no yes no yes ↓ no information unique eq
4 publicly no no no − any unique eq
5 publicly no publicly no − any unique eq
6 publicly no no yes ↓ private signal
no information
unique eq
7 publicly no privately no ↓ lower bound maximized
at no information
multiple eqs
8 privately no no no ↓ lower bound maximized
at no information
multiple eqs
9 privately no no yes ↑ lower bound better
than no information
multiple eqs
10 privately no privately no ↑ p1 = 1, p2 = 1,
q1 = 1, q2 = 0.5
unique symmetric eq
Table 3.1: Best possible revenue impacts and corresponding signal structures in the interdependent
value setting. ci indicates signaling the common attribute to Bidder i and pri indicates signaling
the private attribute to Bidder i. For the common attribute, “publicly” means the realization of
the signal can be observed by all bidders and “privately” means the realization of the signal can
only be observed by the corresponding bidder. Since private values are independent, whether that
signal is revealed publicly or privately makes no difference. Note that the order of the two bidders
is arbitrary, but the existence of the asymmetry is not.
4. t1 = th and t2 = th, P (t1 = th, t2 = th) =
1
4
:
R4 =P (s
2
2 = H) min(αx,E(v|s22 = H))
+ P (s22 = L) min(αx,E(v|s22 = L)).
The expected revenue is R = 0.25(R1 + R2 + R3 + R4). By simple algebra, we find that
the proposed signal structure achieves better revenue than either no information or full
information. 
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An interesting observation about this signal structure is that, while the signal structure
conveys more information to Bidder 1, her utility is actually lower compared with when
there is no information. Bidder 2’s utility improves.
Finally, we see what happens if the seller signals the common attribute to each bidder
privately (case 10 in Figure 3.1). In this situation, the equilibrium bidding strategy for th
type bidder is to bid her expected value regardless of the signal she receives and for tl type
bidder is to bid her expected value conditioned on the other bidder observing same signal.
It is easy to show that the signal structure p1 = p2 = 1, q1 = 1, q2 = 0.5, results in higher
expected revenue than when the seller conveys no information or full information.
Theorem 4 When revealing the signal realization of the common attribute privately to each
bidder, the seller’s revenue is higher at signal structures p1 = p2 = 1, q1 = 1, q2 = 0.5, or
p1 = p2 = 1, q1 = 0.5, q2 = 1, than when revealing no information or full information.
Proof Since the private attribute of each bidder does not affect the value to the other bidder,
if ti = tl, the equilibrium strategy of bidder i is the same as in Proposition 1.
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bidiL(L) = E(v|s0i = L, s0−i = L)
= v(w0 = G,wi = G)
P (w0 = G|s0i = L, s0−i = L)P (wi = G)
+ v(w0 = G,wi = B)
P (w0 = G|s0i = L, s0−i = L)P (wi = B)
+ v(w0 = B,wi = G)
P (w0 = B|s0i = L, s0−i = L)P (wi = G)
+ v(w0 = B,wi = B)
P (w0 = B|s0i = L, s0−i = L)P (wi = B)
=
(1− p1)(1− p2)x2
(1− p1)(1− p2)x+ q1q2(1− x) ,
bidiH(H) =E(v|s0i = H, s0−i = H)
=
p1p2x
2
p1p2x+ (1− q1)(1− q2)(1− x) .
If ti = th, the bidder’s payoff is only related to the relative private attribute, so the equilib-
rium bidding strategy is always
bidith = αx.
We break the revenue up into the following four parts,
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1. t1 = tl and t2 = tl, where we have P (t1 = tl, t2 = tl) =
1
4
:
R1 = P (s
0
1 = H, s
0
2 = H)bid
i
H(H)
+ (1− P (s01 = H, s02 = H))bidiL(L);
2. t1 = tl and t2 = th, where we have P (t1 = tl, t2 = th) =
1
4
:
As α > 1, αx > bidH(H);
R2 = P (s
0
1 = H)bid
1
H(H) + P (s
0
1 = L)bid
1
L(L);
3. t1 = th and t2 = tl, where we have P (t1 = th, t2 = tl) =
1
4
:
R3 = P (s
0
2 = H)bid
1
H(H) + P (s
0
2 = L)bid
2
L(L);
4. t1 = th and t2 = th, P (t1 = th, t2 = th) =
1
4
:
R4 = αx.
Thus, the expected revenue is R = 1
4
(R1 +R2 +R3 +R4). By simple algebra, we can find that
the signal structure p1 = p2 = 1, q1 = 1, q2 = 0.5 yields higher revenue than no information
or full information, and the revenue increase is from R3. 
Consider signal structure p1 = p2 = 1, q1 = 1, q2 = 0.5 (the other one is symmetric). Bidder
1 always has perfect information. If Bidder 2 receives a low signal, she is certain w0 is bad;
however, she is uncertain when she gets a high signal. Surprisingly, although Bidder 1 has
perfect information, her expected utility is actually lower than that of Bidder 2. It is easy
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to see that if both bidders are tl types or th types, then the expected utility of each bidder is
zero. The interesting case is when one bidder is a th type, and the other one is a tl type. In
this situation, the bidder with imperfect information is more likely to receive a high signal
than the bidder with perfect information; therefore, in expectation, the perfect information
bidder will pay more (since it is a second price auction), hurting her utility.
3.3 Conclusion
The key point in the emerging signaling literature in information economics and computer
science is to study what can be achieved through information design, or persuasion, when
the mechanism is already fixed. We demonstrate the range of possible outcomes that can
be achieved through different signaling schemes in common value auction, and show that
the uninformative scheme has the lowest risk among those that extract full surplus. While
different signal structures may not help improve revenue in second-price sealed bid common
value auctions, there are natural auction models, like the interdependent value model for
corporate takeovers we present, in which the optimal design of signal structures can be
revenue enhancing.
3.4 Related Work
This part of chapter is related to several literatures. Broadly, this chapter fits into a growing
line of literature in AI on how the information environment available to agents influences
market outcomes as we address in this thesis. In Chapter 2, we model the effects of common
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and private signals about quality in matching with interviews. Hajaj and Sarne [70] exam-
ine how e-commerce platforms can gain from information withholding policies. Chhabra et
al. [31] study the welfare effects of competition between information providers with different
levels of information quality. Rabinovich et al [118] present an efficient model for security as-
set assignment which combines both Stackelberg security games and the Bayesian Persuasion
model.
The literature on auctions with signaling, as mentioned earlier, typically analyzes symmetric
information structures, where there are few positive results in terms of revenue enhance-
ments. In addition to the literature from economics cited above, recent work in algorithmic
economics that assumes symmetric information disclosure includes that of Emek et al [51]
as well as Bro Miltersen and Sheffet [25], both of which study second-price auctions of mul-
tiple indivisible goods and consider hiding information by clustering. Guo and Deligkas [68]
single-item second-price auctions where the item is characterized by a set of attributes and
the auctioneer decides whether to hide a subset of attributes.
When we move to asymmetric information, most early work considers the case in which one
bidder is perfectly informed about the value of the item, while the other bidders are entirely
uninformed [108,148]. Milgrom and Weber [108] show that reducing information asymmetries
can increase the seller’s expected revenue in a two-bidder first-price common value auction
where one bidder is perfectly information and the other bidder is entirely uninformed. Goeree
and Offerman [67] also consider public information disclosure in common value auctions, in
which the common value is an average of i.i.d. private values (signals) of all bidders. They
also conclude that seller’s public information disclosure can raises efficiency and seller’s
revenues. Hausch [73], however, through a simple example in a first price common value
auction, shows that reducing information asymmetry may decrease the seller’s expected
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revenue when the better-informed bidder is neither strictly better-informed nor perfectly
informed.
Syrgkanis et al [134] consider common value hybrid auctions where the payment is a weighted
average of the highest and second-highest bids. They show that public revelation of an
additional signal to both bidders may decrease the auctioneer’s revenue, different from [107].
Parreiras [116] consider continuous signal spaces and also show that second price auction
revenue-dominates first price auction. In both of these papers, the seller does not control
the information structure for both bidders.
There are also several recent papers considering this question from the optimal mechanism
design perspective [18, 42, 129], rather than assuming a fixed structure for the mechanism
and analyzing the question of optimal signaling given the mechanism. Very recent work
of Alkoby et al [5] analyzes signaling by a third party information provider under a fixed
mechanism.
Also related is the literature on deliberative auctions. Deliberation covers any actions that
update an agent’s belief. In the study of deliberative auctions, research has thus far focused
on either the perspective of bidders (receivers) or on optimal mechanism design. Larson
and Sandholm [86, 87] provide a very general model for costly information gathering in
auctions. They show that under costly deliberation, bidders perform strategic deliberation
in equilibrium in most standard auction settings (Vickrey, English, Dutch, first price and
VCG). Thompson and Leyton-Brown [135] investigate deliberation strategies for second price
auctions where agents have independent private values (IPV) and the impact of agents’
strategies on seller’s revenue. They perform equilibrium analysis for (1) deliberation with
costs, (2) free, but time-limited deliberation. They further show that, in the IPV deliberative-
agent setting, the only dominant-strategy mechanism is a sequential posted price auction, in
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which bidders are sequentially given a posted-price, take-it-or-leave-it offer until the good is
sold [136]. Celis et al [29] provide an efficient mechanism in IPV deliberative-agent setting to
obtain revenue within a small constant factor of the maximum possible revenue. Brinkman
et al [24] show that the dependence structures among agents’ signals of the value of the item
they are bidding on can produce qualitatively different equilibrium outcomes of the auction.
This literature also typically does not focus on the optimal design of the signal structure
from the perspective of the seller.
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Chapter 4
Competing Dynamic Matching
Markets
From this chapter, we explore dynamic markets. We focus on the dynamics of multiple
platform interactions. Specifically, we formalize a two-market model where agents enter
one market or both markets; they can then be matched to other agents who have joined
the same market or both markets. The markets adhere to different matching policies, with
one matching greedily and the other building market thickness through a policy of patience
(patient market). We provide an analytic lower bound on the loss, or the expected fraction of
vertices who enter and leave the pool without finding a match, of the two-market model and
show that it is higher than running a single “patient” market. We also provide a quantitative
method for determining the loss of the two-market model.
Our work draws motivation from kidney exchange, an instantiation of barter exchange where
patients paired with willing but medically incompatible donors swap those donors with other
patients. In the United States, multiple fielded kidney exchanges exist, and patient-donor
pairs are entered simultaneously into one or more of these markets, based on geographical
location, travel preferences, home transplant center preferences, or other logistical reasons.
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Individual kidney exchange clearinghouses have incentive to compete on number of matches
performed within their specific pools; yet, fragmenting the market across multiple exchanges
operating under different matching policies may lower global welfare. In this chapter, we
provide the first theoretical and experimental evidence on dynamic kidney exchange graphs
showing that this may indeed be the case.
4.1 Kidney Exchange Model
Here, we start from describing the basics of kidney exchange. A kidney exchange can be
represented as a directed compatibility graph G = (V,E). Each vertex in the graph is a
patient-donor pair in the pool. A directed edge e is constructed from vertex vi to vertex
vj if the patient vj is compatible with the donor kidney of vi. Edges exist or do not exist
due to medical characteristics (most importantly blood type, tissue antibodies and antigens)
of the patient and the donor. There may also be other logistical constraints, but those are
not relevant for our work here. In this pool, the donor of vertex vi is willing to give her
kidney if and only if the patient of vi receives a kidney. A weight we can be assigned to
an edge e. The weight typically has been used in the literature to represent the priority of
a transplantation (and therefore the utility to the system in some senses). We also use it
to represent the match quality when recipient vj receives vi’s donor kidney (this part will
be discussed in Chapter 6). In this graph, a sequence of transplants occurs when several
vertices form a cycle c. A k-cycle refers to a cycle with exactly k pairs. In this thesis, we
only consider 2-cycles and 3-cycles, as is typical in fielded kidney exchange (incorporating
cycles longer than 3 offers limited benefit given logistical constraints). Fielded exchanges
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also gain from chains, where an altruist donor without a paired patient enters the pool and
start a directed path of transplants. We do not include chains here.
A matching M is therefore a set of disjoint cycles in the compatibility graph G. The cycles
must be disjoint because no donor can give more than one of her kidneys (some recent work
explores multi-donor donation [54,55] but we do not consider this here). Given a pre-defined
utility function u : M → R and the set of all legal matchings M, we are trying to find a
matching which maximizes u,
M∗ ∈ arg ma
M∈M
u(M).
Kidney exchanges typically find the maximum weighted cycle cover, formally,
u(M) =
∑
c∈M
∑
e∈c
we.
In this thesis, we consider two objectives, the number of matches (effectively we = 1,∀e),
and expected total graft survival (where we is defined as the expected graft survival for the
recipient in edge e).
An integer programming (IP) solver is usually used to find the optimal solution [2,12,33,45].
We use the position-indexed chain-edge formulation (PICEF) [45] method to find the optimal
solution when doing two-&three-cycle swap if necessary.
4.2 Greedy and Patient Exchanges
So far we have described a static matching market, in which all patient-donor pairs are
presented, and the market only needs to make a one-time matching decision. However,
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in practice, patient-donor pairs dynamically join and leave the market. In this thesis, we
consider a stylized model of dynamic kidney exchange following the description of Akbarpour
et al. [4]. More specifically, an exchange is running in the continuous-time interval [0, T ], with
agents arriving according to a Poisson process with rate parameter m ≥ 1. The exchange
determines whether potential bilateral transactions between agents are either acceptable or
unacceptable. The probability of an acceptable transaction existing between any pair of
distinct agents is defined as d/m, 0 ≤ d ≤ m, and is independent of any other pair of agents
in the market. Each agent a remains in the market for a sojourn s(a) drawn independently
from an exponential distribution with rate parameter λ = 1; the agent becomes critical
immediately before her sojourn ends, and this criticality is known to the exchange. An
agent leaves either upon being matched successfully by the exchange or upon becoming
critical and remaining unmatched, at which point she perishes.
At any time t ≥ 0, the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random
graph Gt = (At, Et), where the agents in the exchange at time t form the vertex set At, and
the acceptable transactions between agents forms the edge set Et. We assume A0 = ∅. Let
Ant denote the set of agents who enter the exchange at time t, such that with probability 1,
|Ant | ≤ 1 for any t ≥ 0. Finally, let A = ∪t≤TAnt .
Akbarpour et al. [4] present a parameterized space of online matching policies, with a focus
specifically on two: Patient and Greedy. (In the next section, we will present a novel
model of two overlapping exchanges, one running the Patient policy and the other running
the Greedy policy.) As described above, vertex arrivals are treated as a continuous-time
stochastic process. These policies behave as follows.
Greedy. The Greedy matching algorithm attempts to match each entering agent immedi-
ately by selecting one of its neighbors (if a neighbor exists at the time of entry) uniformly at
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random. One obvious consequence of this is that the remaining graph of unmatched agents
at any instant is always empty. We refer to a market running this policy as the Greedy
market or simply Greedy for the rest of the thesis.
Patient. The Patient matching algorithm attempts to match each agent only at the instant
she becomes critical. As with Greedy, if a critical agent has multiple neighbors, only one is
selected uniformly at random. We refer to a market running the Patient policy as a Patient
market or simply Patient when appropriate.
If the random graph model is Erdo˝s-Re´nyi [53] when not considering arrivals, departures, and
matching, then the remaining graph at any instant is also Erdo˝s-Re´nyi with parameter d/m;
furthermore, d is the average degree of the agents. Both the Patient and Greedy policies
maintain this observation.
The main result of Akbarpour et al. [4] is that waiting to thicken the market can be sub-
stantially more important than increasing the speed of transactions. Formally, the Patient
exchange dramatically reduces the number of agents who perish (and thus leave the exchange
without finding a match) compared to the Greedy exchange.
In the Akbarpour et al. [4] paper, an agent a receives zero utility if she perishes, or u(a) = 0.
If she is matched, she receives a utility of 1 discounted at rate δ, or u(a) = e−δs(a). In this
work, we focus on the special case of δ = 0 in this paper (i.e., we only consider whether or
not an agent is matched), and leave the δ 6= 0 case for future research. Let ALG(T ) := {a ∈
A : a is matched by ALG by time T}. Then, in this model, the loss of an algorithm ALG is
defined as the ratio of the expected number of perished agents to the expected size of A, as
shown in Equation 4.1.
L(ALG) =
E[|A−ALG(T )−AT |]
E(|A|) =
E[|A−ALG(T )−AT |]
mT
(4.1)
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At any time t ∈ [0, T ], let Zg,t, Zp,t represent the size of the pools under the Greedy and
Patient matcing policies, respectively. Then, Akbarpour et al. [4] proved that the Markov
chain on Z·,t has a unique stationary distribution under either of those policies. Furthermore,
let pig, pip : N → R+ be the unique stationary distribution of the Markov chain on Zg,t, Zp,t,
respectively, and let ξg := EZg∼pig [Zg], ξp := EZp∼pip [Zp] be the expected size of the pool under
the stationary distribution under Greedy and Patient. Then, the following observations can
be made.
Loss of Greedy. If a Greedy exchange is run for a sufficiently long time, then L(Greedy) ≈
ξg
m
. The intuition here is that the Greedy pool is (almost) always an empty graph. Equa-
tion (4.2) formalizes the loss.
L(Greedy) =
1
mT
E
[∫ T
0
Zg,tdt
]
=
1
mT
∫ T
0
E [Zg,t] dt (4.2)
Loss of Patient. If a Patient exchange is run for a sufficiently long time, at any point
in time it is an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph. So once an agent becomes critical, she has no
acceptable transaction with probability (1 − d/m)Zp,t−1. Thus, L(Patient) ≈ ξp(1−d/m)ξp−1
m
.
Equation (4.3) formalizes the loss of a Patient market.
L(Patient) =
1
mT
E
[∫ T
0
Zp,t(1− d/m)Zp,t−1dt
]
=
1
mT
∫ T
0
E
[
Zp,t(1− d/m)Zp,t−1
]
dt
(4.3)
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4.3 Overlapping exchanges
The key result of Akbarpour et al. [4] is that a greedy dynamic matching market leads to
significantly lower global social welfare than a patient matching market with full knowledge
of criticality. The central question of this chapter is what happens in a situation where a
greedy exchange and a patient exchange exist simultaneously and compete with each other
to match some shared portion of the population. Agents in this overlapping subset of the
population join both exchanges simultaneously and accept the first match offer from either
of the constituent exchanges.
Drawing on Section 4.2, we model this in a similar stochastic, continuous-time framework as
follows. Agents arrive at the Competing market (a model for the whole system, incorporating
both the Greedy and Patient exchanges) at some rate m according to a Poisson process. For
each agent, the probability of entering both the Greedy exchange and the Patient exchange
is γ, the probability of entering the Greedy exchange alone is (1−γ)α, and the probability of
entering the Patient exchange alone is (1−γ)(1−α), where γ, α ∈ [0, 1]. The probability that
a bilateral transaction between each pair of agents is acceptable remains d/m, conditioned on
both agents being mutually “visible” to an exchange. The agents’ rates of perishing, received
utility for being (un)matched, and other settings are otherwise the same as in Section 4.2.
We analyze the Competing market as three separate evolving pools:
Greedyc is the pool consisting of agents who enter the Greedy exchange only (with proba-
bility α(1− γ)).
Patientc is the pool consisting of agents who enter the Patient exchange only (with proba-
bility (1− α)(1− γ)).
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Bothc is the pool consisting of agents who enter both exchanges (with probability γ).
We use Zˆg,t, Zˆp,t and Zˆb,t to denote the size of Greedyc, Patientc and Bothc, respectively, at
any time t. Similar to an exchange running a single Greedy or Patient matching policy, the
Markov chain on Zˆ·,t also has a unique stationary distribution. Let pˆi· : N → R+ be the
unique stationary distribution of the Markov chain on Zˆ·,t, and let ξˆ· := EZˆ·∼pˆi· [Zˆ·] be the
expected size of the pool under the stationary distribution. Using this, we will define the loss
of Greedyc, Lˆ(Greedyc), the loss of Patientc, Lˆ(Patientc), and the loss of Bothc, Lˆ(Bothc).
First, note that the graph formed by the agents in Greedyc is empty, so the loss—as in
Equation (4.2)—can be approximated by Lˆ(Greedyc) ≈ ξˆgm .
Next, we consider the agents in Bothc. If an edge exists between an agent in Bothc and an
existing agent in Greedyc or another agent in Bothc, she will be matched immediately by the
Greedy exchange (and thus does not contribute to the loss). Similar to the Greedyc case,
at any point in time t, the Bothc pool is an empty graph; thus, any unmatched agents who
become critical in Bothc will only be matched to agents in Patientc. Thus, these leftover
agents in Bothc have no acceptable transactions with probability (1 − d/m)Zˆp,t . Since each
agent becomes critical with rate 1, letting Competing market run for a sufficiently long time
results in Lˆ(Bothc) ≈ ξˆb(1−d/m)
ξˆp
m
, where ξˆb, ξˆp are the previously defined expected sizes of
Bothc and Patientc.
Finally, we consider the Patientc pool. At any time t, the agents who remain in Patientc
potentially have acceptable transactions with only the agents in Bothc and the agents in
Patientc. Hence, in Zˆp,t, once an agent is critical, she has no acceptable transactions with
probability (1 − d/m)Zˆp,t+Zˆb,t−1. Similarly, each agent becomes critical with rate 1; thus,
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if we allow the Competing market a sufficiently long execution window, Lˆ(Patientc) ≈
ξˆp(1−d/m)ξˆp+ξˆb−1
m
.
Because the three pools of agents—Greedyc, Patientc, and Bothc—are disjoint (although
they may be connected via possible transactions in the ways listed above), we can define the
total loss of the Competing market as follows.
L(Competing) ≈ ξˆg + ξˆp(1− d/m)
ξˆp+ξˆb−1 + ξˆb(1− d/m)ξˆp
m
. (4.4)
A more precise version of Equation (4.4) follow as Equation (4.5); we will make use of this
form in Section 4.5.
L(Competing) =
1
mT
E
[∫ T
0
Zˆp,t(1− d/m)Zˆp,t+Zˆb,t−1
+ Zˆb,t(1− d/m)Zˆp,t + Zˆg,tdt
]
=
1
mT
∫ T
0
E
[
Zˆp,t(1− d/m)Zˆp,t+Zˆb,t−1
+ Zˆb,t(1− d/m)Zˆp,t + Zˆg,t
]
dt
(4.5)
Unfortunately, we do not have a closed form expression for the stationary distribution or the
expected size of the pool under the stationary distribution. We note that each of ξˆg, ξˆp, and
ξˆb can be approximated well using Monte Carlo simulations—thus, Equation (4.4) can be
solved numerically. We do this in Section 4.5.1 for two parameterizations of the rival market
setting.
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4.4 A bound on total loss
While we do not have a closed form for the exact expected loss of the Competing market
as described by Equation (4.4), we can provide bounds on the overall loss. In this section,
we give one such bound for the global loss under the constraint that Greedyc is more likely
to receive agents than the overlapping Bothc exchange. Formally, this occurs when γ ≤ 0.5
and α ≥ γ
1−γ . We also impose some loose requirements on the arrival rate of vertices to
the exchange and the probability of an acceptable transaction existing between two agents;
intuitively, the exchange cannot be “too small” or “too sparse,” which we formalize below.
Under these assumptions, we use the bound to prove Theorem 5, which states that a single
Patient market outperforms the Competing market.
Theorem 5 Assume γ ≤ 0.5, m > 10d, and α(1− γ) ≥ max{γ, 1
2
e−d/2(1 + 3d)
}
. Then, as
m→∞ and T →∞, almost surely
L(Competing) > L(Patient).
Proof We prove the theorem by giving a lower bound on Lˆ(Greedyc), the loss of only the
greedy portion of the Competing market. In our model, the fraction of agents entering only
the Greedyc side of the market is α(1 − γ); for notational simplicity, we use x := α(1 − γ)
in this proof. Similarly, the fraction of agents entering Bothc is γ; again, for notational
simplicity, we use y := γ throughout this proof.
As before, let Zˆg,t be the size of Greedyc at any t ∈ [0, T ], and τˆ the expected size of the
Greedyc pool. Similarly, let Zˆb,t be the size of Bothc at any t ∈ [0, T ], and ηˆ the expected
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size of the Bothc pool. That is,
τˆ := E
t∼unif[0,T ]
[
Zˆg,t
]
and ηˆ := E
t∼unif[0,T ]
[
Zˆb,t
]
.
By assumption, α(1− γ) ≥ γ; that is, the arrival rate of Greedyc is greater than or equal to
the arrival rate of Bothc. In this case, τˆ ≥ ηˆ; the Greedy matching policy removes verties
from both Bothc and Greedyc, while the Patient matching policy removes vertices from
only Bothc, which means the matching rate for Bothc is greater than the matching rate for
Greedyc.
From Akbarpour et al. [4], we know the expected rate of perishing of the individual Greedy
exchange is equal to the pool size because the Greedy matching policy does not react to
the criticality of an agent at any time t in its pool and each critical agent will perish with
probability 1. Therefore, we can draw directly on Equation (4.2) to write
Lˆ(Greedyc) =
1
xmT
E[
∫ T
t=0
dt Zˆg,t] =
τˆ
xm
. (4.6)
We know x and m, so lower bounding τˆ will result in an analytic lower bound on Lˆ(Greedyc).
Following the ideas of Akbarpour et al. [4], we do this by lower bounding the probability
that an agent a does not ever have an acceptable transaction for the duration of her sojourn
s(a). Because these agents cannot be matched by any matching policy, this directly gives
a lower bound on Lˆ(Greedyc). Toward this end, fix an agent a ∈ A who enters Greedyc
at time t0 ∈ unif[0, T ] and draws a sojourn s(a) = t. Let fsa(t) be the probability density
function at t of s(a). Then we can write the probability that a will never have a neighbor
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(i.e., possible match) as
P [N(a) = ∅] =
∫ ∞
t=0
fsa(t)E
[
(1− d/m)Zˆg,t0+Zˆb,t0
]
E
[
(1− d/m)|AGnt0,t0+t+ABnt0,t0+t|
]
dt,
where AGnt0,t0+t (resp. AB
n
t0,t0+t
) denotes the set of agents who enter Greedyc (resp. Bothc)
in time interval [t0, t0 + t]. The first expectation captures the probability that agent a has
no matching at the moment of entry and the second expectation considers the probability
that no new agents that can match with a arrive during her sojourn.
Using Jensen’s inequality, we have
P [N(a) = ∅] ≥
∫ ∞
t=0
e−t(1− d/m)E[Zˆg,t0+Zˆb,t0 ]
(1− d/m)E[|AGnt0,t+t0+ABnt0,t+t0 |]dt
=
∫ ∞
t=0
e−t(1− d/m)τˆ+ηˆ(1− d/m)(x+y)mtdt.
From the assumptions in the theorem statement, d
m
< 1
10
, so 1− d/m ≥ e−d/m−d2/m2 . Also,
as described earlier, τˆ ≥ ηˆ (when γ ≤ 0.5 and α ≥ γ
1−γ , as assumed). Therefore,
Lˆ(Greedyc) ≥ P [N(a) = ∅]
≥ e−(τˆ+ηˆ)(d/m+d2/m2)
×
∫ ∞
t=0
e−t−(x+y)td−(x+y)td
2/mdt
≥ 1− (τˆ + ηˆ)(1 + d/m)d/m
1 + (x+ y)d+ (x+ y)d2/m
≥ 1− 2τˆ(1 + d/m)d/m
1 + (x+ y)d+ (x+ y)d2/m
,
(4.7)
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where the third inequality is obtained from the fact that e−z ≥ 1 − z when z ≥ 0, here
z = (τˆ + ηˆ)(d/m+ d2/m2).
Combining Equation (4.6) and Equation (4.7),
Lˆ(Greedyc) =
τˆ
xm
≥ 1− 2τˆ(1 + d/m)d/m
1 + (x+ y)d+ (x+ y)d2/m
,
which gives us a lower bound for τˆ ,
τˆ ≥ xm
1 + (3x+ y)d+ (3x+ y)d2/m
.
Thus, as m→∞, we get,
Lˆ(Greedyc) ≥
1
1 + (3x+ y)d+ (3x+ y)d2/m
≥ 1
1 + 3d
.
We are interested in bounding the total loss of the Competing market, which is L(Competing) =
xLˆ(Greedyc) + (1− α)(1− γ)Lˆ(Patientc) + yLˆ(Bothc). By definition, both Lˆ(Patientc) ≥ 0
and Lˆ(Bothc) ≥ 0, and by Equation (), Lˆ(Greedyc) ≥ 11+3d . Thus,
L(Competing) ≥ x
1 + 3d
.
Akbarpour et al. [4] showed that running an individual Patient market results in exponen-
tially small loss L(Patient) < 1
2
e−d/2. Thus, as T,m→∞, we can get,
L(Competing) > L(Patient). (4.8)
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We note that the result of Theorem 5 holds for only a section of the possible parameterizations
of a Competing market—specifically, when γ ≤ 0.5 and α ≥ γ
1−γ . In the next section, we will
give numerical results showing that this result—that the loss of the Competing market is
greater than the loss of an individual Patient exchange—appears to hold for a vastly larger
space of values of γ and α. Indeed, experimentally, we will see that the loss of the Competing
market is sometimes greater than the loss of an individual Greedy exchange, which itself is
substantially greater than the loss of an individual Patient exchange.
4.5 Experimental validation
In this section, we provide experimental validation of the theoretical results presented in
Sections 4.3 and 4.4. Section 4.5.1 quantifies the loss due to competing markets as described
by Equation (4.4), while Section 4.5.2 expands the model to kidney exchange and draws from
realistic data to quantify the loss of competing kidney exchange clearinghouses.
4.5.1 Dynamic matching
In Section 4.3, we gave a method for computing the expected loss due to competing markets
as Equation (4.4); however, we were unable to derive closed forms for the expected size of
the competing, patient, and greedy pools (ξˆb, ξˆp, and ξˆg, respectively) under the stationary
distribution. These quantities can be estimated using Monte Carlo simulation for different
entrance rates m. We do that now.
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Figures 4.1 and 4.2 simulate agents entering the Greedyc, Bothc, and Patientc markets ac-
cording to a Poisson process with rate parameter m = 1000 and remaining for a sojourn
drawn from an exponential distribution with rate parameter λ = 1. An agent chooses to
enter Bothc with probability γ, only Greedyc with probability α(1 − γ), and only Patientc
with probability (1 − α)(1 − γ), as in the theory above. We vary α ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 1} and
γ ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 1}, and plot the global loss realized for each of these parameter settings.
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Figure 4.1: Average loss (y-axis) as the overlap between markets γ increases (x-axis), with entrance
rate parameter m = 1000 and d = 20, for different values of α. The loss of individual Patient and
Greedy markets are shown as thick black and thick dashed bars, respectively.
Immediately obvious is that running a single Patient market results in dramatically less loss
than competing markets, for all different values of α and γ. Furthermore, we see that the loss
of a single Greedy market is also dramatically higher than the loss of a single Patient market,
as predicted by Akbarpour et al. [4]. Indeed, from Equation (4.3) we would expect the single
Patient market to have essentially zero loss, so these experiments show that adding in a rival
Greedyc market increases loss. In fact, as the left side of Figure 4.1 and the right side of
Figure 4.2 show, it is the case that if the markets do not overlap substantially (i.e., γ is low)
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Figure 4.2: Average loss (y-axis) as the probability α of entering Patientc or Greedyc changes (x-
axis), with entrance rate parameter m = 1000 and d = 20, for different values of the market overlap
γ. The loss of individual Patient and Greedy markets are shown as thick black and thick dashed
bars, respectively.
and agents are more likely to enter the greedy side of the market (i.e., α is near 1), then the
loss of the competing market is worse than running a single Greedy market! This is due in
part to the decrease in market thickness on the Patientc side of the market—a behavior we
will see exacerbated below and in the kidney exchange experiments of Section 4.5.2.
Figure 4.3 decreases the rate parameter of the entrance Poisson process to m = 100, while
holding the probability of an acceptable transaction between two agents at that of Figures 4.1
and 4.2 (so d = 2, leading to 2/100 = 2%). With fewer participants in the market overall,
all the qualitative results of the m = 1000 markets above are amplified. The individual
Greedy market’s loss is now 5.9% worse than the individual Patient market (as opposed to
3.3% in the m = 1000 case); both individual markets’ losses are substantially higher as well.
Similarly, the parameter settings for which the competing market scenario has higher loss
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than either individual market are much broader than the m = 1000 case, which is a product
of market thinness.
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Figure 4.3: Average loss as the probability α of entering Patientc or Greedyc (top) or the overlap
between the two markets γ (bottom) changes, with entrance rate parameter m = 100 and d = 2.
The loss of individual Patient and Greedy markets are shown as thick black and thick dashed bars,
respectively.
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4.5.2 Dynamic kidney exchange
In this section, we expand our matching model to one of barter exchange, where agents
endowed with items participate in directed, cyclic swaps of size greater than or equal to
two. One recently-fielded barter application is kidney exchange, where patients with kidney
failure swap their willing but incompatible organ donors with other patients. We focus on
that application here. Dynamic barter exchange generalizes the matching model presented
above, so we would not expect the earlier theoretical results to adhere exactly. Interestingly,
as we show in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.2, the qualitative ranking of matching policy loss (with a
patient market outperforming a greedy market, both of which outperform two rival markets)
remains.
This section’s experiments draw from two kidney exchange compatibility graph distributions.
One distribution, which we call Saidman, was designed to mimic the characteristics of a
nationwide exchange in the United States in steady state [127]. Yet, kidney exchange is still
a nascent concept in the US, so fielded exchange pools do not adhere to this model. With
this in mind, we also include results performed on a dynamic pool generator that mimics
the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) nationwide exchange, drawing data from
the first 193 match runs of that exchange. We label the distribution derived from this as
UNOS.
Formally, we represent a kidney exchange pool with n patient-donor pairs as a directed
compatibility graph G = (V,E), such that a directed edge exists from patient-donor pair
vi ∈ V to patient-donor pair vj ∈ V if the donor at vi can give a kidney to the patient
at vj. Edges exist or do not exist due to the medical characteristics (blood type, tissue
type, relation, and many others) of the patient and potential donor, as well as a variety of
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logistical constraints. Our generators take care of these details; for more information on how
edge existence checking is done in the Saidman and UNOS distributions, see Saidman et
al. [127] or Dickerson and Sandholm [48], respectively. Importantly, under either distribution,
there is no longer a costant probability “d/m” of an acceptable transaction existing between
any two agents.
Vertices arrive via a Poisson process with rate parameter m = 100 and depart according
to an exponential clock with rate parameter λ = 1 as before, and choose to enter either
exchange or both with the previously-defined probabilities γ and α. However, a “match”
now only occurs when a vertex forms either a 2-cycle or 3-cycle with one or two other
vertices, respectively.7 Section 4.5.2 performs experiments on 2-cycles alone, which adheres
more closely to the theoretical setting above (2-cycles can be viewed as a single undirected
edge between two vertices), while Section 4.5.2 expands this to both 2- and 3-cycles.
Kidney exchange with 2-cycles only
We now present results for dynamic matching under competing Patientc and Greedyc kidney
exchanges, both of which use only 2-cycles. Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show losses incurred
in our parameterized market when run on Saidman-generated and UNOS-generated pools,
respectively.
While the barter exchange environment under either the Saidman or UNOS distribu-
tions clearly breaks the structural properties of the stationary distribution of the underlying
7In fielded kidney exchange, cycles longer than some short cap L (e.g., L = 3 at the UNOS exchange and
many others) are typically infeasible to perform due to logistical constraints, and thus are not allowed. We
adhere to that constraint here. Fielded exchanges also realize gains from chains, where a donor without a
paired patient enters the pool and triggers a directed path of transplants through the compatibility pool.
We do not include chains in this work.
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Figure 4.4: Average loss under various values of γ and α for the Saidman distribution with 2-cycles
only.
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Figure 4.5: Average loss under various values of γ and α for the UNOS distribution with 2-cycles
only.
Markov process used in our theoretical results, the qualitative results of these experiments
align with the traditional dynamic matching results of Section 4.5.1. The overall loss real-
ized by UNOS is substantially higher than that realized by Saidman because, in general,
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UNOS-generated graphs are more sparse than those from the Saidman family. Similarly,
in either distribution there exist “highly-sensitized” vertex types that are extremely unlikely
to find a match with another randomly selected vertex, and thus almost certainly create
loss. Indeed, both Figure 4.4 and 4.5 exhibit higher loss than the similarly-parameterized
Figure 4.3 of Section 4.5.1.
Kidney exchange with both 2- and 3-cycles
We now extend our experiments to allow for “matches” that include both 2- and 3-cycles.
Unlike Section 4.5.1 or 4.5.2, where a matched edge was chosen uniformly at random from
the set of all acceptable transactions between a distinguished vertex and its neighbors, in
these results we may wish to distinguish a potential match from others (for example, by
choosing a 3-cycle before a 2-cycle, as the former results in a larger myopic decrease in
the market’s loss). Thus, given a set of possible 2- and 3-cycle matches, we consider two
matching policies: Uniform selects a cycle at random from the set of possible matches,
regardless of cycle cardinality, while Uniform3 selects a 3-cycle randomly (if one exists),
otherwise a random 2-cycle.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show results for the Saidman and UNOS distributions, respectively,
under the Uniform match selection policy. Intuitively, one might expect the loss of a
matching policy run in the 2- and 3-cycle case to be less than the same policy run in the
2-cycle case alone, as the set of possible matches weakly increases in the former case. We
see this behavior when comparing the Saidman results of Figure 4.6 to the earlier 2-cycle-
only Saidman results of Figure 4.4, witnessing a drop in global loss of around 4% for any
parameter setting. We see a similar decrease in loss when comparing the new UNOS results
of Figure 4.7 to those in the 2-cycle case shown in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.6: Average loss under various values of γ and α for the Saidman distribution with both
2- and 3-cycles, under the Uniform matching policy.
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Figure 4.7: Average loss under various values of γ and α for the UNOS distribution with both 2-
and 3-cycles, under the Uniform matching policy.
We now consider the Uniform3 matching policy, which would likely be closer to how a
fielded exchange would act. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show results for the Saidman and UNOS
families of compatibility graphs, respectively. The loss of the individual Patient market
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does not change in either distribution, which is likely a byproduct of the thicker markets
induced by its match cadence. Curiously, the loss of the individual Greedy market drops
dramatically—to around the Patient loss in the UNOS case, and below Patient in the Said-
man case. This large drop in Greedy loss is likely due in part to Greedy now “poaching”
larger 3-cycles from the leftover market from which the Patient policy draws. The other
qualitative results of earlier sections are repeated, with rival markets hurting global loss
relative to either individual market for nearly all settings of γ and α.
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Figure 4.8: Average loss under various values of γ and α for the Saidman distribution with both
2- and 3-cycles, under the Uniform3 matching policy.
4.6 Discussion
Our main goal is to study the impact of competition between exchanges in a dynamic match-
ing setting. In this chapter, we extended the recent dynamic matching model of Akbarpour
et al. [4] to two rival matching markets with overlapping pools. Specifically, we formalized a
two-market model where agents enter one market or both markets; they can then potentially
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Figure 4.9: Average loss under various values of γ and α for the UNOS distribution with both 2-
and 3-cycles, under the Uniform3 matching policy.
be matched to other agents who have joined the same market or both markets. The markets,
called Greedy and Patient, adhere to different matching policies. We provided an analytic
lower bound on the loss of the two-market model and showed that it is higher than running
a single Patient market. We also provided a quantitative method for determining the loss
of the two-market model. We supported these theoretical results with extensive simulation.
We also looked at competing kidney exchanges, and provided (to our knowledge) the first
experimental quantification of the loss in global welfare in a setting with two clearinghouses
using realistic kidney exchange data drawn from a generator due to Saidman et al. [127] and
another based on the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) program.
We see competing dynamic matching markets as fertile ground for future research, with a
trove of both theoretical and practical questions to answer. First, the model of Akbarpour et
al. [4] discounts the utility of a match by the time the matching agent has already waited in
the pool; this is well motivated in a variety of settings, including kidney exchange. Our results
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in this chapter assume a discount factor of zero, so it would be valuable to consider the impact
on discounted loss for non-zero cases. Second, in our model the choice of market to enter is
exogenously determined for each agent. In reality, agents with different levels of knowledge,
wealth, etc. may make strategic decisions on which markets to enter. Thus, one could
approach this dynamic matching problem from a game-theoretic point of view. Similarly,
taking network effects (where more popular exchanges have an easier time attracting agents,
lower operating costs, higher probabilities of two agents forming an acceptable transaction,
and other advantages) into account would make these models more applicable to many real-
world settings. Finally, we only looked at two overlapping markets; generalizing this to any
number of overlapping markets would also be of interest.
In terms of barter exchange and, specifically, kidney exchange, the question of how clearing-
houses interact is a timely one. In the United States and, eventually, elsewhere, multi-center
and single-center exchange clearinghouses are already competing, each drawing from some
(often overlapping) subset of the full set of patient-donor pairs available. Indeed, the dy-
namic barter exchange problem in a single market is still not fully understood (barring very
promising recent work due to Anderson et al. [6]). We saw in Section 4.5.2 that including
3-cycles in the matching process results in lower loss, even when two markets overlap, com-
pared to including only 2-cycles (a result that has been shown repeatedly in the static [124]
and dynamic [6] single clearinghouse setting), so extending the theoretical underpinnings
of our framework to a more general setting would be of great value. Finally, it is curious
that the Uniform3 policy had such a large effect on the loss of the individual Patient and
Greedy exchanges compared to the Uniform policy; further exploration of different match-
ing policies (including those that use a strong prior to consider possible future states of the
pool when matching now) would be helpful in making policy recommendations to fielded
exchanges.
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Chapter 5
Equilibrium Behavior in Competing
Dynamic Matching Markets
Built on the two-market model of Chapter 4, this chapter addresses questions about the
equilibrium behavior of competing dynamic matching market systems. Instead of using
stochastic participants and fixed policies, we now consider the strategic behaviors: first from
the points of view of individual participants when market policies are fixed, and then from
the points of view of markets when agents are stochastic.
First, we analyze models where individual market participants have agency. These partici-
pants can be of different types (short-lived or long-lived) and may choose entrance into the
market system such that their individual utility is maximized. Different types of agents may
have different preferences, and we analyze equilibrium behavior in both continuous (Sec-
tion 5.2) and discrete (Section 5.3) time settings. We show that even with just two types
of agents, strategic market choice can induce market fragmentation—while there are some
pooling equilibria where all strategic agents choose the same market (which is socially prefer-
able), separating equilibria become significantly more likely, as the proportion of agents who
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are assigned to a particular market increases (these agents may be constrained by geog-
raphy or cost, for example), and with short-lived agents choosing the patient market and
long-lived agents the greedy market. This is because the patient market is typically thicker,
giving a higher probability of matching during an agent’s sojourn, and short-lived agents
suffer less penalty because the market attempts to match them sooner relative to arrival.
Unfortunately, the fragmentation comes at significant social cost in reduced thickness.
Second, in Section 5.4, we prescribe agency to the markets themselves, allowing them to
choose overall matching policies (defined by the frequency at which they decide to match)
strategically to maximize their overall utility. In this case, the agents are stochastic in their
choice to join one or the other market, or to enter both markets. We quantify via best
response dynamics the social welfare loss of this competitive marketplace under a variety
of initial conditions, and compare that loss to the lower bound provided by a single market
running an optimal matching policy.
Overall, our results demonstrate the serious concern of a “race to the bottom” when multi-
ple matching markets compete. This is due to both fragmentation and the choice of socially
suboptimal matching policies by individual markets. When agents choose markets strate-
gically, differences in their types and utilities can lead to preferences for one or the other
markets and induce separating equilibria and fragmented markets. Even when agents do
not have market choice, if markets can choose their matching policies, individual markets
may be incentivized to match as early as possible an inefficient fraction of the time in the
race to match more agents. The intersection of differential impact on different types and
competing matching platforms raises important ethical issues in allocation and regulation.
Such discussions can be informed by our models. Further, our models can also provide the
foundation for future models that consider situations where both agents and markets can be
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strategic. Section 5.5 concludes with some recommendations for policymakers derived from
our results.
5.1 Preliminaries
We still follows Greedy polices and Patient polices as we discussed in Chapter 4. Besides,
the market can also choose a clearing rule that interpolates between the Patient and Greedy
clearing rules (the so-called Patient(α) clearing rule), which allows tuning of the matching
rate. Specifically, a market matching with the Patient(α) strategy draws an exponential
random variable Cv with rate parameter 1/α for each vertex v. If vertex v entering at time t
becomes critical at time tc < t+Cv, she matches at tc, as in the Patient matching algorithm.
Otherwise the vertex matches at time t + Cv. Note that when α → 0 we will have Cv p→ 0,
which corresponds to a Greedy matching algorithm.
5.1.1 Model I: Strategic Agents
Our first model considers two types of agents in terms of length of life, short-lived and
long-lived. Short-lived agents come into the markets with a length of life Ts and long-lived
agents have a length of life Tl, where Ts < Tl. Each agent (who is aware of her own
type) decides which market to enter upon arrival. A fraction θ of agents are short-lived
and the remaining 1 − θ fraction are long-lived. We allow a φ fraction of random-choice
agents (random agents) to choose either market with 0.5 probability. The remaining 1 − φ
fraction of agents are strategic. For these models, we restrict attention to models in which
one Greedy and one Patient market compete. The action space for agents is the market
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choice, B = {Greedy, Patient}. We want to analyze the equilibrium strategies of strategic
agents given the setting of θ and φ. Here, the market choice becomes a tradeoff between
matching probability and utility. That is, entering a Patient market may give an agent a
higher matching probability but lower utility as the agent has a higher expected sojourn
time; in contrast, immediate matching from a Greedy market provides a higher utility but
may lower the probability of matching since the market is not thick enough.
We investigate the behavior of strategic agents in the two-market Model I in both contin-
uous time (Section 5.2) and discrete time (Section 5.3) models.
5.1.2 Model II: Strategic Markets
Our second, complementary, direction is to model the situation where agent behaviors are
stochastic, but markets themselves make strategic decisions. We define each market’s utility
as the aggregate utility of the (non-strategic) agents it matches (it is reasonable to assume
that the market can capture some fraction of this utility). We follow the model in Section 4.3
for assigning agents to one or both of the two competing markets. A γ1 fraction of agents are
assigned to both markets; the market which successfully matches the agent first will receive
utility from the match. The remaining agents are only assigned to one market: a γ2 fraction
enter the first market, while a 1− γ2 fraction enter the second market.
The action chosen by a market is its choice of market-clearing rule, parameterized by the
matching rate α described above. The market-clearing rule choice involves a tradeoff: if
Market 1 chooses a fast matching rate, it will match more agents assigned to both markets,
but will match fewer agents which are only assigned to Market 1. The relative market sizes,
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Shared Notation
p Probability of potential transaction existing between two agents
T Number of time periods the markets operate
k Exponential rate of Poisson process entering market
Model I Notation Model II Notation
δ Discount rate used by short- & long-lived agents M{1,2} Strategic market 1 (2)
a A short- or long-lived agent γ1 Probability a vertex enters both markets
s(a) The sojourn time of agent a γ2 Probability a vertex enters M1 only
u The utility function of a discounting agent α
{1,2}
t Exponential rate parameter for matching
T{s,l} The length of life of a short-(long-)lived agent rate in market M1 (M2) at time t
θ Fraction of short-lived agents d Exponential rate parameter for criticality
φ Fraction of random-choice agents TR Time between updates of clearing rates
mg,e Pr. acceptable transaction when entering Greedy (Patient) u{M1,M2} Utility function of strategic market M{1,2}
m{g,p},s Pr. acceptable transaction staying in Greedy (Patient)
mp,c Pr. of acceptable transaction when critical in Patient
Λp,t Number of agents critical at time t in Patient market in the
discrete model, or rate of perishing in the continuous model
Z{g,p},t Size of Greedy (Patient) market at time t
U{s,l},{g,p} Expected utility of short- (long-)lived agents
choosing Greedy (Patient) market
Table 5.1: Variable definitions in Chapter 5.
parameterized by γ1 and γ2 are factors in the optimal choice. We investigate equilibrium
behavior via simulation of two markets in Model II in Section 5.4.
5.2 Strategic Agents in Continuous Time
We consider two markets operating simultaneously, one Greedy and one Patient. For sim-
plicity, we assume that lengths of life Ts and Tl for short-lived and long-lived agents are
constants that are fixed across the same type of agents.8
The markets run in the continuous-time interval [0, T ]. Agents arrive according to a Poisson
process with rate parameter k ≥ 1 (k = 100 in our simulations). The type of each arriving
agent is stochastic; with probability θ, the arriving agent is a short-lived type; and with
8We also ran experiments where Ts and Tl are sampled from two exponential distributions with different
rate parameters λs and λl, truncated so that Ts < 1 and Tl ≥ 1. The results were qualitatively very similar
to the case where Ts and Tl are constants.
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probability 1− θ, she is a long-lived type. Parameter φ controls whether an agent is random
or strategic, that is, with probability φ, she is a random agent and w.p. 1 − φ she is a
strategic agent. Upon arrival, the agent needs to decide which market to enter. Random
agents choose a market uniformly at random and strategic agents choose a market based on
comparing the expected utilities of entering each market.
We first consider agents entering the Greedy market. As the Greedy market matches agents
immediately upon entry, the probability of an agent having acceptable transactions imme-
diately after entering at any time t is mg,e(t) = (1 − (1 − p)Zg,t−1), where Zg,t represents
the size of the pool under the Greedy matching policy at time t. To be noticed, t here is
an infinitesimal time. Since entry occurs stochastically in continuous time, only one agent
enters exactly at time t. Therefore, as long as there exist any acceptable transactions, the
entering agent will be matched immediately. Once the moment of entry has passed, an agent
can only be matched at the point in time when some other agent enters the market. The
probability of an agent who was not matched at entry having an acceptable transaction at
the time of entry of some other agent is mg,s(t) =
(1−(1−p)Zg,t−1)
Zg,t−1 . Denote the probability of an
agent entering the Greedy market at any point in time t as P [Entrytg]. Thus, the expected
utility of an agent for choosing the Greedy market Utype,g(t) at time t given she knows her
type is
Utype,g(t) =mg,e(t) +
∫ Ttype
0 P [Entry
t
g ]
mg,s(t+ s(a))e
−δs(a)ds(a),
(5.1)
where type ∈ {short, long}.
Now consider agents entering the Patient market. The Patient market attempts to match
agents at the instant they become critical. The probability of an agent having acceptable
transactions during their stay (before perishing) at any time t is mp,s(t) = Λp,t
(1−(1−p)Zp,t−1)
Zp,t−1 ,
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where Λp,t is the rate of perishing in the Patient market and Zp,t is the size of the pool
under the Patient matching policy at time t. The probability of an agent having acceptable
transactions at the instant she becomes critical is mp,c(t) = (1 − (1 − p)Zp,t−1). Denote the
probability that some agent in the Patient market becomes critical at any time t as P [Exittp].
The expected utility of an agent for choosing patient market Utype,p(t) at time t given her
type is
Utype,p(t) =
∫ Ttype−
0 P [Exit
t
p]mp,s(t+ s(a))
e−δs(a)ds(a) +mp,c(t+ Ttype)e−δTtype ,
(5.2)
where  is an infinitesimal amount of time right before an agent perishes and type ∈
{short, long}.
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Figure 5.1: Results of continuous market for p = 0.02, δ = 0.05, Ts = 2, Tl = 3. Long:Greedy
(Short:Greedy) and Long:Patient (Short:Patient) show the expected utility of a strategic long-type
(short-type) agent if she chooses Greedy and Patient respectively.
Equations (1) and (2) clarify the tradeoffs agents face. In general, while the patient market
may give a higher probability of finding a match, the fact that an agent typically has to
wait longer diminishes her expected utility. Since agents start with the same utility and it
diminishes at the same rate, this means that short-lived agents will have a relatively higher
preference for the Patient market compared with long-lived agents (who have to wait longer
until the point in time when they are most likely to get matched, the time of criticality, in
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the patient market). Since there are positive externalities to entering a market and making it
thicker, we may expect that the market-choice game may have both pooling and separating
equilibria, where either both types of agents enter one market or short-lived agents enter the
Patient market while long-lived agents enter the Greedy market.
Since the equations above do not admit closed-form solutions, we use empirical game-
theoretic analysis to find equilibria in the game with strategic market-choice for each type.
The strategy space is B = {Greedy, Patient}. For different values of θ and φ, we compute
the utilities of strategic short-lived and long-lived agents if they choose the Greedy market
or the Patient market respectively using Monte Carlo simulations holding the strategies of
the other agents fixed, and ascertain whether or not pooling or separating equilibria exist in
different regions of the θ, φ space. As conjectured, we do see an overall pattern of pooling
and separating equilibria in different regions. Figure 5.1a shows an example of the results
when the fraction of random agents is φ = 0.4. These results can be broken up into three
regions: The red region represents pooling equilibria where both long-type and short-type
strategic agents choose the Greedy market; long-lived and random agents are the majority
in this region, thus the Greedy market can be thick enough.9 The yellow region represents
pooling equilibria where both types choose the Patient market; in this range of settings, we
have more short-lived agents and the Greedy market is not thick enough as the short-lived
agents perish too soon.10 In the blue region, we find a separating equilibrium exists: strate-
gic short-lived types choose the Patient market (Us,p > Us,g) and long-lived types choose the
Greedy market (Ul,g > Ul,p).
9Note that, in this region, both types of agents choosing the Patient market is also an equilibrium, albeit
one with overall lower social welfare.
10Similarly, in this region, both types of agents choosing the Greedy market is also an equilibrium, lower
in social welfare than the Patient pooling equilibrium.
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Figure 5.1b shows overall social welfare in the Competing system with a single Greedy market
and a single Patient market under different settings of θ when the fraction of random agents
φ = 0.4. We can see the market fragmentation caused by competition, separating equilibria
(θ ∈ [0.4, 0.6]), lowers the social welfare when compared to a single market. This pattern
holds across the whole range of φ.
Finally Figure 5.1c shows the range of separating and pooling equilibria as a function of
φ, the proportion of random agents. As the proportion of random agents increases, the
portion of the θ domain covered by separating equilibria increases, since the thicknesses of
the two markets are determined almost entirely exogenously, and the main consideration
is an optimization of utility rather than equilibrium considerations of what other strategic
agents are doing.
5.3 Strategic Agents in Discrete Time
While the model of Section 5.2 uses essentially the same models of utility as prior work,
we are restricted by the lack of analytical tractability. We now consider a discrete time
version of Model I that captures the same basic intuitions and can be used more directly
in modeling strategic market choice. We believe this model is more amenable for further
work on these questions. Now, agents enter the market in “batches”, that is, k ≥ 1 agents
enter the Competing market at each time step t. Short-lived agents live for Ts time steps
and long-lived agents live for Tl time steps (Tl > Ts), where Ts and Tl are fixed constants
for each type. At each time step t, each market operates as follows: o1: agents enter → o2:
market clears → o3: agents perish. Random agents choose a market to enter uniformly at
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random and strategic agents choose a market based on comparing the expected utilities of
entering each market.
We first analyze the utility of agents choosing the Greedy market. As the Greedy policy
will match agents immediately after they enter the market, the probability of an agent
having acceptable transactions immediately after entering is mg,e(t) = (1 − (1 − p)Zg,t−1),
where Zg,t represents the size of the pool under the Greedy matching policy at time t. The
market will run a maximum matching algorithm at each time step during o2 as k ≥ 1 agents
enter the market at the same time. This means that agents may be unmatched even if
they have potential acceptable transactions. We define the probability of being matched in
the maximum matching given the agent has acceptable transactions as χg(t) in the Greedy
market at time t. The probability of an agent having acceptable transactions when they stay
in the market (that is, not at their time-step of entry) at time t is mg,s(t) = (1− (1− p)kg,t),
where kg,t is the number of agents entering to the Greedy pool at time t. Thus, the expected
utility of an agent for choosing Greedy market Utype,g at time t given she knows her type is
Utype,g(t) = mg,e(t)χg(t) + (1−mg,e(t)χg(t))[
e−δmg,s(t+ 1)χg(t+ 1)+
∑Ttype−1
s(a)=2
e−δs(a)mg,s(t+ s(a))χg(t+ s(a))
∏s(a)−1
j=1 (1−mg,s(t+ j)χg(t+ j)
]
,
(5.3)
where type ∈ {short, long} and Ttype ≥ 3. We have two special cases, where
Utype,g(t) = mg,e(t)χg(t) when Ttype = 1;
and
Utype,g(t) = mg,e(t)χg(t) + (1−mg,e(t)χg(t))mg,s(t+ 1)χg(t+ 1)e−δ when Ttype = 2.
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We next consider the expected utility of agents choosing the Patient market. The Patient
market will match agents only at the instant they become critical. The probability of an
agent having acceptable transactions when they stay in the Patient market at each time
step t is mp,s(t) = (1 − (1 − p)Λp,t), where Λp,t is the number of agents becoming critical
in the Patient market at time t. As there may be more than one agent becoming critical
at each time t, the Patient market will also run a maximum matching at o2. We define
the probability of being matched in the maximum matching given the agent has acceptable
transactions as χp(t). The probability of an agent having acceptable transactions when she
is critical is mp,c(t) = (1− (1− p)Zp,t−1), where Zp,t is the size of the pool under the Patient
matching policy at time t. Thus, the expected utility of an agent for choosing Patient market
Utype,p at time t given she knows her type is
Utype,p(t) = mp,s(t)χp(t)+[∑Ttype−2
s(a)=1
e−δs(a)mp,s(t+ s(a))χp(t+ s(a))
∏s(a)−1
j=0 (1−mp,s(t+ j)χp(t+ j))
]
+
∏Ttype−2
j=0 (1−mp,s(t+ j)χp(t+ j))
mp,c(t+ Ttype − 1)χp(t+ Ttype − 1)e−δ(Ttype−1),
(5.4)
where type ∈ {short, long} and Ttype ≥ 3. We also have two special cases, where
Utype,p(t) = mp,c(t)xp(t) when Ttype = 1;
and
Utype,p(t) = mp,s(t)χp(t) + (1−mp,s(t)χp(t))mp,c(t+ 1)χp(t+ 1)e−δ when Ttype = 2.
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At any time t ∈ [0, T ], Zg,t, Zp,t represent the sizes of the pools under the Greedy and Patient
matching policies, respectively. The Markov chain on Z·,t has a unique stationary distribution
under either of those policies. Let pig, pip : N → R+ be the unique stationary distributions
of the Markov chain on Zg,t, Zp,t, respectively, and let ξg := EZg∼pig [Zg], ξp := EZp∼pip [Zp] be
the expected sizes of the pool under the stationary distribution under Greedy and Patient.
After mixing, we represent the expected sizes of the pools at any time as ξg, ξp respectively.
Similarly, kg,t,Λp,t, χg(t) and χp(t) also can be represented by expected values kg,Λp, χg and
χp. We use Monte Carlo simulations to estimate ξg, ξp, kg,Λp, χg and χp respectively. This
then allows us to numerically compute the expected utilities in Equation (5.3) and (5.4) and
derive the equilibria for different parameter settings.
Figure 5.2 shows an example of the results when the fraction of short-lived agents is φ = 0.4.
The results are qualitatively very similar to those from the continuous-time model, but the
additional analytical tractability of the model presented here makes it promising for future
development of models of competing markets.
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Figure 5.2: Results of discrete market for p = 0.02, δ = 0.05, Ts = 2, Tl = 3. Long:Greedy
(Short:Greedy) and Long:Patient (Short:Patient) show the expected utility of a strategic long-type
(short-type) agent if she chooses Greedy and Patient respectively.
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5.4 Strategic Markets
In the previous two sections, we assumed all markets operated with fixed matching policies,
and strategic agents entered that system in a way that maximized their individual expected
utility. Here, under Model II, we prescribe agency onto the markets themselves, allowing
them to strategically adjust their matching policies under best response dynamics to max-
imize their expected aggregate utility. We investigate equilibrium behavior in this model,
and measure overall social welfare loss relative to a single-market baseline.
5.4.1 Experimental Setup
We are interested in modeling the behavior of a two-market system where the markets
respond to each other under best response dynamics. Formally, at any time period, one
market observes the matching rate of its competitor and then chooses, for the next time
period, its own matching rate that will yield maximum payoff for perpetuity,11 even though
the market will change its best response within a short span of time TR. Best response
dynamics have been shown to mimic many settings where agents operate reactively or with
bounded expertise [146], and can be used in some cases to find equilibria [109].
We simulated the long-term utilities for two markets M1 and M2 with Patient(α
1) and
Patient(α2) matching policies, respectively, for (α1, α2) ∈ R≥0 × R≥0, for T = 250 periods,
and 100 trials. We estimated the best response functions BR1 and BR2 for markets M1
and M2, respectively by simulating two markets with overlaps γ1 ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9} over
a grid of patience parameters α1, α2. As a reminder, higher values of α correspond to more
11For a formal overview of best response dynamics, see, for example, the book by [110].
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Figure 5.3: Simulation results for d = 1, k = 100, p = 0.02. γ2 denotes the fraction of vertices, not in
both markets, that enter only market M1. The red line denotes the loss rate with a single Patient
market. The green triangles denote the loss rate of a (Patient,Patient) equilibrium (an equilib-
rium in essentially all bootstrap samples). The squares denote the loss rate of a (Greedy,Greedy)
equilibrium and the color of squares denotes the proportion of bootstrap samples which reach a
fast matching outcome (defined in §5.4.2) from initial conditions (Greedy,Greedy).
patience—i.e., matching less frequently—and higher values of γ1 indicate higher overlap—
i.e., more agents entering both markets.
We assumed the markets have bounded rationality in their computations of best response
functions. From the set S of all Monte Carlo simulations, we took X = 2500 bootstrap
samples of size n = 50, {S ′i}Xi=1 where S ′i ⊂ S. Each bootstrap sample represents simulations
that a boundedly rational market would run. Thus, given a single bootstrap sample S ′i ⊂ S:
BRi(α
1) = arg max
α2
Es∈S′i [uM2(α
1, α2)]
BRi(α
2) = arg max
α1
Es∈S′i [uM1(α
1, α2)]
Under best response dynamics, the matching rate will now change over time, so we let α1t
and α2t denote the matching rates at time t of market M1 and M2, respectively. We iterated
best responses until convergence or cycles occurred over initial conditions of α10, α
2
0 values.
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5.4.2 Experimental Results
In general, we observe two main phenomena for the best response dynamics. First, we
observe convergence to the Patient strategy under appropriate initial conditions (α10, α
2
0) for
any constituent in the competing market system. Second, for markets with sufficient overlap,
and sufficiently low initial values of (α1, α2), we observe convergence to a (Greedy,Greedy)
equilibrium or (α1, α2) parameters very close to (Greedy,Greedy). No other phenomena
occur in more than 5% of bootstrap samples.
To simplify the description of results, we refer to convergence to (Greedy,Greedy), or cycles
or equilibria involving solely 0 ≤ α{1,2} ≤ 1/100, as fast matching. For the parameter
range chosen for the simulations (specifically d = 1), 0 < α{1,2} ≤ 1/100 rarely impacts the
matching choice. Furthermore, the social welfare for these outcomes only differ by at most
0.3%. We describe the notable effects of the parameter choices on best response dynamics
below.
Market overlap. The impact of the market overlap γ1 on the best response dynamics can
be characterized by the effect on the range of initial matching rates (α10, α
2
0) which converged
to a fast matching outcome in “many” bootstrap samples—here, we use a cutoff of 25%.
Figure 5.3 visualizes this behavior for increasing values of market overlap γ1.
When market overlap γ1 ≤ 0.4, less than 0.1% of bootstrap samples converge to a fast matching
outcome for any chosen initial matching rates. This is expected, as with δ = 0, a faster
matching rate increases utility uM1 of M1 primarily when M1 successfully matches an agent
that enters both markets before M2 can. When γ1 ∈ [0.4, 0.8], the range of initial conditions
that converged to a fast matching outcome rose to a peak at or before γ1 = 0.7, then fell off.
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Surprisingly, when γ1 = 0.9, no initial conditions converged to fast matching in more than
4.4% of bootstrap samples.
Market asymmetry. We investigate the impact of γ2, which controls the balance of agents
entering only market M1 (which occurs as γ2 → 1) or market M2 (γ2 → 0). When γ2 ≤ 0.1,
no conditions outside of fast matching converged to fast matching in more than 25% of
samples.
5.4.3 Welfare Loss
We now measure the impact of competition on global social welfare. As with Model I,
we define social welfare as the discounted total number of matches; here, however, we set
δ = 0. As before, we compute the distribution of social welfare for a range of γ1 and γ2 with
respect to our bootstrap samples of Monte Carlo simulations. Figure 5.3 shows social welfare
for outcomes (Patient,Patient) and (Greedy,Greedy)—which approximates the loss rate of
fast matching—as well as the proportion of bootstrap samples that converge to fast matching
from initial conditions (Greedy,Greedy). Note that, just as in Model I, all experimental
outcomes are strictly worse (i.e., result in lower social welfare) than that of a single Patient
market.
As expected, when the overlap γ1 increases, the expected loss rate decreases due to a larger
network of potential matches. However, as γ1 increases, some initial conditions also become
more likely to result in a fast matching outcome. For example, under two equally-sized
markets (γ2 = 0.5), the Greedy loss rate of 26.9% is higher than the loss rate of 24.3% for γ1 =
0.4, where the only outcome that occurs with meaningful probability is (Patient,Patient).
This additional equilibrium occurs in 96.4% of bootstrap samples. The additional overall
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welfare loss of 4.4%-5.0% incurred by a fast matching outcome for the same initial parameters
is shown in Figure 5.3.
We also observe the effect on social welfare of a thicker market as market asymmetry in-
creases; at its most extreme (γ2 = 0 and γ2 = 1), all vertices are effectively in a single
market. As such, as γ2 moves toward its bounds, again there are stronger network effects on
social welfare.
Welfare losses arise both from matching speed and market fragmentation. As a baseline,
the loss rate that occurs from a single Patient market—one with no competition—under the
same model parameters is 18.2%. As shown in Figure 5.3, all other market conditions result
in greater overall loss. In the succeeding section we explore policy options that could help a
central planner mitigate this loss due to competition.
5.5 Policy Implications & Future Directions
Our results indicate that, left to themselves, matching markets that compete with each
other can cause significant social welfare losses through fragmentation (§5.2 and §5.3) and
suboptimal matching policies (§5.4). Our results are a proof-of-concept support of the “race
to the bottom” seen in many real competing matching market systems. For example, in the
US, multiple kidney exchanges compete over patient-donor pairs and/or hospitals. Two of
the largest US exchanges are the National Kidney Registry (NKR) and the United Network
for Organ Sharing (UNOS). NKR matches in an essentially greedy fashion. UNOS started
by matching once per month, then moved to twice per month, weekly, and now 2+ times
per week in part to reduce the “failure rate” caused by competition with the fast-matching
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NKR. We see this behavior replicated in our model, and can quantify social welfare loss as
well. Combinations of analytic and simulation results of this nature have set policy in kidney
exchanges before (e.g., Dickerson et al [47] and Dickerson and Sandholm [48] have set parts
of UNOS policy), and our model could help inform this debate.
While our research can inform policy discussions, it is important to have a separate conver-
sation about the ethics of different regulatory and policy changes and how these can impact
different populations (for example, by better-serving short-lived patients at the expense of
long-lived ones), and our research is not intended to be prescriptive on those issues. That
said, since we cannot use money directly to match supply and demand in a matching market,
the market/policy designer’s toolkit must consider other options. For example, in kidney
exchange, one could offer increased priority in the future on the deceased-donor waitlist (liv-
ing donor kidney grafts typically survive 10-15 years before another transplant is needed) if
they were to go to a patient market rather than a greedy [14,69,131,138].
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Chapter 6
Modeling Quality in Matching
Markets: The Case of Kidney
Exchange
To improve the performance of kidney exchange for both number of matches and individual
quality, one proposal, which does not rely on the ability of solving market fragmentation or
setting up a national center, has been to incorporate compatible pairs into exchanges.
There is the potential for significant benefit from including directed donation pairs in kidney
exchanges that also include incompatible pairs. The benefit can arise from two fronts: (1) a
significant increase in the number of incompatible donors who find matches; (2) an increase
in the quality of matches, since factors like HLA match [104,127] etc. play a role in expected
graft survival. The main goal of this chapter is to estimate the potential benefits along
both these fronts in a realistic manner. In doing so, we will also contribute to the literature
on matching with cardinal utilities by providing a realistic data-generation mechanism for
cardinal utilities.
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Overall, in this chapter, we model quality in matching markets and investigate the benefits of
incorporating compatible pairs in kidney exchange. We estimate expected survival of a graft
from the recently proposed Living Donor Kidney Profile Index (LKDPI) [104], and use this
as our measure of quality. 12 We impose the basic incentive compatibility constraint that,
for compatible pairs to be transplanted through exchange instead of directly, each recipient
must receive a graft with lower LKDPI, or increased expected survival time, compared with
that of her original donor.
During the years from 2014 to 2016, we were able to obtain data on 184 living donor kidney
transplantations that took place at the transplant center of Barnes-Jewish Hospital (hence-
forth “Center”). Of these 184, 171 were directed donations from a compatible donor to
his/her paired recipient. We obtained complete information that enabled computation of
the LKDPI on 166 of these pairs, which we use to estimate distributions of LKDPI scores
(and hence expected graft survival) within compatible pairs and across pairs. We were able
to obtain complete antibody and antigen data on 121 of these pairs, which enables donor-
recipient compatibility checking.13
The first question we can ask is about the heterogeneity of match qualities across pairs
and the effects of this heterogeneity on the quality of the final matching. At one extreme,
LKDPIs across pairs could be completely independent of the original LKDPIs within the
pairs. This would correspond to maximally heterogeneous match qualities and offer the
highest possible benefits to recipients in compatible pairs of participating in the exchange.
12LKDPI itself is a somewhat complex number to interpret. It is intended to be on the same scale as
the KDPI for cadaveric kidneys, which is a percentile measure. Thus an LKDPI of 10 indicates that the
kidney is comparable to the 10th percentile of cadaveric kidneys in terms of quality (with lower numbers
being better). However, since some living donor kidneys can be better than any cadaveric kidney, LKDPI
values can also be negative.
13We do not have data for the remaining 45 pairs because of a change in the software system, so there is
no selection bias.
113
At the other extreme, LKDPIs could be completely determined by the characteristics of
the donor or the recipient in a pair, in which case there would be no social gains from
trade [10]. In reality, LKDPI does take into account various match characteristics (for
example, HLA mismatches and body weight ratios), but where the gains from trade may
fall in the spectrum is an empirical question. Our experiments confirm that the distribution
of match quality (LKDPIs) from “external” donors is far from independent of the match
quality within a compatible pair, and this has significant implications on the possible gains
from trade to the compatible pairs. As a benchmark, we conduct counterfactual tests that
assume no incompatibilities among any of the pairs, and that all 166 pairs participate in
a pareto-improving kidney exchange with 2 and 3 cycle swaps. This improves the average
LKDPI of transplanted kidneys from 37.15 to 25.5, corresponding to about 1.5 years of
expected graft survival. We can estimate the hypothetical benefit if all donor-recipient pair
LKDPIs were independent draws from the same distribution, and we find that the new
average LKDPI achieved would be 2.67, corresponding to more than a 5 year benefit in
terms of expected graft survival. Interestingly, we provide evidence that the variability is
largely driven by characteristics of the donor rather than the recipient, so there could be
benefits from increasing the pool of possible donors, as has recently been suggested [55].
Based on this observation, we argue for the importance of constructing a minimal simulator
that produces realistic LKDPI / match quality values, and describe the construction of such
a simulator, which closely matches the characteristics we observe. Having established the
potential for gains from matching simply among already compatible pairs, we then turn to
estimating impacts in differently-sized populations when both compatible and incompatible
pairs are present using this simulator, paired with the standard Saidman simulator [127]
for generating recipient-donor pairs and compatibilities. These two simulation mechanisms
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together enable us to simulate realistic living donor kidney scenarios of any size with com-
patible and incompatible pairs. We use the simulator to estimate both the increase in the
number of recipients in incompatible pairs who would be matched if compatible pairs par-
ticipated in the exchange, as well as the increase in the expected graft survival for recipients
in compatible pairs that participate in the exchange.
We find that with compatible pairs joining the kidney exchange, the percentage of matched
incompatible pairs almost doubles. For example, with a small pool of 50 donor-recipient
pairs, 74% of incompatible pairs are matched, compared with 39% when the two-&three-cycle
swap is only run within the incompatible pairs. With a large pool of size 600, the percentage
of matched incompatible pairs reaches 91%, compared with 54% if we only run two-&three-
cycle swap within incompatible pairs. These results are similar to those of Gentry [61],
who also estimate that the proportion of incompatible pairs matched can be doubled by
participation of compatible pairs. They focus only on compatible recipients gaining a donor
age benefit. Our methods, combined with the LKDPI, also allow us to estimate the benefits
to recipients in compatible pairs. If the optimizer maximizes expected survival of grafts over
the entire population, there is an increase of 1.4-2.5 years in expected graft survival among
recipients from compatible pairs. If the optimizer instead maximizes number of transplants,
this number is between 0.9 and 1.23 years.
An important practical consideration is likely to be that of waiting time. Compatible pairs
may not be willing to wait even in order to find a potentially better match. Therefore, we
consider a dynamic matching model where the incompatible pool matches either in a greedy
or patient fashion (a la [4]), but the compatible pairs match greedily (from the incompatible
pool if it improves the match for the compatible-pair recipient and directly from donor to
recipient otherwise). Even with this pessimistic restriction, we estimate substantial benefits,
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going from matching 35% of incompatible pairs to 55% for the arrival and departure rates
we examine.
In this dynamic setting, we also look at the effects on two hard-to-match subpopulations,
namely blood group O recipients and highly sensitized patients. We estimate that the positive
impacts on blood group O recipients are more substantial than in the general population
(an increase from 18% to 46%), while those on the highly sensitized population are similar
to the general population (an increase from 24% to 37%).
By bringing quantitative estimates of these benefits into the light, we can inform policy
debates. For example, how much expected benefit would be needed to convince compatible
pairs to enter an exchange? How long would they be willing to wait in a dynamic setting?
These are all questions that can begin to be addressed from the foundation of the models
and simulator we develop in this work.
6.1 Modeling Match Quality
Historically, much work on matching (and welfare economics broadly) has focused on ordinal
preferences rather than cardinal utility [9]. This sidesteps the problem of having to make
interpersonal comparisons of utility, and research has focused on outcomes in terms of ob-
jectives like stability and Pareto optimality [110]. However, with the increasingly important
social roles played by matching mechanisms [43,44,112,126], it is imperative to understand
the outcomes of mechanisms in terms of overall social welfare (however this is defined for a
given application) as well as distributional effects. Doing so necessitates considering specific
models of utility [14,69,94,105].
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There is value in traditional parametric models that are used for utility, and these have
been central to model development. Examples of such models include utilities that decay
exponentially in waiting time [4,7], and random utility models for specific match pairs [38].
However, a common criticism of such models is that it is unclear how general or valuable
results are when the utility model itself is not grounded in reality. In our case, we are
explicitly looking for a realistic model that can be used for decision-making. Further, in
order to convince compatible pairs to enter kidney exchanges, we must be able to quantify the
expected benefit to them in some meaningful manner, therefore, we need an individual model
of match quality that can be reasoned about from the perspectives of agents in the market.
One important consideration that we defer to future work is the waiting cost to agents in
terms of cost and quality of life. For compatible pairs, this is a complex modeling problem
from a practical standpoint, because the baseline waiting time is itself highly variable. The
time from initial workup to transplantation for a compatible pair is at least several months
long because of the barrage of necessary testing, and for part of this time the pair is not
even sure that they will be judged compatible. Therefore, in this chapter we focus on match
quality, and subject our analyses to pessimistic assumptions (greedy dynamic matching), and
various robustness checks (varying pool sizes can proxy for match frequency, for example).14
Quantifying match quality. Transplant surgeons often have to make decisions on whether
a proposed transplant is worthwhile to proceed with. The Kidney Donor Profile Index
(KDPI) was developed as a means of assessing the quality of a cadaveric (deceased donor)
kidney [119]. Recently, the Living Kidney Donor Profile Index (LKDPI) has been proposed
14The question of how to analyze waiting cost from the perspective of the matching market is also complex;
however, one reasonable way to think about it is as costs to the healthcare system. For example, dialysis
costs $70,000-$100,000 per year [74,83,100], and this is a cost that must be borne by some agent (individuals,
private insurance, hospitals, or the government). Incorporating this can be useful when the modeling task is
to assess matching policies and how they change costs over the entire system, rather than from the perspective
of individual agents, hospitals, and so on.
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as an analog for living donations [104]. LKDPI takes into account characteristics of both
the donor and the recipient.
KDPI is a percentile score. For example, a score of 4 implies that the kidney is in the
“top 4%” of cadaveric kidneys. LKDPI is intentionally designed to be on the same scale (as
mentioned in the Introduction, since living donor kidneys can be better than any cadaveric
kidney, the LKDPI often takes negative values as well). Therefore, optimizing for LKDPI,
while a useful proxy, is semantically ill-founded. However, since LKDPI is computed based
on a survival model (Cox regression [34]), one can translate the model to a model of ex-
pected graft survival (or graft half-life), the survival time of the transplanted organ in the
donor [72].15 We have found that an exponential curve fits the graft half-life as a function
of LKDPI almost perfectly (see Figure 6.1), and can thus estimate expected graft survival
as 14.78e−0.01239x where x is the LKDPI. We can use this measure in place of LKDPI where
it is more appropriate.16 Thus the edge weight we in each cycle is defined as the estimated
expected graft survival of the recipient.
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Figure 6.1: An exponential curve fits the graft half-life as a function of LKDPI.
15After graft failure, the donor typically needs another transplant.
16One could also use expected graft survival as input to an expected “Quality Adjusted Life Year”
(QALY) [23,137,140] computation over the lifetime of the recipient.
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6.2 Exchanges between compatible pairs: A single cen-
ter analysis
6.2.1 Data description
Massie et al [104] come up with the LKDPI measure based on several important charac-
teristics for determining graft survival. We gathered de-identified data on all donor and
recipient characteristics that are used in computing LKDPI from all directed living-donor
transplants performed at the center in a three year period (2014-2016). There were 166 such
transplants with complete characteristics for calculating LKDPI and graft survival; 121 of
them also include complete HLA antibody and antigen information. The distribution of each
characteristic is shown in Table 6.1. We also analyze the correlation of every pair of char-
acteristics, shown in Figure 6.2, which serves as a fundamental building block for designing
the simulator in Section 6.3.
6.2.2 Counterfactual analysis within the center
Typically, if a donor and recipient are deemed medically compatible, a directed transplant is
performed, with the donor’s kidney going to the recipient. However, there may be cases where
the match quality is low even if they are compatible, and perhaps the recipient could receive
a better kidney through an exchange; for example, they may be able to receive a kidney from
a younger donor, or avoid an immunologically risky donor/recipient combination, like child
to mother or husband to wife [61]. Such scenarios are hypothetical, and may seem unlikely
at first glance. To validate our conjecture, for these donor-recipient pairs, we computed the
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Mean s.d.
Donor Age 48.22 12.68
Donor eGFR 98.11 15.08
Donor Systolic BP 124.14 13.11
Donor BMI 27.78 4.46
Recipient Weight (Female) 180.7 42.26
Recipient Weight (Male) 190.34 39.9
Donor Weight (Female) 160.75 30.06
Donor Weight (Male) 200.8 32.8
Donor Sex F: 0.7 M: 0.3
Rec Sex F: 0.35 M: 0.65
Donor African-American Y: 0.05 N: 0.95
Donor Cigarette Use Y: 0.32 N: 0.68
Donor/Rec Related Y: 0.50 N: 0.50
Donor Blood Type O: 0.6, A: 0.3, B: 0.07, AB: 0.03
Rec Blood Type O: 0.46 A: 0.39 B: 0.12 AB: 0.03
Donor/Rec ABO compatible Y: 0.88 N: 0.12
Donor/Rec related Donor/Rec unrelated
Donor/Rec HLA-B Mismatches 0: 0.18, 1: 0.32, 2: 0.5 0: 0.01, 1: 0.1 , 2: 0.89
Donor/Rec HLA-DR Mismatches 0: 0.13, 1: 0.06, 2: 0.81 0: 0.01, 1: 0.06, 2: 0.93
Counterfactual Matrix: all unrelated
Donor/Rec HLA-B Mismatches 0: 0.009, 1: 0.091, 2: 0.9
Donor/Rec HLA-DR Mismatches 0: 0.02, 1: 0.04, 2: 0.94
Table 6.1: Distribution of each characteristic of the center’s data. F/M means Female/Male, Y/N
represents Yes/No, and Rec is a shortening of Recipient.
expected graft survival (EGS) of each pair, and then performed counterfactual simulations to
assess the potential to improve outcomes. The two counterfactual simulations share a Pareto
improvement restriction—no recipient may receive a kidney with a shorter (i.e., worse) EGS
for them than the EGS for them of the kidney from their original paired donor.
Optimal. In the first simulation, we find the best matching, allowing arbitrary length cycles;
this can also be treated as a bipartite matching problem (with the restriction that the
matching must be perfect) between donors on one side and recipients on the other.
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Figure 6.2: Correlation matrix of each pair of characteristics.
Two and Three-cycle swap. In the second simulation, we only allow either a direct dona-
tion from the donor to the recipient or through a two- and three -cycle kidney exchange,
to more closely approximate realistic logistical constraints.
We consider two subsets of the data. The “complete” 166-pair subset, assuming no HLA
incompatibilities, and the “restricted” subset of 121 pairs for which we have complete anti-
body/antigen information and can determine all incompatibilities and rule out such trans-
plants. The distribution of EGS and corresponding LKDPI among the real pairs and in the
results of our counterfactual simulations are shown in Figure 6.3. The mean and median
EGS and LKDPIs are given in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 below.
We can see there is a median improvement of 1.93 years of expected graft survival for the
Optimal and 1.38 years for the two-&three-cycle swap (over a median half-life of 10.84 years).
We also see that including compatibility constraints itself does not have a huge effect on the
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Figure 6.3: Distribution of the expected graft survival (left) and LKDPI (right) of the original
matched pairs and matched pairs in the two counterfactual simulations, using 121 subset of real
data with HLA antigens and antibodies from the center over the last three years.
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Figure 6.4: Distribution of the expected graft survival (left) and LKDPI (right) of the original
matched pairs and matched pairs in the two counterfactual simulations, using the 166 full dataset
of real data from the center over the last three years. We can see the distribution is similar to
Figure 6.3.
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Optimal
Two&Three
-cycle Swap
Original
Mean 11.44 10.88 9.80
Median 11.39 10.84 9.46
(a) 121 subset with HLA antigens and antibodies
Optimal
Two&Three
-cycle Swap
Original
Mean 11.58 11.14 9.67
Median 11.67 11.18 9.34
(b) 166 full data without HLA antigens and antibodies
Table 6.2: Mean and median EGS for two counterfactual simulations, compared to reality over the
last three years at the center. Figure (a) shows the 121-subset of data with HLA antigens and
antibodies, and Figure (b) shows the 166-subset assuming no incompatibilities.
Optimal
Two&Three
-cycle Swap
Original
Mean 23.99 27.69 36.10
Median 21 25 36
(a) 121 subset with HLA antigens and antibodies
Optimal
Two&Three
-cycle Swap
Original
Mean 23.46 25.50 37.15
Median 19 22.5 37
(b) 166 full data without HLA antigens and antibodies
Table 6.3: Mean and median LKDPI for two counterfactual simulations, compared to the reality
over the last three years at the center. Figure (a) shows the 121-subset of data with HLA antigens
and antibodies, and Figure (b) shows the 166-subset assuming no incompatibilities.
results (some of the improvement in the larger set is simply due to having a thicker market).
Beyond the specific results, it is surprising to see the high number of transplants that were
performed with LKDPIs above 50, since these indicate that the average cadaveric kidney
would have been better for the recipient, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that living
donor kidneys are always better. The optimized matches from the counterfactual “exchange”
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are much better, with many fewer “bad” matches and many more with LKDPI of 20 or lower,
predictive of excellent outcomes.
6.2.3 Discussion
This is a proof-of-concept for the potential of improving quality of matching. One immediate
question arises from the fact that we are using three years worth of data on recipients and
donors in a static setting; this is obviously unrealistic. However, the main point is to estimate
realistic distributions from data; we can use projections to then analyze differently-sized
static markets (from smaller ones to larger ones that could be realized through regional
pooling or already-functioning national exchanges). We turn to these questions and beyond
in the next section.
6.3 Including compatible pairs in kidney exchanges
In addition to improving match quality, we may also be able to improve the number of
matches by including compatible pairs to thicken the exchange with incompatible pairs. This
could also lower costs for transplant centers by allowing for more internal matches where the
transplant center does not need to go to a regional or national exchange to find a match for
an incompatible pair.17 In order to estimate the possible benefits more systematically over
different possible population sizes, we need to efficiently and correctly simulate LKDPIs over
donor and recipient populations.
17This could have positive and negative effects overall, by perhaps increasing fragmentation, but lowering
costs. However, many centers choose not to participate in broader exchanges much of the time in practice,
for a variety of reasons.
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6.3.1 Determinants of match quality, and design of a Compatibil-
ity+LKDPI simulator
This would be simple if LKDPIs were distributed in a manner that was easy to correctly
estimate, for example, independently, or independently conditional on the LKDPI of the
original compatible pair. Unfortunately, this turns out not to be the case. To get a simple
benchmark of how much this may affect the results, we can simulate different distributions
based on data from the center.
We first build a counterfactual matrix of estimated graft survival based on the original (166-
pair) data by calculating LKDPI values for each of these 166 pairs. We then investigate
the expected graft survival of donor-patient pairs under the Optimal and two-&-three cy-
cle swap matching algorithms when resampling the matrix in different ways. To simulate
independent LKDPIs, we resample individual LKDPIs from the whole matrix. To simu-
late donor-dependent LKDPIs, we shuffle all donors for a given recipient, and to simulate
recipient-dependent LKDPIs, we shuffle all recipients for a given donor. The results are
shown in Table 6.4. The first row shows statistics from the original compatible match-
ing. As we see, most of the methods for generating LKDPIs vastly overestimate the pos-
sible gains, and the evidence is consistent with the observation that the determination of
LKDPI/expected graft survival is largely based on the donor’s characteristics [104]. These
results demonstrate the need for a good simulator.
The central empirical facts that allow us to construct an efficient simulator are analyses of
the joint distributions of variables involved in determining compatibility (PRA and ABO
compatibility, based on the simulator of [127]) and computing LKDPI (See Table 6.1), and
analysis of the possible underlying mechanisms of dependence. In particular, compatibility
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is solely a function of blood type and antibodies, while LKDPI considers many other factors,
most of which have limited relationship to those (Figure 6.2). Since the state of practice
in kidney transplantation has been to always assume that any living donor is excellent (a
practice called into question by our results above), it is unlikely that there is any selection
bias in the characteristics we sample for typical compatible pair arrivals. We first generate
a donor-recipient pair, with all LKDPI-related characteristics generated sequentially in a
manner that respects the data distributions in Table 6.1 and the correlation structure shown
in Figure 6.2. We then generate the PRA (percentage reactive antibodies) and compatibility
based on the Saidman model. Details of our simulator are in Appendix B, Algorithm 3. The
last line of Table 6.4 shows that the simulator produces results very close to the real data.
EGS
original
EGS
2&3 swap
EGS
Optimal
LKDPI
original
LKDPI
2&3 swap
LKDPI
Optimal
Original
166 dataset
9.67 11.14 11.58 37.15 25.50 22.46
Sample from
the whole matrix
9.23 14.40 15.30 40.51 2.67 -2.5
Shuffle all donors
per recipient
9.19 14.16 14.94 40.92 4.11 -0.47
Shuffle all recipients
per donor
9.21 11.74 12.50 40.70 20.6 15.49
Sample from
the simulator
9.38 11.40 11.80 39.21 24.50 20.09
Table 6.4: The EGS and LKDPI comparison of different sampling methods and different market
clearing algorithm.
6.3.2 Experimental results using the LKDPI simulator
We can now use the LKDPI simulator to estimate the benefits in terms of both quality and
quantity of transplants. We study the impact of different optimization objectives (survival
and number of matches) on outcomes for both compatible and incompatible pairs. We
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C-Or Compatible pairs original donation
ENM Expected number of matched pairs
P-I Pool with only incompatible pairs
P-CI Pool with both incompatible and compatible pairs
Maximize EGS Maximize ENM
I-maxSur P-I 2−&3− cycleswap I-MaxNum P-I 2−&3− cycleswap
I-O-MaxSur P-I Optimal I-O-MaxNum P-I Optimal
CI-MaxSur P-CI 2−&3− cycleswap CI-MaxNum P-CI 2−&3− cycleswap
CI-O-MaxSur P-CI Optimal CI-O-MaxNum P-CI Optimal
Table 6.5: Table indexing abbreviations we use corresponding to different optimization objectives,
matching methods, and different subpopulation measurements.
are most interested in the improvement of (1) expected graft survival of compatible pairs
compared with their original donation, since the incentive for compatible pairs to enter is to
seek a better organ for the recipient; (2) the number of matched incompatible pairs compared
with the number when running two-&three-cycle swap only on incompatible pairs. We find
the maximum weighted cycle cover, where the weight can be (1) we = expected graft survival
of recipient, (2) we = 1, (maximizing the number of matched pairs). Table 6.5 summarizes
the possible objectives and the metrics that we measure.
In our experiments, we fix the size of the pool and generate donor-recipient pairs using the
simulator. We find that the sizes of the compatible and incompatible pool are roughly even.
This matches the statistics of the center we have data from. In 2017, 217 compatible pairs
and 181 incompatible pairs registered for initial transplant workups (though only 1/3 of
them ended up having a transplantation procedure in the center).
We then run two-&three-cycle swap under the Pareto improvement restriction, where com-
patible pairs only swap if their expected graft survival increases. Our results for the pro-
portion of incompatible pairs matched for different pool sizes can be summarized as follows
(Figure 6.5 shows more detail):
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Without
compatible
With
compatible
Size of pool: 50 (25+25) 39% 74%
Size of pool: 100 (50+50) 48% 83%
Size of pool: 600 (300+300) 54% 91%
These results are similar to the results of Gentry [61], who also estimate that the proportion
of incompatible pairs matched could be doubled by participation of compatible pairs that
would gain a donor age benefit. From the perspective of compatible pairs, there is a 2.15-
2.61 improvement in expected years of graft survival improvement (for those whose donor
changes) when we maximize expected survival of the whole population, and 1.36-1.63 years
when we maximize the number of matched incompatible pairs.
While the rate of entry of compatible and incompatible pairs may be similar, it is possible
that one or the other population is less likely to go through with a transplant. In order to
study how our results would vary with different assumptions about this, we hold the number
of compatible pairs fixed and vary the number of incompatible pairs. These results can be
seen in Appendix C, and qualitatively still suggest substantial benefits from incorporating
compatible pairs.
6.4 Modeling Dynamic Markets
While different sizes of pools can proxy for different match frequencies, and patience in
matching can improve outcomes [4], there are also good arguments and practical concerns
that favor greedy or frequent matching [7,37]. In particular, it is a reasonable, if pessimistic,
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(a) Maximizing EGS.
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(b) Maximizing number of matched pairs.
Figure 6.5: The comparison between expected graft survival of compatible pairs by participating
two-&three-cycle swap (blue solid line) and their original matching (blue dash line), expected graft
survival of incompatible pairs when compatible pairs participate two-&three-cycle swap (red solid
line) and only within incompatible pairs (red dashed line), and proportion of matched incompatible
pairs when compatible pairs participate two-&three-cycle swap (black solid line) and only within
incompatible pairs (black dashed line), where Figure (a) shows the results of maximizing the ex-
pected graft survival across the whole graph G, and Figure (b) shows the results of maximizing the
number of matched pairs.
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assumption, that compatible pairs would be completely unwilling to wait, and would there-
fore insist on an immediate exchange, or else they would want to go ahead with the direct
donation.
In this section, we build a dynamic model where patient-donor pairs arrive gradually over
time. Incompatible pairs stay in the market until they find an acceptable swap or they perish
(they may leave the market if the patient’s condition deteriorates to the point where kidney
transplants become infeasible, for example). Compatible pairs must either be matched with
an incompatible pair at the moment of arrival, or else the donor gives directly to the recipient
immediately.
Arriving patient-donor pairs are still generated from our simulation model described above.
Pairs arrive at the market according to a Poisson process, with rate parameter m ≥ 1. The
sojourn of an agent is draw from an exponential distribution, with rate parameter λ = 1.
If a compatible pair arrives, all feasible swaps for that pair are considered (where feasibility
means both that compatibility requirements are satisfied and the recipient in the compatible
pair receives a higher-quality kidney match). If there is more than one acceptable swap
the newly entered pair chooses the one with the longest expected graft survival for its own
recipient; ties are broken uniformly at random. Incompatible pairs can be matched either
greedily, in the same manner as above, or using a patient algorithm [4] which waits to match
until the moment an agent is about to perish (with the caveat that incompatible pairs with
possible matches in the incompatible pool are not considered as matches for compatible
pairs).
We again find a substantial benefit in terms of the number of incompatible pairs matched
under either mechanism (from approximately 35% to approximately 55%). Figure 6.6 also
shows that compatible pairs for whom the new mechanism changes the match improve their
130
expected graft survival by almost two and a half years. There is some effect of “competition”
– since match quality is largely a function of the donor, and compatible pairs need to receive
good donors in order to participate, the average expected graft survival of those who are
transplanted in the incompatible pool actually goes down; however, the huge increase in the
number of matches more than compensates in terms of the sum total of years of graft life
(where pairs that don’t receive a transplant are assigned an EGS of 0). Therefore, our results
demonstrate that the potential value of incorporating compatible pairs is high even under
pessimistic assumptions about what wait times they would be willing to tolerate.
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Figure 6.6: Comparison of matched proportion of incompatible patients (left) and change in EGS
(right) when running different matching algorithms for the incompatible pool in the dynamic set-
ting.
6.4.1 Fairness considerations: Hard to match types
An important consideration in kidney exchanges is how they may differentially affect different
populations. The populations one often worries about are those who are harder to match.
Therefore, we consider the effects on two groups of hard-to-match patients, those with blood
group O (patients with blood group O have fewer ABO-compatible living donors [65]) and
highly sensitized patients, who are likely to have antibodies to a significant fraction of the
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population. We define highly sensitized patients as those whose PRA is greater than 80%,
constituting approximately 30% of the patient population.
Figure 6.7-left shows that there is a significant improvement for the matched proportion
of incompatible blood type O patients (from 0.18 to 0.46) when incorporating compatible
pairs. Therefore the relative benefit to this group is actually higher than to the rest of the
population. The matched proportion of incompatible highly sensitized patients improves to
37% from 24% when compatible pairs are included, a rate of increase roughly similar to that
in the overall population.
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Figure 6.7: Comparison of matched proportion of incompatible patients of Blood Type O (left)
and high PRA (right) when running different matching algorithms for the incompatible pool in the
dynamic setting.
6.5 Conclusion and Future research
Living donor kidney transplantation has proven to be an important domain for the devel-
opment of matching theory and algorithms. It is becoming increasingly important to study
cardinal utilities in kidney exchange, and we believe this could open up more fertile avenues
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for research. Our main goal in this chapter is to develop the framework and a robust frame-
work for analyzing match quality in models of kidney exchange. Our framework is based on
real donor and recipient data from a major transplant center. We have also used the model
to estimate the benefits, in terms of both quantity and quality of transplants, of including
compatible pairs in kidney exchange. We find that if we were able to induce compatible
pairs to join kidney exchanges, the percentage of matched incompatible pairs would increase
dramatically, and there would also be a substantial increase in expected graft survival for re-
cipients in compatible pairs. Quantifying the potential quantitative benefits of participating
through LKDPI may also make compatible pairs more likely to join.
While our work here is largely in a static setting and a simple dynamic setting, the de-
velopment of our realistic LKDPI simulator allows for the investigation of many different
matching models. Of particular interest will be questions related to matching policy in the
dynamic setting with both compatible and incompatible pairs, incorporating wait times, and
possible systemic effects of including compatible pairs in exchanges, for example, changes in
incentives for centers.
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Chapter 7
Competition Between Financial
Exchanges
In this chapter, we turn our eyes to financial markets and investigate the market competition
in this domain. As we discussed in Section 1.2.2, most modern financial exchanges operate
using the continuous double auction (CDA) mechanism, which is a greedy fashion mechanism.
The existence of this continuous time feature has led to the development of the phenomenon
called High frequency trading in the last two decades. With companies keeping investing in
faster infrastructure for trading and events like the “flash crash” of May 2010, high frequency
trading (HFT) has become an increasingly debated topic in both the media and policy
spheres [93]. There is increasing evidence that at least one form of high frequency trading,
namely latency arbitrage, has reached a point of socially diminishing returns. Frequent batch
auctions is recommended as a market structure that could replace CDAs, since the minimum
time period between trades is specified, and there is no benefit to being faster than that.
In this chapter, we first provide a baseline of social welfare in a single market with high-
frequency traders. We then consider the competition between platforms that employ different
microstructures: one, a continuous double auction, and the other, frequent batch auction.
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We ask: (1) Which of these markets would traders choose? (2) Could the frequent batch
auction market replace the CDA market simply by entering the marketplace of exchanges,
or would it require a regulatory push?
Our key measure of welfare is the price of immediacy – the expected loss suffered by back-
ground traders. This measures the cost that the “average trader” pays in order to execute
transactions. This is a different measure than that of Wah and Wellman [144] or Wah et
al [142], who use surplus. These are both reasonable measures, but surplus is most mean-
ingful in private value models, where some meaning can be attributed to different agents
having different valuations for an asset. Our model follows in a tradition of common value
models, where the asset has a true underlying value, and different traders may have different
estimates of that true value. The existence of background traders in our model provides a
useful proxy for estimating the cost of trading. It is worth noting that this doesn’t mean that
background traders are necessarily losing money – typically such traders would stay in the
market for much longer, and under reasonable models of price appreciation, these “losses”
can be thought of as transaction costs for buy-and-hold type investors.
First, we look at simple models of individual markets and confirm that our model satisfies
the basic intuitions one would expect. Namely, informed traders (in particular, low latency
traders) make more profit (and background traders are consequently made worse off) in
CDA markets than in frequent call markets. A zero-profit market maker (with no specialized
information) can greatly improve the position of background traders, taking away most of
the profit opportunities from informed traders in CDA markets.
Next, we model competition between a CDA market and a frequent call market when in-
formed traders pick which market to place their orders in based simply on which market
is more mispriced with respect to their current belief. We show that the informed traders
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do better overall when they choose to place orders in the market that is more mispriced
from their perspective. We show that, when informed traders are all using this strategy, a
majority of orders flows to the call market, and background traders are better off than in a
single CDA market.
Note that all of the above analysis is not in an equilibrium setting – we assume that all
informed traders use the same strategy. We can use the insights developed in these models
to begin analyzing strategic market choice. We do so by introducing a learning framework,
where informed traders learn a parametric form for the expected profit of choosing to place
an order in a market (and a non-parametric probability of order execution) given the distance
of that market’s “current price” from the trader’s estimate of the true value of a stock. We
show that, when all agents use this learning approach, they converge to an approximate
equilibrium where a majority of trades again flow to the frequent call market.
7.1 Market Model
7.1.1 The CDA and Call Markets
Our model of competing markets consists of two markets, one employing a continuous double
auction (CDA) mechanism and the other one employing a frequent call (CALL) mechanism.
We begin by describing the details of each individual market, which will serve as the foun-
dation for our model of competing markets.
Each market is running in the continuous-time interval [0,T]. A single security is traded
in the market. There is an underlying “true value” process. The initial true value of the
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security v0 is drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean vinitial and standard deviation
σinitial. Then, the true value jumps according to a Poisson process with rate parameter λjump.
If the true value jumps, the new true value vt is generated from vt ∼ N (vt−dt, σj), where vt−dt
is the price instantaneously before the jump (we restrict vt ≥ 0, so all values are truncated
at 0).
In the CDA market, outstanding orders are maintained in two priority queues: one for bids
(the buy orderbook) and one for asks (the sell orderbook). Bids and asks are prioritized by
price first and time second. When a new order comes in, it is added to the corresponding
order book. A trade is executed if the highest bid exceeds or is equal to the lowest ask. The
execution involves the orders at the top of the bid and ask queues, at the price of the older
of the two orders involved.
The CALL market is similar to that described by Budish et al [27]. It clears in fixed intervals
of time τ (the call interval). At each clearing time, the market collates all of the orders and
computes the aggregate demand and supply functions of all bids and asks, respectively. The
market clears where supply equals demand, with all executions occurring at the same price,
called the market-clearing price. None of the orders are visible to any traders during the
call interval. The market announces the market-clearing price after each clearing (market
announcement). When no order was executed at the last clearing time, if both the buy and
sell orderbooks are not empty, the market announcement will be the mid-point of the highest
bid and lowest ask, otherwise it will be the most recent available market-clearing price. All
untraded orders roll into the next call.
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7.1.2 Valuation model
Each trader has a private valuation for the security (or equivalently for our purposes, a
private signal of the true value). We have two types of traders, informed (IF) traders and
background (BG) traders. Each informed trader IFi receives a private signal of the security
value, wi,t ∼ N (vtˆ, σtrader), where vtˆ is the underlying true value of the security at some
time tˆ, where tˆ ≤ t, and σtrader is a noise parameter. We define two types of informed
traders, namely, low latency (LL) traders and high latency (HL) traders. High latency
traders have staler information, i.e., wi,t ∼ N (vt−δ, σtrader), and low latency traders observe
information with no delay, thus wi,t ∼ N (vt, σtrader). Background traders do not have any
private information; each arriving background trader wishes to either buy or sell one unit
(with equal probability). They demand immediacy, that is, they want to get their orders
executed as soon as possible, so they are willing to take any market price.
7.1.3 Agent arrival process
There are a fixed number of traders of each type. Informed traders and background traders
both arrive at the market according to separate Poisson processes, with informed traders
arriving with rate λIF and background traders’ arriving with rate λBG. In the event that an
informed trader arrival occurs, a specific IF trader is selected uniformly at random from all
the IF traders to place/replace an order; similarly, if a background trader arrival occurs, a
specific BG trader is selected uniformly at random from all the BG traders to place/replace
an order.
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7.1.4 Agent strategies in individual markets
Each of the informed traders and background traders is only allowed to maintain a single
unit order in the market. When informed and background traders reenter the market, they
can replace existing orders that have not yet been executed. We model informed traders as
using limit orders and background traders as using market orders exclusively.
Informed traders’ strategy: Sindividual We consider trading strategies in the Zero In-
telligence (ZI) family for informed traders. There is a large literature involving ZI strategies,
including some controversy, which we will not rehash here [32, 115]. While ZI strategies are
clearly not the “best” trading strategies in isolation, it is also generally believed that they
model order arrival processes well, and they are a standard method for choosing prices in
complex agent-based market simulations [57, 114]. We first define, in the CDA market,
p∗t,CDA =

(BID t.p) + (ASK t.p)
2
, if BID t and ASK t exist,
the most recent execution price, if any order
book is empty,
where (BID t.p) and (ASK t.p) refer to the price of BID t and ASK t respectively. And in the
CALL market,
p∗t,CALL = the most recent market announcement .
When an informed trader IFi places an order, a limit price is generated from
pi,t ∼ N (p∗t,market, σprice),
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where market ∈ {CDA,CALL}. Based on pi,t and wi,t, the informed trader IFi’s strategy at
time t is as follows,
pi,t

>wi,t, places a unit sell order,
<wi,t, places a unit buy order,
=wi,t, uniformly at random places a unit buy or sell order.
Note that pi,t = wi,t is a zero probability event. If pi,t >(ASK t.p) and the order is a buy
order, then it executes immediately and therefore effectively functions as a market order.
Similarly if pi,t <(BID t.p) and the order is a sell order. We call the strategy above Sindividual.
Background traders’ strategy The background traders choose whether they want to
buy or sell a unit uniformly at random. Once the direction is decided, the order is routed
to the market and handled in a special manner as a market order through a “waiting”
mechanism. The market is aware of the direction of a market order and the fact that this
indicates the trader would like to execute the order at any available market price. However,
market orders are not visible to any other traders in both the CDA and CALL markets, since
they may need to wait for execution if there is no corresponding limit order on the other
side in the CDA market, and at least until the next call in the CALL market.
Market maker’s strategy In the CDA market, we also incorporate a market maker in
some of our experiments. To increase the liquidity of the market, the market maker maintains
a unit buy order and a unit sell order at all times. This market maker is implemented using
the Bayesian market making algorithm (BMM) of Brahma et al [22], with parameters tuned
to maintain near zero-profit. BMM is a learning algorithm that learns from the current bid
and ask prices and the direction of incoming trades, augmented with jump prediction and a
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technique to widen its spread in times of uncertainty. BMM updates its own belief whenever
there is an execution, and it immediately replaces its orders. Our implementation closely
follows that of Brahma et al, except that we only need to use it for unit orders in our model.
7.1.5 CDA and CALL market operation
CDA market operation In the CDA market, BID t and ASK t are based only on orders
from informed traders (and also possibly the market maker). If the order book only has
market orders that are waiting from background traders, the market shows the order book
as empty. The scenario that we want to simulate is that background traders are waiting
in the market to buy or sell; as soon as an unfilled corresponding order becomes available,
they will immediately take the other side of that order. We need to specify the execution
priority in the situation where one side of the market has both market orders and limit orders
from informed traders. In this case it must be that the other side of the market is empty
(note that this never happens with a market maker present), otherwise the market orders
on the first side would have executed. In this situation, we prioritize by time. Procedure 2
illustrates the operation of a CDA market when a new buy order arrives (a sell order arrival
is similar).
CALL market operation The main difference from a standard aggregation mechanism in
our implementation involves the background traders. Background traders would like to buy
or sell at any price, so all the market orders are always at the top of both the sell orderbook
and the buy orderbook in the CALL market. All the market orders in each orderbook are
prioritized by submission time, with earlier submissions having higher priority. At each
clearing time, the market collates all of the orders and computes the aggregate demand
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ALGORITHM 2: CDA market operation when a new buy order arrives
Input: buy orderbook, sell orderbook
1: A new buy order OD1 arrives, (OD1.p) is the price of OD1
2: if not empty(sell orderbook) then
3: if OD1 is a limit order then
4: if (OD1.p) ≥ (ASK t.p) and ASK t comes earlier than any market order then
5: Execution(ASK t, OD1) at (ASK t.p)
(in which case, OD1 is the highest bid and sell orderbook has limit orders from IF
traders or BMM )
6: else
7: if sell orderbook contains market orders then
8: Execution(the oldest market ask, OD1) at (BID t.p)
(in which case, OD1 is the highest bid)
9: end if
10: end if
11: else {OD1 is a market order}
12: if ASK t is available and comes earlier than any market order then
13: Execution(ASK t, OD1) at (ASK t.p)
14: else
15: Execution(the oldest market ask, OD1) at the most recent execution price
16: end if
17: end if
18: end if
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and supply functions of all bids and asks, respectively. The market clears where supply
equals demand, with all executions occurring at the same price, the market-clearing price.
If the market only clears market orders, the market-clearing price is the most recent market
announcement. If only market orders clear on one side of the market, while some limit orders
clear on the other side, the market-clearing price is determined by the side that has limit
orders being cleared. More specifically, if cleared buy orders consist of only market orders
and cleared sell orders include limit orders, the clearing price will be the highest ask of all
the cleared limit orders; if cleared sell orders consist of only market orders and cleared buy
orders include limit orders, the clearing price will be the lowest bid of all the cleared limit
orders. When some limit orders clear on both sides of the market, the clearing price is the
midpoint of the highest ask and lowest bid of all cleared limit orders.
7.2 Competing markets
In the competing markets model, we assume that one CDA market and one CALL market
run simultaneously. A single security is traded in both markets. Thus, there is only one
underlying “true value” process, but the CDA and CALL markets can price the security
differently. The traders choose to place orders in only one market at a time, although they
can switch markets each time they re-enter. Each market is running in the same manner as
when there is an individual market and each trader can maintain only one unit order in the
whole system.
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7.2.1 Agent strategies in competing markets
Informed traders’ strategy On what basis should a trader choose which market to place
an order in? One important factor is the distance between the trader’s belief and p∗t,market,
dmarketi,t = |wi,t − p∗t,market|, (7.1)
where market ∈ {CDA,CALL}. We call this the belief distance. Comparing dCDAi,t with
dCALLi,t , the informed trader IFi can choose one of two strategies. One is to place the order
in the market that has larger dmarketi,t , SLARGE, and the other is to place the order in the
market that has smaller dmarketi,t , SSMALL. The tradeoff here is that IFi gets lower probability
of execution but higher profit if she places the order in the market that has larger dmarketi,t .
We will discuss the effects of these two different strategies in Section 7.3. Strategy 1 shows
a summary of IFi’s strategy in the competing markets. After IFi decides in which market to
place the limit order, she follows Sindividual to decide the direction and price of the order in
the selected market.
ALGORITHM 2: Strategy 1 IFi’s strategy in the competing markets at time t
1: if following SLARGE then
2: dCDAi,t

>dCALLi,t ,
places an order at CDA market
following Sindividual
<dCALLi,t ,
places an order at CALL market
following Sindividual
3: else {following SSMALL}
4: dCDAi,t

<dCALLi,t ,
places an order at CDA market
following Sindividual
>dCALLi,t ,
places an order at CALL market
following Sindividual
5: end if
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Background traders’ strategy When a background trader enters the market to place or
replace a new order, she first compares the price in both markets. For instance, if she wants
to buy, she will compare ASK t and p
∗
t,CALL (if they are available), and select the market
which has the lower price to place a market order there. If ASK t is not available, that is
the sell orderbook in the CDA market shows as empty, she will place the order in the CALL
market. She follows a similar process for sell orders.
After every market clearing in the CALL market, the background traders check whether their
orders have been executed. If not, and the corresponding order books in the CDA market
are not empty, that is the sell orderbook is not empty if a BG trader wants to buy and the
buy orderbook is not empty if a BG trader wants to sell (here empty means the order books
do not have orders from informed traders – market orders from background traders are not
visible to any trader), the background traders move their existing orders from the CALL
market to the CDA market. In the implementation, the background traders with orders
that did not execute are randomly permuted. Each of them moves their order to the CDA
market in this random order, until there are no corresponding limit orders on the other side
of the market in the CDA. This process is atomic in time.
Strategy 2 shows the overall framework for implementing buy orders for background traders
in the competing markets model. The sell strategies are similar.
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ALGORITHM 2: Strategy 2 The overall framework for implementing the buy orders for back-
ground (BG) traders in the competing markets model
1: t = 0
2: while t ≤ T do
3: An event happens after ∆t
4: t = t+ ∆t
5: if A BG trader arrives in the market then
6: BGi is selected from all BG traders uniformly at random
7: if ASK t is available then
8: if ASK t ¡= p
∗
t,CALL then
9: BGi places a market order in CDA market
10: else
11: BGi places a market order in CALL market
12: end if
13: else {sell orderbook in CDA market shows as empty}
14: BGi places a market order in CALL market
15: end if
16: end if
17: if CALL market clear then
18: After each market clearing
19: A = {All the BG traders who have buy orders in CALL market}
20: while A is not empty and ASK t is available do
21: Select BGi uniformly at random from A
22: A = A− {BGi}
23: BGi moves her order to the buy orderbook in CDA market, the new order age is
re-generated from the age counter.
24: CDA market clears
25: end while
26: end if
27: end while
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7.3 Simulation results
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Figure 7.1: Comparison of expected per-order (left) and total (right) profit in the competing markets
under the small distance (SSMALL) and large distance strategies (SLARGE). LL-*, HL-* and BG-*
represent low latency, high latency, and background traders respectively. On the left, the first bar
in each group shows the expected per-order profit in the whole competing system, while the second
and third show the contributions of the CDA and CALL markets to that total. On the right, the
stacked bars show total profit, with contributions from each of CDA and CALL shown within in
different shades.
In this section, we simulate four different environments, namely CDA vs CALL competing
markets (competing markets), an individual CDA market (i-CDA market), an individual
CALL market (i-CALL market) and an individual CDA market with BMM (i-CDA-BMM
market). The parameters are set as follows. Each simulation run lasts T = 100, 000 units of
time. The initial true value of the security v0 is drawn from N (vinitial = 50, σinitial = 4). The
true value jump parameter σj = 4.0 and the rate parameter for the jump is λjump = 0.0001,
which means there is a jump every 10000 units of time on average. We have 20 informed
traders, 10 high latency traders and 10 low latency traders, and 20 background traders.
Reentry rates are fixed across the environments, with informed traders arriving in the market
at rate λIF = 2, and background traders entering at rate λBG = 1. In all settings, CALL
markets clear every 1 unit of time, τ = 1. The standard deviation of informed traders’ belief
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is σtrader = 2.0, and the high latency traders’ information delay is δ = 1000 units of time.
The time between jumps is 10000 units of time on average, so high latency traders have
information with no delay a significant fraction of the time, as vt−δ = vt. Following a jump,
high latency traders receive staler information for the next 1000 units of time. The standard
deviation of the distribution from which informed traders draw ZI prices is σprice = 4.0. We
simulate both SLARGE and SSMALL strategies for informed traders.
Across our experiments, we are interested in the total profit, expected per-order profit and
order execution percentage for each trader type. At time T , all shares held by traders are
liquidated at price vT . Unfilled orders are abandoned. The expected per-order profit of each
trader type is total profit divided by the total number of executed and replaced un-traded
orders. In the environment with competing markets, we also calculate the total and expected
per-order profit in CDA market and CALL market separately.
Figure 7.1 shows that the informed traders make higher profit in both per-order and in
total when using SLARGE. The difference are small but statistically significant. Therefore,
we would expect the informed traders to choose SLARGE if given these two options (if they
had to choose one as a group), confirming our intuition that traders gravitate to markets in
which they perceive more mispricing. Because of this, for the rest of our analysis, we use
SLARGE as the strategy for informed traders in the competing markets.
As mentioned in the introduction, one measure of social welfare is the “price of imme-
diacy” which is the loss suffered by background traders. Figure 7.2 shows that, for the
non-competing settings, background traders perform better in the i-CALL market than the
i-CDA market in terms of both the expected per-order (left figure) and total (right figure)
profit (consequently, informed traders have lower profit in the i-CALL market than the i-
CDA market). The i-CDA-BMM market has much higher social welfare, as measured by
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Figure 7.2: The expected per-order (left) and total profit (right) of different types of traders in
the competing markets (*-large), the i-CDA market (*-i-cda), the i-CALL market (*-i-call) and the
i-CDA-BMM market (*-i-cda-bmm).
background trader losses, than both i-CALL and i-CDA markets. This confirms some of
the results of Wah and Wellman [144] in a completely different model and setting. One
possible solution to the problems resulting from HFT may then be to have market-making
agents who are regulated and deployed to perform this specific role in CDAs. They could be
compensated separately for this role. However, (1) there are additional risks associated with
this role [36] and (2) markets have been moving away from having designated specialists
and allowing HFTs and others to fulfil the role of market-makers. Given these practical
realities, it is important to understand how markets can function without them, so we focus
on comparing situations with no market maker.
In the competing markets (first 3 panels of Figure 7.2), we analyze the expected per-order and
total profit in the whole system, and also in the CDA market and CALL market separately.
Similar to running an individual market, the order execution percentage is close to 100
for background traders in the competing markets (shown in Figure 7.3), and so background
traders are not losing out in terms of order execution. Considering expected per-order profit,
background traders do better in the CALL market than the CDA market in the competing
markets (see left figure of Figure 7.2, *-large). Overall, they are doing worse in the CALL
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Figure 7.3: Order execution percentage in the competing markets (*-large), the i-CDA market
(*-i-cda), the i-CALL market (*-i-call) and the i-CDA-BMM (*-i-wmm).
market than the CDA market in the competing system (shown on the right of Figure 7.2,
*-large), but this is because a vast majority of orders are going to the CALL market (see
Figure 7.4), and they lose more money there. In sum, they are doing slightly better in the
competing markets than they do in the i-CDA market in terms of both the expected per-
order and total profit. The better news is that the CALL is absorbing a large fraction of
the orders, driving trade away from the CDA (see Figure 7.4). This is promising, because
if the CALL could absorb all the trades, the BG traders would be better off, as the system
would reduce to the i-CALL market. We note that these results are robust for a wide range
of strategy parameters, information delay and arrival rates.
7.4 Learning traders
The analysis above shows that frequent call markets absorb a large fraction of trade when we
assume that all informed traders use the same strategy. We now use the insights developed
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Figure 7.4: Illustration of proportion of orders entering CDA market vs. CALL market in the
competing markets under SLARGE.
in these models to analyze strategic market choice. In this section, we introduce a learning
framework where informed traders learn a parametric form for the expected profit of choosing
to place an order in a market, and also a non-parametric probability of order execution given
the distance between that market’s price and the trader’s belief (the belief distance defined
previously). We then analyze the behavior of the system with these learning traders.
7.4.1 Learning algorithm
The expected profit pit of an order placed at time t, contingent on its execution, according
to a trader’s belief, is
pit =

wt − execution price, if buy
execution price − wt, if sell
(7.2)
where wt is the trader’s belief about the true value at time t. The trader computes expected
profit assuming her belief is correct. The main idea here is to predict the expected profit
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if the order is placed in a particular market. Traders must learn an estimate of this as a
function of the belief distance. In this chapter, we allow all the traders to learn an expected
profit function that is quadratic in the belief distance. Each learning trader LIFi uses an
online regression algorithm for reinforcement learning based on one developed by Walsh et
al [145]. The form of the learning model is:
ymarketi,t = D
market
i,t Q
market
i , (7.3)
where ymarketi,t predicts the expected per-order profit contingent on execution, market =
{CDA,CALL},Dmarketi,t = [(dmarketi,t )2, dmarketi,t , 1] and Qmarketi contains the weight parameters
of the model for market = {CDA,CALL}. Thus, the predicted expected per-order profit not
contingent on execution is given by
E(ymarketi,t ) = Pr(exe—dmarketi,t )Dmarketi,t Qmarketi (7.4)
The probability of execution Pr(exe—dmarketi,t ) is learned non-parametrically by counting suc-
cessful and unsuccessful executions in bins of the belief distance.
The trader uses an -greedy algorithm to select a market to trade in along the learning path.
Whenever the trader makes a decision, with probability 1 − , she places an order in the
market with higher predicted expected profit, and with probability , she randomly picks one
market to place the order ( = 0.1 in our case). After market selection, the trader chooses a
price based on the ZI strategy Sindividual.
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Figure 7.5: Five example plots of the curves traders learn for profits in the CDA and CALL markets.
Each graph shows the learned curves of 5 traders in one instantiated learning simulation.
7.4.2 Results
Our goal is to use this model of learning traders to investigate two questions: (1) If all
the informed traders use the same learning algorithm, do they converge to (approximate)
equilibrium strategies? (2) Can we characterize any equilibria of the competing markets
system?18 We use an experimental framework similar to Section 7.3. A CALL market and
a CDA market run simultaneously from [0, T ], T = 100, 000. The CALL interval τ = 1.
There are 20 learning informed traders (LIF). These are all low latency traders who observe
information with no delay; therefore wi,t ∼ N (vt, σtrader), where vt is the underlying true value
of the security at time t, and σtrader is the noise parameter. The reentry rate of learning
informed traders is λLIF = 2. There are 20 background traders (with reentry rate λBG = 1)
following Strategy 2. In addition, we also simulate the existence of a pool of fixed informed
traders (FIF) who are committed to a particular market, either CDA or CALL. This is
to ensure that there is some flow of trade in each market – otherwise there are degenerate
equilibrium paths where all traders start off by going to one of the markets, and there is
never incentive to deviate to the other. There are 5 fixed (low-latency) informed traders in
18Note that traders only choose which market to place an order in (albeit as a function of the belief
distances to both markets, so this can be a complex decision space). Once the market is determined, the
choice of price is according to the ZI strategy. The problem becomes exponentially more complex if traders
can strategize over both market choice and price. Over time, traders should learn the expected profit of the
ZI strategy in a market, a useful proxy for the profit potential of that market. It could be interesting to
interact this learning problem with different pricing strategies, but some restriction will always be necessary
to gain any traction.
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each market who place orders following Sindividual. The reentry rate of fixed informed traders
is defined as λFIF. We vary the reentry rate of fixed informed traders λFIF = {1, 0.1, 0.0005}.
Outcomes of the learning process The first question is whether the learning process
followed by the informed traders converges, and, if so, whether the learned representations are
a good approximation to the true profit function. Empirically, we find that the estimates of
QCDAi ,Q
CALL
i under different λFIF settings all do converge. Further, each trader’s parameters
converge to very similar ranges (see Figure 7.5). We check whether these parameters are a
good approximation by fixing the parameters of all the traders except one and having them
play strategies using those parameters. For the remaining trader, we flip a coin to determine
the choice of market, and test whether the profit achieved is well-fit by the curve given by
the learned parameters. Figure 7.6 shows that the learning curves of the trader for each
market are very close to the polynomial curves that are best-fit to the profits achieved using
the randomized strategy, confirming both that the quadratic space is a good fit and that the
learned parameters are correct for the environment.
Equilibrium As mentioned above, there are two main questions we would like to engage.
First, since all the traders are converging to a particular set of learned parameters, do these
parameters constitute an equilibrium or an approximate equilibrium (under the specified
space of strategies – i.e., where the strategy is a mapping from dCALL and dCDA to one of the
two markets, which can be specified by the quadratic form of the expected profit function
and the nonparametric probability of execution model)? Is there a profitable deviation (some
other set of parameters that one of the traders could use and increase her profits)?
154
Belief distance
0 5 10 15 20
Pr
of
it
0
5
10
15
20
25
CDA-bin-data
CDA-fit
CDA-learn
CALL-bin-data
CALL-fit
CALL-learn
Figure 7.6: The learned curve vs. the best fit to realized after-the-fact data for profit as a function
of belief distance in CDA and CALL markets.
To find deviations, we search the parameter space (holding the execution probability model
constant) for this trader using Bayesian Optimization (BO), a powerful framework for opti-
mization of a black-box function or expensive objective function that uses very few function
evaluations [130]. Here, the objective function is the expected profit of a trading strategy
that uses the parameters QCDAi ,Q
CALL
i when the other traders are using their learned strate-
gies. Market selection is determined by yCDAi,t and y
CALL
i,t based on Equation (7.4), so the
actual values of QCDAi and Q
CALL
i are not important in themselves. The important thing is
how they decide the relation between yCDAi,t and y
CALL
i,t at each prediction. Therefore, based
on the value of parameters of the learned curves from Figure 7.5, we constrain our search
space from [−10,10], as this is enough to represent the relation between predicted profit in
these two markets. We utilize an existing code base for BO [60] to search the space.
Our results show that the learned parameters yield an approximate equilibrium, achieving
between 90-95% (0.91, 0.95, 0.95 for λFIF = .0005, 0.1, 1 respectively) of the profit of the best
response strategy found by BO. In the learned approximate equilibrium, typically above 90%
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of orders are placed in the CALL market. Interestingly, the best response strategy found by
BO always resulted in the deviating trader placing every single order in the call market. So
we then asked whether all informed traders placing all their orders in the call market is an
equilibrium, and found that, except under exceptional conditions, it is (that is, BO returned
a set of parameters for the remaining trader that resulted in that trader placing all its orders
in the CALL market as well). The only condition which we found under which it is not an
equilibrium is when there is very little liquidity from FIF traders in the CDA market, but
still some background traders – in this case the deviating informed trader can essentially
become a price setter and trade with the background traders at whatever prices it chooses.
7.5 Conclusion
We have developed an agent-based model in the tradition of classic microstructure models
to engage the question of whether frequent call markets can drive liquidity away from CDA
markets. If they could do so, this would have the potential to increase welfare both by
reducing transaction costs for average market participants and by reducing the incentive for
firms to engage in the latency “arms race.” Our results are promising. Even in the presence
of impatient background traders who primarily demand immediacy and are willing to pay
for it, we show in both a simple zero-intelligence model, and more sophisticated learning and
equilibrium settings, that call markets have the potential to attract a large fraction of the
order flow. In addition to the policy implications, we believe the modeling approach taken
in this chapter constitutes a useful bridge between classic financial microstructure models
and more complex agent-based models, preserving intuition from the former, while allowing
us to examine richer environments and questions.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
This thesis addresses the design, analysis, and modeling of mechanisms and information
structures for real-world applications. We provide new and richer models for understanding
static and dynamic markets across different domains, including kidney exchange and financial
markets. We address the outcome of single platforms, as well as fill in gaps in the study
of the dynamics of multiple platform interactions. Within static markets, we show how
the information structure and environment influence the outcomes of matching markets and
auction markets. Because mechanisms are harder to change than the information available
to participants, understanding the effect of information structure becomes valuable. For
dynamic markets, we first provide baselines of different market-clearing rules on market
outcomes. Our main contribution in this part is modeling the dynamics of multiple platform
competition, which is understudied in most of the domains. We focus on social welfare,
as well as the equilibrium behaviors of both individuals and markets in competing-market
systems. Through these efforts, we can make better-grounded policy recommendations for
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both kidney exchange and financial markets, and help better inform the debates in both
areas.
8.2 Future Work
While we provide suggestions for future work within its domain in each chapter, here I
provide a broader picture of the overall thesis, especially with regard to dynamic matching
markets.
8.2.1 Static Markets
For information design in static markets, we investigated the role of information on aggregate
and distributional outcomes, and also designed revenue enhancement signal structures. In
this thesis, we look at stylized models for both matching markets and auction markets. One
direction is to consider a richer and more complex model. For example, in matching markets,
we study the situation where there is a universally shared, common knowledge ranking of all
firms, and there is a “true” universally shared ranking of all candidates. A natural extension
is to examine situations with more diverse preferences, and where interviews are costly but
not necessarily budgeted (allowing employers to decide strategically how many candidates
to interview). In auction markets, we consider the second-price auction with one seller
and two bidders. This model can be extended to the auction with more bidders, though the
complexity for determining the equilibrium strategies and revenue-enhancing signal structure
will be dramatically increased. Another direction is to investigate what happens when the
market outcome is not decided in a centralized manner (using the Gale-Shapley algorithm
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as above, or in a second-price auction, for example), but must instead take place through
explicit offers and acceptances.
8.2.2 Dynamic Markets
In dynamic markets, we mainly focus on the dynamics of multiple markets’ interaction.
On this front, there are several more issues can be further studied. One is to consider more
complex models which would make these models more applicable to many real-world settings.
For example, in dynamic kidney exchange problem, the future work can take network effects
(where more popular exchanges have an easier time attracting agents, lower operating costs,
higher probabilities of two agents forming an acceptable transaction, and other advantages)
into account. Besides, we look at only two overlapping markets for both kidney exchange
and financial markets; generalizing this to any number of overlapping markets would also be
of interest.
Chapter 6 provides a cardinal utility model. Another important line to study is how to use
this cardinal utility model is to further improve outcomes in kidney exchange in the dynamic
setting. For example, we have done related work which develops a matching algorithm for
kidney exchange with compatible pairs. The algorithm utilizes the estimation of “shadow
survival” (as opposed to the more common shadow prices) by the cardinal utility model and
is mainly based on the online primal-dual technique. A future interesting direction is to
incorporate the waiting time in this kind of utility model. Here, future work can analyze the
relationship between match quality and waiting time to assess whether there is a significant
change in the expected quality of a match as a function of waiting time; and can also predict
the relationship between waiting time and match quality. The transplant center’s utility can
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also be taken into account: the costs of performing local vs. non-local transplants, entering
pairs into kidney exchanges, actual procedure costs (which can vary based on donor and
recipient characteristics), and insurance reimbursements.
A richer strategy space can also be considered. For example, in competing financial markets,
we consider the learning strategies only in quadratic space. One way to release this constraint
is to consider non-parametric strategies using Gaussian process. In dynamic matching mar-
kets, we simplify the strategy by types (short-lived and long-lived), where it is interesting to
study the relation between agent strategies and their criticality.
160
Appendix A
Additional Experiments For
Competing Dynamic Matching
Markets
In this part, we provide additional results supporting the dynamic kidney exchange experi-
ments of Section 4.5.2. Figure A.1 corresponds to the 2-cycle-only experiments of Figures 4.4
and 4.5 in the body of the Chapter 4; instead of varying the market overlap parameter γ
on the x-axis, they vary the probability α of entering either the Greedyc or Patientc market,
while holding γ constant for a variety of values. Similarly, Figure A.2 corresponds to the
2- and 3-cycle Uniform matching policy experiments of Figures 4.6 and 4.7. Finally, Fig-
ure A.3 corresponds to the Uniform3 matching policy results shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9.
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Figure A.1: 2-cycles-only experiments, paired with Figure 4.4 (left) and Figure 4.5 (right).
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Figure A.2: 2- and 3-cycle Uniform experiments, paired with Figure 4.6 (left) and Figure 4.7
(right).
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Appendix B
Simulator Details
This part provides the details of the simulator in Section 6.3. Our basic simulation model is
based on the distribution of all relevant recipient and donor characteristics from the data of
the center. The characteristics of each donor-recipient pair are generated from the distribu-
tion of the center’s data (See Table 6.1). We determine compatibility based on the simulator
from Saidman et al [127], which utilizes PRA and ABO compatibility. More specifically,
we first generate a donor-recipient pair, with all LKDPI-related characteristics generated se-
quentially in a manner that respects the data distributions in Table 6.1 and the correlation
structure shown in Figure 6.2. We then generate the PRA (percentage reactive antibodies)
and compatibility based on the Saidman model. The exact details of how we generate the
characteristics can be found in Algorithm 3.
Age(Years) Average Measured GFR (ML/min/1.73m2ˆ)
20-29 116
30-39 107
40-49 99
50-59 93
60-69 85
70+ 75
Table B.1: Average measured GFR by age in people.
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ALGORITHM 3: Details of Generating Living Donor Pair
Input: Pair ID
Output: A living donor pair
Sample following characteristics based on the distribution of Table 6.1:
Donor Age ∼ N (48.22, 12.68) ;
Donor Sex: P (F ) = 0.7, P (M) = 0.3;
Rec Sex: P (F ) = 0.35, P (M) = 0.65;
Donor eGFR: Table-B.1 based on Donor Age;
Donor SBP Table-B.1 based on Donor eGFR;
Donor Weight: Sample based on Donor Sex;
Rec Weight: Sample based on Recipient Sex;
Donor BMI: 0.0948 (Donor Weight) + 11.387;
Donor/Rec Weight Ratio: Donor Weight/Rec Weight;
Donor Blood Type: Based on Saidman’s simulator ;
Recipient Blood Type: Based on Saidman’s simulator ;
Donor is African American: Based on Donor Blood Type ;
Donor cigarette use: P (Y ) = 0.32, P (N) = 0.68 ;
Donor&Rec Related: Based on Table 6.1;
Check Donor&Rec ABO compatibility;
Donor&Rec HLA-B mismatches and Donor&Rec HLA-DR mismatches: Jointly sample from
Table 6.1 based on whether the pair is related or not;
Donor&Rec isWifePatient: Based on Saidman’s simulator; if the recipient is female and the
donor-recipient pair is unrelated, the probability that the donor is the recipient’s spouse is 0.4897;
Recipient PRA: Based on Saidman’s simulator;
Generate crossmatch incompatibility: Based on PRA and isWifePatient;
Determine compatibility: The pair is compatible if and only if both ABO compatible and a
negative crossmatch.
To note, in this simulator, (1) the estimated GFR (line 5) is generated from Table B.1
which depends on age instead of using the distribution from Table 6.119; (2) The BMI (line
9) is generated based on a regression on data from the transplant center; (3) When we
consider a counterfactual pair, we always assume they are unrelated. (4) HLA-B and HLA-
DR mismatches of a donor-recipient pair are generated based on whether the donor and
recipient are related or not. When we need to decide the HLA-B and HLA-DR mismatches
of a counterfactual pair, we use the distribution from the counterfactual matrix instead of
the distribution from the original dataset.
19See https://www.kidney.org/sites/default/files/docs/12-10-4004 abe faqs aboutgfrrev1b singleb.pdf.
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Appendix C
Varying the Size of the Incompatible
Pair Pool
This appendix provides more experimental results corresponding to Section 6.3.2. While
the rate of entry of compatible and incompatible pairs may be similar, it is possible that
one or the other population is less likely to go through with a transplant. This could result
in different ratios between the sizes of the two pools. In order to study how our results
would vary with different assumptions about this, we hold the number of compatible pairs
fixed and vary the number of incompatible pairs. Both compatible and incompatible pairs
are randomly generated using the population characteristics from Table 6.1 and following
Algorithm 3, where the compatibility is decided by Saidman’s simulator. The number of
compatible pairs we consider are 50, 100, and 200, while the number of incompatible pairs
ranges from 10 to 200.
The performance of incompatible pairs – The number of matched pairs. For in-
compatible pairs, we are primarily interested in the increase in the number of matches when
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Figure C.1: (a) Expected number of matched incompatible pairs under maximizing expected
graft survival (solid lines) and expected number of matched recipients (dash lines) when holding
the number of compatible pairs (CS) as 50, 100, 200; (b) Expected graft survival of incompatible
recipients under maximizing expected graft survival (solid lines) and expected number of matched
recipients (dash lines) when holding the number of compatible pairs (CS) as 50, 100, 200 and
varying the size of incompatible pairs from 10 to 210. Each point in the graph is an average of 500
simulations.
compatible pairs join the pool. Figure C.1a shows the expected number of matched incom-
patible pairs/recipients when maximizing expected graft survival of all cycles (*-MaxSur) and
maximizing the number of matched pairs (we = 1, *-MaxNum). For both objective functions,
the optimal matching will match all the pairs (I/CI-O-MaxSur/MaxNum). In two-&three-
cycle swap, both objective functions achieve similar performance (though *-MaxNum are
slightly better then *-MaxSur). When the market is thick enough (compatible size is 200,
CS=200), the number of matched incompatible pairs is very close to the optimal solution. In
general, for two-&three-cycle swap, the pool with compatible pairs (CI-*) matches far more
incompatible recipients then only running two-&three-cycle swap within the incompatible
pairs (I-*).
–Expected graft survival. We now investigate how expected graft survival of incompatible
pairs changes when compatible pairs join the pool. The results of comparing *-MaxSur and
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*-MaxNum can be found in Figure C.1b. Overall, *-MaxSur (solid lines) has longer expected
graft survival than *-MaxNum (dash lines) as we expect. When compatible pairs participate,
expected graft survival of incompatible pairs is lower than when running two-&three-cycle
swap within incompatible pairs (I-*). Another interesting observation is that the expected
graft survival of incompatible recipients decreases as the number of compatible pairs increases
for both *-MaxSur and *-MaxNum.
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Figure C.2: two-&three-cycle swap : Expected graft survival of compatible recipients under max-
imizing expected graft survival (solid lines) and expected number of matched recipients (dash lines)
when holding the number of compatible pairs (CS) as 50, 100, 200 and varying the size of incom-
patible pairs from 10 to 210.
The performance of compatible pairs – Expected graft survival. Under the Pareto
improvement restriction, the compatible pairs are guaranteed to match with their original
donor at least and they only swap if they can find a better organ for both the Optimal and
two-&three-cycle swap. From Figure C.2a we can see that for both objective functions
(MaxSur and MaxNum), compatible pairs have a substantially longer graft survival for
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participating two-&three-cycle swap (CI-*) than if matched with their original donor (C-
or). The size of the compatible pool does not have major influence on the performance. It
is also obvious that the compatible pairs benefit more when the market clearing algorithm
maximizes the expected graft survival rather than the number of matched pairs. The number
of incompatible pairs who are not matched when maximizing graft survival, but who would
have been matched when maximizing the number of matches, is shown in Figure C.2b.
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